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The overarching concern of this thesis is discovering what it is that autism does to gender. This thesis 
argues that autism has come to constitute a form of gender trouble. Thus, the central question is how 
people assigned female at birth who have been formally diagnosed with autism as adults understand 
their gendered identity pre and post diagnosis. This thesis ascertains whether the diagnosis of autism 
holds any significance in how autistic individuals understand, think about and produce their gender. 
This thesis is interested in how an autistic identity is negotiated and how an autistic subjectivity 
emerges. It takes as its central proposition that autism is a masculinised diagnostic category and one 
which is produced and knowable through a masculinised discourse. Furthermore, autism is categorised 
as a neurodevelopmental disorder, thus, it becomes attached to the self or the ‘I’ of the person 
diagnosed through contemporary understandings of neurology and the self. This thesis determines if 
the gender trouble that is seemingly bound to autism plays out in the identity formation of those 
diagnosed and whether the diagnosis has any bearing on how they understand their gendered identity. 
Eight people assigned female at birth who reside in the United Kingdom and who have been diagnosed 
as autistic by services in the National Health Service at eighteen years old or over have been 
interviewed for this thesis.  
 
The purpose of speaking with this particular group of individuals is to understand whether autism 
becomes a lens through which identity is constructed and whether this identity becomes framed by, 
or is resistant to, the gendered discourses which produce autism. And, indeed, whether these 
discourses which are so commented upon in the academic literature and popular discourse alike 
actually have any bearing on how individuals come to understand themselves as autistic subjects. Thus, 
this mode of investigation pays specific attention to how one becomes autistic; which resources and 
knowledges are drawn upon to understand the self and whether these are used to create an 




AFAB- Assigned female at birth 
AMAB- Assigned male at birth 
ASC- Autism spectrum condition  
ASD- Autism spectrum disorder 
BPD- Borderline personality disorder  
DSM- Diagnostic Statistical Manual  























1.1 Research objectives 
In this thesis I ask: what does autism do to gender? Much of the preceding work examining the 
connections between autism and gender has asked: ‘what does gender do to autism’. This latter 
question has in mind the overrepresentation of boys and men with autism, the presumed 
predisposition of autistic people to enjoy ‘masculinised’ pursuits such as maths and science over more 
‘feminised’ interests, and the perceived autistic lack of sociality and appropriate empathic responses 
which are positioned as being on a spectrum with normative male skills and deficits. This observed 
phenomena of a connection between maleness and autism has been an entry point for understanding 
what autism is, where it can be found in the brain and what causes the condition (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 
2010, 2018, Cahill, 2017). By asking the question from another direction I am positioning autism as less 
an ontological category which is biologically bound to gender but as a discursive construction which is 
understood and produced through normative gender assumptions. As such, this thesis explores what 
happens to gender when a person who was assigned female at birth (AFAB) receives a diagnosis in 
adulthood when autism is seemingly so closely tied to maleness and masculinity. This thesis will 
examine if- and how- the gendered discourses which ‘make up’ autism are interpreted, embodied and 
resisted by autistic AFAB individuals.  
 
Autism circles around gender on multiple levels: from disputes over the accuracy of the gender ratio 
in autism diagnosis, to the ways in which autism is culturally portrayed and, consequently, discursively 
known as masculine, to the recent research into the over representation of autistic people accessing 
gender clinics (Murray, 2008, Jack, 2011, Nobili, et al., 2018, Loomes, et al., 2017, Mandy, et al., 2017). 
In many ways, autism has come to constitute a form of gender trouble. Autism is considered to be a 
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neurodevelopmental condition and through this neurobiological understanding the possibility for 
finding some truth about the difference between the sexes has been explored. This has been discussed 
most explicitly through Simon Baron-Cohen’s (2002, 2010, 2018) ‘extreme male brain’ hypothesis. 
Baron-Cohen’s theory is perhaps the most well-known example of how normative gender ideals are 
mobilised as a complementary binary to hypothesise on autisms connection to gender. By positioning 
autism on an existing spectrum of essentialised gender categories from hyper feminine to hyper 
masculine Baron-Cohen is able to assert that autism functions as a ‘extreme maleness’.  Autism has 
been mobilised as a mirror for the normal for some time,  as a condition it holds a strange place and 
one that is distinct from other neurodevelopmental conditions as it has been positioned as having 
access to the limits and potentials of the human being (Goodley in Timimi et al., 2016, Hacking, 2009). 
I argue, as others have, that currently autism is being mobilised as somehow having access to what 
gender and sex difference is and, in this way, autism has become a ‘pathology of gender’ (Gillis-Buck 
and Richardson, 2016).  
 
That medical conditions are positioned as having access to the normal is nothing new, as Georges 
Canguilhem (2015) wrote in 1966: ‘The identity of the normal and the pathological is asserted as a gain 
in knowledge of the normal’ (p.43). Indeed, researchers have asked what is at stake for understandings 
of gender and our gendered regimes when autism is used as magnifying glass to better understand 
‘normal’ or rather, normative, sex and gender differences (Gillis-Buck and Richardson, 2014, Jack, 
2014, Jack, 2011). Where this thesis steps into this research is by thinking about these gendered 
understandings of autism as dominant discourses which function on the level of text but have material 
effects with regards to autistic people’s experiences. In doing so, I position a diagnosis of autism in 




As will be shown throughout this thesis, the various connections of autism to gender cannot be fully 
explored without interrogating what happens to the individuals who are diagnosed with this already 
gendered neurological condition. When I began this project, I assumed that the masculinised discursive 
construction of autism would enforce AFAB individuals to enact this version of autism in order to 
receive a diagnosis, or, to legitimise to themselves and to others that they were, indeed, autistic. 
Furthermore, I considered that the diagnosis would produce a certain gendered unsurety in the 
participants. Autistic narratives such as those by Yergeau (2018) and James (2017) discuss how an 
autism diagnosis leads one to consider their brain as the sole controlling force of all aspects of their 
behaviour, their desires, their hopes, their fears and so on. It is as though the autistic person were 
simply a brain in a jar secluded from outside influence, exempt from neural plasticity and not impacted 
by the social, ‘[…] reducing being, body, selfhood, rationality, intentionality, rhetoricity, and symbolism 
to the domain of spatialised brains’ (Yergeau, p.51). Consequently, I wondered how the gendered brain 
of autism would be related to after diagnosis by the participants; would it be as though a ‘male brain’ 
had been transplanted within them?  
 
What I found through my conversations with the participants of this study was far more nuanced and 
spoke to wider concerns than what certain autism scientists, popular discourses, and lay people say 
about autism and its connection to gender. Specifically, the interviews presented a view onto the 
gendered regimes which affect us all, but which become clearer and more intensely felt by those who 
already do not fit into the ableist parameters of normativity. They demonstrate how gendered 
normativity is inextricable from the ableist structuring of legible subjectivities, whereby those with 
neurological differences (or other disabilities) are always-already gender deviants. In this sense, 
neurological difference functions as a ‘neurological queerness’ as Yergeau (2018) suggests. 
Consequently, for several of the participants after years of attempting to ‘fit’ into these gendered 
parameters the diagnosis did not produce a sense of gendered unsurety but, rather, a sense of 
gendered emancipation. The diagnosis was a distinct moment when those who had struggled to enact 
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gender in a normative sense were able to make sense of why they had never quite succeeded at this 
and to begin to be gendered differently. Thus, what came to the fore in the interviews was a sense 
that the autism diagnosis functioned as a ‘coming out’ to be gendered otherwise; to queer gendered 
expectations with impunity with a diagnosis of autism legitimising this. For those who did not consider 
the diagnosis in this way it still enabled a consideration of gender, if only by becoming aware of the 
gendered discussions that circulate around autism.  
 
 This enabled this research to depart from causal- or circular- relationships between autism and gender 
(i.e. crudely speaking, is autism the result of prenatal androgens? Does autisms connection to maths 
and science prove this? Does this account for the gender disparity in diagnosis? Are AFAB individuals 
more masculinised as a result of being autistic?) and instead allowed for a position whereby gender 
and autism have a co-constituent, or emergent, relationship.  Importantly, whilst a certain ‘freedom’ 
from normative gendered modes of embodiment was anticipated or enacted by some of the 
participants through the diagnosis they were still beholden to their prior interpolations. Thus, this 
thesis highlights the temporal and relational aspects of ‘coming out’ as autistic. Or, to put it another 
way: it demonstrates the repetitive and reiterative nature of becoming autistic and of doing gender.  
 
I came to this area of research from both an academic and a professional route. I had just finished a 
Batchelor’s degree in Cultural Studies, and I had started working with young people who had recently 
left the care system. I was keen to keep my Cultural Studies way of thinking alive, so I was quietly 
analysing the bureaucratised system of care I now worked in, hoping I could put some of my University 
learnt skills to use. One of the young women I worked with received an autism diagnosis in place of a 
diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and after the autism diagnosis I saw how differently 
her behaviours and her vulnerability was viewed. She went from being viewed as troublesome and 
troubled to vulnerable, innocent and naïve. Though, of course, nothing about her behaviour and way 
of being had changed, the only difference was her BPD diagnosis became autism. At the time I had 
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vague knowledge of a connection between autism and masculinity, and of BPD and hysterical 
femininity (Appignanesi, 2008). However, this period during my employment really sparked an interest 
that would carry me through to the completion of this thesis. I wanted to know how the gendered 
formations of diagnoses interact with a person’s sense of selfhood. In particular, I wanted to find out 
whether a diagnosis gained in adulthood enforces a new understanding of the gendered self in relation 
to the discourses that frame the diagnosis.  
 
Consequently, as mentioned above, this thesis tentatively situates the diagnosis of autism as a 
discursive event in order to understand if, and how, a diagnosis in adulthood engenders a 
reconsideration of the gendered self through the new interpolation of autism. Thus, the approach of 
the analysis is one of becoming: what are the ways that one becomes autistic?  How are the social, 
cultural and political modes through which autism has a reality mobilised by autistic individuals after 
diagnosis?  This study is consequently an analysis of the gendered assemblages, that bring autisms 
reality into being and how these knowledges are enacted or resisted by those who are diagnosed. 
Taking into account the gendered regimes which affect us all, I argue that autism must be understood 
as constructed through these discourses. This makes the study of autism necessarily a feminist issue. 
Thus, this thesis will enter into a dialogue with feminist theory, critical disability studies and post 
structuralist social thought. 
 
To conduct this research, I recruited eight people who were assigned female at birth (AFAB). Each 
participant was diagnosed at eighteen or over with what would have been called Asperger’s Syndrome 
or high functioning autism prior to the shift to the umbrella diagnosis ‘autistic spectrum disorder’. Semi 
structured interviews were conducted which ascertained information about the person’s life course 
pre and post diagnosis. These were then analysed to determine how AFAB people experienced their 
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gendered embodiment pre diagnosis and whether the diagnosis had an effect on their understanding 
of their gendered identities.1  
 
The research questions which guide this project are as follows:  
 
1) Does the diagnostic category of autism act as a discursive event and a gendered technology of 
power for late diagnosed autistic people?  
2) How do autistic people assigned female at birth produce a sense of the autistic self through the 
existing discourses of autism?  
 
I argue that understanding how autistic individuals relate to the diagnosis of autism has not played a 
role in much, if any, autism research. The scant qualitative research of autistic people’s experience 
does not interrogate the diagnosis of autism and takes it as a pre discursive fact, whereby the diagnosis 
simply gives access to an authentic autistic self  (for examples of qualitative research see: Kanfiszer, et 
al., 2017, Kourti, et al., 2019, Webster and Garvis, 2017). As noted, much of the recent research into 
autism and gender has been conducted around the gender ratio in diagnosis which cites a higher rate 
of assigned male at birth individuals (AMAB) (Gould, 2017, Baron-Cohen, 2010).  This latter area of 
 
1 I have chosen to only include people who were assigned female at birth due to the time and length constraints of 
this thesis. I acknowledge that autisms gender trouble may also affect AMAB individuals and this will be followed up 
in my forthcoming Ph.D research at the University of Bergen, Norway. AFAB refers to the sex that the medical team 
gave to a baby shortly after birth. This sex categorisation goes on to becomes the way that gender sticks to, and 
shapes, the body. The sexing of the body comes to bear on how a person understands themselves, how others 
understand them and even shapes the biology of the body as Anne Fausto-Sterling has noted (2012). I find this a 
useful mode of thinking as it incites an immediate demand to rethink our conception of biological sex being 
correlative with the gendered formations which work through the categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’. This terminology 
was not something I was aware of prior to a symposium where I gave a paper about my research. I was advised by 
a fellow presenter that if it is important to know what sex/gender an individual has then AFAB and assigned male 
at birth (AMAB) are the preferable terms. This not only provides a conceptual interjection but this language sides 
with transgender and non-binary activism which seeks to remove the genitals as being the regulatory force which 
determines gender identification. Only one participant in this study doesn’t identify with the sex assigned to them at 
birth. I considered simply omitting their data because I didn’t want to erase their identity and position them as a 
woman. However, given their experiences of being read and interacted with as a girl in childhood I decided that their 
story was important to hear in the context of this research. Moreover, when I delved into my interviews it became 
less clear that the people that I interviewed had a strong connection to their sex and its correlation with their gender. 
Thus, using this terminology allows us to destabilise the notion of a ‘common sense’ biological determinism.  
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autism research positions sex/gender difference as an ontological fact of the individual and seeks to 
determine if sex/gender is the cause of higher rates of diagnosis in AMAB people.2  Consequently, this 
research asks the question; what does gender do to autism? As I have argued here, an important 
avenue of research that needs to be taken up is understanding how these gendered discourses of 
autism affect those who are diagnosed. This thesis is examining if autism functions as a diagnostic 
event and through this naming consequently makes intelligible a temporally and spatially shifting set 
of distinct bodily and psychological manifestations and effects. Therefore, concepts and names, and 
how people come to construct their selfhood through these categories, are integral to the thesis. As 
such, it is now important to provide an exegesis of the language which will be used going forward in 
this thesis.   
 
1.2 Terminology  
 
When we claim to have been injured by language, what kind of claim do we make? We ascribe an 
agency to language, a power to injure, and position ourselves as the objects of its injurious 
trajectory. We claim that language acts, and acts against us, and the claim we make is a further 
instance of language, one which seeks to arrest the force of the prior instance. 
 (Butler, 1997, p,1) 
 
Autism and gender, and the language used to describe and produce them as distinct categories are 
highly contested ground. As with other categories through which we come to know the other and 
ourselves, autism, gender and their effects are often produced and sustained at the level of language. 
As Dan Goodley and Katherine Runswick-Cole (2014) discuss in relation to disability, it would be 
preferable that we would not have to use labels such as ‘intellectual disability’, ‘autistic’ and the high 
 
2 I follow Anne Fausto-Sterling (2012) in the use the term sex/gender here. Sex/gender allows us to articulate 
the entanglement of the social production of sex and gender as they work on and through the biological body.  
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and low functioning categories that go along with them. However, these words, and the categories 
they sustain, have to be acknowledged both on a philosophical, and, an (inter) personal level.  
 
As Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2014) state, for the people whom they reference these labels can 
function as both ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ (p.1). Inclusion can take the form of being granted access 
to a specific group of people where pride and resistance are key, such as LGBT groups or neurodiversity 
groups. Exclusion can mean that by inclusion in a specific community one is not considered a member 
of a majority group and is therefore not worthy of the same legal rights and protection. This exclusion 
can act on the level of symbolic violence, whereby one isn’t endowed with the symbolic privilege to 
construct representations of themselves. Of course, exclusions can occur with inclusionary groups or 
politics; such as the exclusion of bisexuality from sexuality discourses, or the exclusion of individuals 
with so called ‘low functioning’ autism from academic research (Osteen, 2007).  
 
I am fully of the belief that autism has a reality. There is ‘something/s’ present in certain neurobiologies 
that partially produces the traits and difficulties correspondent with autism.3  As a researcher who is 
not medically educated it matters less to me that we find ‘proof’ of autism than that we treat people 
with dignity, respect and afford them the right to a life full of the things we deem to be important, if 
not essential, for human life. Not only the essentials of bare life but the right to relationships, respect, 
desires, agency, safety and so on (Agamben, 1995, Kittay, 2009). It is here I believe language matters 
once again. 
 
Acknowledging autism has a reality and it is experienced by individuals in differing ways, the terms in 
which we discuss autism and to categorise it as a specifiable disability have a philosophical genealogy. 
 
3 I use the word ‘partially’ here to note that whilst certain ways of being can be attributed to a distinct neurobiological 
difference, the modes in which these come to be pathologised primarily occur through, and as part of, the regulation 
of social norms of human behaviour and conduct.  
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To be fully human is to abled bodied and cognitively able and consequently granted access to the 
privileges of being endowed with rationality, reason, worthy of life and a liveable life at that. To be 
deemed to be less than human, or non-human offers up the other side of the binary of ability/disability; 
lives that are not worthy of human rights, to a dignified existence or to full life (Braidotti, 2018). This 
is what is at stake. As such, it is necessary to subject  language, labels and categories to ‘close readings’ 
for the structures of power and possibilities which underpin them and, in turn, to understand how 
those categories come to highlight how bodies can be thought, what they can do and how they are 
politically constituted.  
 
As Butler (1997) suggests, language has the power to injure. This is clearly not a property inherent to 
language but historically contingent upon structural, institutional and (inter)personal usage. Butler 
does not mean this solely in the sense that language can injure in a symbolic sense (which of course it 
can) but that it has material effects. In the case of autism, and referring back to Goodley and Runswick- 
Cole’s (2014) notion of inclusion/exclusion, autistic can be used as a slur and, likewise,  the naming of 
autism as it pertains to a stigmatised state of being can cause violence to be inflicted on the body.4 
Conversely, the absence of language to categorise behaviours or motivations, can legitimise violence 
both by others and the self. In the case of autism; assigned female at birth individuals without a 
diagnosis are statistically more likely to have engaged in self harming or suicidal behaviours than their 
neurotypical counterparts (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011).  We could argue that this was because 
there was no language to describe their feelings and struggles with their otherness. Without a name 
for their difficulties and, consequently, with no support from educators, social services, and carers, 
difficulties were compounded and led to a tendency for the individual to blame themselves for their 
 
4  See the ongoing history of Applied Behavioural Analysis which utilises negative reinforcement behavioural 
techniques to change perceived maladaptive behaviours (Morris, 2013). Recently legal cases involving bleach 
enemas and injections administered by care givers to rid their child of autism have been given attention by the press 
(See: The Guardian, 2016, BBC, 2015).  
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perceived shortcomings. Indeed, this was a common articulation in the interviews for this project as 
will be discussed in the analysis chapters.  
 
Language, the words we use and their absence, has the power to transform subjects in both negative 
and positive ways. They can be mobilised to foreclose entrance to certain modes of being and they can 
be reclaimed as a strategy of resistance and agency. A key example is the reclamation of crip and queer 
(McRuer, 2006, Rand, 2013).5 Language, during processes of interpellation, is also what brings subjects 
into being. The well-known example which Butler cites is the proclamation ‘it’s a girl!’ or ‘it’s a boy!’ 
given at the birth of a child (Butler, 1990). This naming simultaneously opens and forecloses the 
formation of the child’s experience and subjectivity. Though differing in its outcomes when someone 
is diagnosed as autistic as an adult, the newly diagnosed adult has also emerged into a different mode 
of being by being interpolated into a state of neurological otherness or difference. As is the nature of 
interpolation, this is not a singular event but will occur in a variety of spatial and temporally distinct 
times across a life course. Additionally, timelines may be (re)considered retrospectively through this 
new lens of autism. Thus, we see language has the power to bring into being certain ontological 
categories, and it has the power to foreclose or delimit access to support and to ‘liveable lives’ (Butler, 
2004). Language, and the changes of, also opens a space where we can interrogate deeper questions 
around the ontologies and epistemologies of specific categories.  
 
The process of coming to the language that I use in this thesis was not a linear process. In a 
phenomenological sense I would position this as a coming to language (Ahmed, 2006). In every 
discussion I had with an autistic person, and every text, autobiography or medical report I read, I 
encountered different ways of naming or discussing autism and gender, and in every encounter I found 
 
5 The two terms of crip and queer have an interlinked epistemological development. The underlaying principles of 
them as necessarily disruptive to the historical meanings which dehumanised disabled and LGBT people have gone 
on to guide activist goals and become an identity for many (Rand, 2013). There is not only epistemological 
interlinkage in the terminology but also in the shared pathologised historical status of LGBT and disabled people, 
whereby queerness was synonymous with pathology (Yergeau, 2018).  
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that I orientated myself slightly differently. I moved away or towards certain words, phrases and 
terminology. In the ways that I dis-guarded, or took on, certain words or ways of naming, the meaning 
and the impact of the terms I used shifted slightly and informed the overall trajectory and aims of this 
thesis.6 Thus, the ways in which I name and describe the categories in this thesis has been done so 
under the premise that language is powerful and that the act of naming is not merely descriptive, it 
brings into being material effects at the same time as it makes transparent the production of meaning 
and materiality. These material effects may be the shaping of a research project in one direction or 
another, or they might be the difference between allowing someone the right to a full and dignified 
existence, or not doing so. In time it may come to be with hindsight and the shifting of meaning that 
the language I have used is no longer working in service of those whom I have written this thesis about 
and for. Consequently, it is perhaps only at the time of writing that I believe these terms are working 
with the participants of this project and those for whom the contents of this thesis directly affect.  
 
Autistic person or Person with Autism?  
I use the terms autistic person rather than person with autism as this is used most often within the 
neurodiversity movement’s disruptive and affirmative politics of difference (Houting, 2018). This 
position argues that a person is autistic, and autism forms their subjectivity. This enables autism to be 
viewed less of an encumbrance and something to be gotten rid of or cured but, rather, as forming the 
distinct subjectivity, individuality and ontology of the autistic person. Whilst I do have a resistance to 
certain identity categories being a stand in for true political group building, at present using autistic 
person overcomes the pathologising tones of person with autism. Pride and resistance may be more 
prevalent in the neurodiversity understanding of autism and being autistic (Yergeau, 2018).  
 
 
6 For example, I initially began this project by looking solely at autistic women. Over the course of the thesis I realised 
that a lot of autistic people do not experience themselves within binary terms such as woman and man. I opened 
my criteria to include those were assigned female at birth. This terminology is important as it allowed for those who 
identify as transgender, non-binary, or agender to take part in the study.  
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There are of course those who do not wish autism to be viewed in this way and they prefer to consider 
autism as separate from their sense of self or identity (Autistic Self Advocacy Network, 2019). As Kenny 
et al (2013) state there is ‘no single way of describing autism that is universally accepted and preferred 
by the U.K’s autism community […]’ (p.20). Many of those who would not agree with the ways I have 
decided to name autism may feel burdened by being autistic, they may not be able to work, find 
friendships and create family relationships (Clements, 2017). Taking on autism as an identity for these 
individuals is to be essentialised into a fatalistic state of abject otherness and it is without a sense of 
pride and political resistance to social norms. Moreover, an important issue lies within the varying 
support needs that those autism have. Whilst pride and community building may be an option for 
those who would have been diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, it may not be for those who require 
more support (Clements, 2017).  
 
Due to these discrepancies in how autistic people consider autism, I ascertained each individual’s 
preferred terminology in the interview. All of the participants stated they would prefer ‘autistic 
person’, with varying levels of importance attached to using this term. Furthermore, I found difficulty 
in demarcating autism into its higher or lower functioning categories without using this phrasing. 
Generally, autism is conceptualised as a ‘spectrum’ onto which high or low functioning labels are 
overlaid (Frith and Happe, 2005). I have engaged continuously with autistic people themselves and 
those affected by the issues in this thesis in order to determine which words bring about the least 
harm and which words are tied into residual historical narratives which dehumanise and discredit them 
(Stiker, 1999, p.3). For example, terms such as mental retardation and dumb have been pushed aside 
in favour of more specific conditions. Autism is one of these specific conditions that came to rename 
some of those classified as ‘mentally retarded’ (Eyal, 2013). Consequently, I utilised my networks on 
the social media site Twitter and started a discussion around what language to use instead of high and 
low functioning (see appendix iii). ‘Varying support needs’ was suggested by many as a way to discuss 
the temporal and relational nature of difficulties autistic people face. This way of communicating the 
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abilities and difficulties that are common to autism also brings into focus support as a human need 
and vulnerability as a political position (Beckett, 2006).   
 
High and low functioning are descriptions of how much assistance and support a person needs to 
function and to reach their goals. It is hard to move away from this language, but I agree with a study 
conducted by Kenny et al (2015) who suggested that this distinction can be damaging to all autistic 
people. For those deemed ‘low functioning’ it can have dehumanising properties and for those who 
are ‘high functioning’ it can erase a variety of support needs. Furthermore, high and low functioning 
labels rely upon a distinctly political measurement of what it means to adequately function or to 
function productively within a neoliberal capitalist regime (Goodley, 2014). It places the onus onto the 
individual as lacking in particular areas, or it denigrates or disavows those ‘high functioning people’ 
whose support needs become a personal weakness or a failure. It also presents ethical and 
philosophical questions around where the boundary lines between low and high functioning lie and 
demands we consider what consequences occur when a permanent place on the ‘spectrum’ is defined 
for an individual (Kittay, 2019).  Therefore, despite the difficulty of making this language ‘fit’ within the 
predetermined parameters of ‘good writing’, I will refer to this terminology by using the phrases higher 
support needs or lower support needs in relation to the particular people whom I speak about within 
this thesis where this is necessary. Support needs may change daily or may stay consistent for many 
years or a lifetime but by bringing into focus the temporal nature of support it will highlight the social 
structures and communal support which we all utilise and need.  
 
Support and vulnerability should not be denigrated nor denied, and, we should remember as Lennard 
Davies (1995) highlights, we are all only able bodied (and able minded) temporarily. Whilst we should 
all be aware of our existence as mutually dependent on one another we should not simply mobilise 
disability to clarify this point. Davis’ assertion is useful in thinking about the relationship between 
disability and ability and how these are constructed politically. Or, as Dan Goodley, we might think it 
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this continuous dialogue between disability and ability as dis/ability. Mobilising dis/ability enables us 
to both look for the boundaries of the human as she is structured within able bodied and gendered 
parameters and how power operates to sustain this. At the same time this allows for a critique of 
(linguistic or otherwise) practices which dehumanise disabled people. Thinking about dis/ability, as 




Autism Spectrum Condition/Autism 
Autism has been subject to many changes in nosology and correspondent name changes over the last 
century or so. The name autism was coined by Eugen Bleuler in 1911 to describe ‘a symptom of the 
most severe cases of schizophrenia’ (Evans, 2013) Autism from the Greek auto meaning self, with its 
etiological roots in autoeroticism, stemmed from a sexological and Freudian understanding of 
pathology (Evans, 2017). In 1943, Leo Kanner, working at John Hopkins University, produced an article 
in which he described a condition he termed ‘infantile autism’. This use of the word autism was distinct 
from Bleuler’s early usage of it. Kanner presented a case study of eleven young children in his care who 
he describes as being ‘[…] without the social instinct to orient towards other people, who were mostly 
focused or even obsessed with objects, and who had a “need for sameness” or a “resistance to 
(unexpected) change”’ (Kanner cited in Baron-Cohen, 2015, p.1329). Just one year later in Vienna, 
Austria, Hans Asperger wrote an article entitled ‘Autistic Psychopathy in Childhood’. This article 
documents almost identical findings of this newly named condition (Asperger in Frith, 1991, pp.37-92). 
Whilst Kanner’s diagnosis went on to be known across the Western world, Asperger’s documentation 
of the children in his hospital was forgotten for many years.7   
 
7 In his book Neurotribes Journalist Steve Silberman argues that despite the belief that the two conditions were 
named without prior contact between the two psychologists and their teams, it is likely that Kanner plagiarised 
Asperger’s work. This was possible because one of Asperger’s colleagues went on to work at John Hopkins 
University with Kanner prior to either paper being published (Silberman, 2015).  
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The rediscovery of Asperger’s young patients who were considered to be of average to high 
intelligence would lead the way for the introduction of Asperger’s syndrome to the diagnostic category 
in the mid 1990s. Enabling the re-emergence of Asperger’s findings was the 1981 publication by Lorna 
Wing who was then a child psychologist at the Institute of Psychology, London. An article entitled; 
‘Asperger’s Syndrome: A Clinical Account’ argued the case for including this new taxonomical definition 
within the wider category of childhood autism (Wing, 1981). In the early 1990s Asperger’s Syndrome 
was added to the International Classification of Diseases and the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM 
IV). Where Asperger’s and Kanner’s definition of autism diverged was in the levels of impact that the 
condition had on the lives of the children. Whilst many of Kanner’s patients needed daily assistance, 
Asperger’s patients were considered intelligent, curious, verbose and eccentric (Sheffer, 2018). 
Psychologist Uta Frith suggests that those with Asperger’s Syndrome ‘shade into eccentric normality’ 
(Frith, 1991, p.111).8  However, despite the traits of Asperger’s being found within the entire human 
population there must be a distinction from ‘normality’ in order for Asperger’s to be identified. Hans 
Asperger identified his condition as a ‘stable personality trait’ which affected ‘far more boys than girls’ 
(Wing, 1991, published online, no pagination).  
 
Lorna Wing’s (1981) article argued for the inclusion of Asperger’s syndrome within the broader 
category of autism. Wing (1981) discusses the differences between so called Kanner’s autism and 
 
8 Historian Edith Sheffer’s book Asperger’s Children: The Origins of Autism in Nazi Vienna discusses the 
classification of Asperger’s patients in Nazi occupied Austria and the emergence of the distinct syndrome. Sheffer 
argues that a historical approach is fundamental to understanding why Asperger’s Syndrome became a definable 
condition. Children, much like adults, in Nazi Germany were organised by virtue of their adherence to desirable 
traits. A particularly important trait demanded from citizens in this project of nationalism was ‘community spirit’. 
Roughly defined as an ability to create strong ties to others and thus to the collective state (Sheffer, p.19). 
Asperger’s patients would be corrected in order to fix their deficits in Gemüt (originally meaning soul) a term 
Asperger’s appropriated to capture the issues that these children had in respect to them playing a part in the new 
construction of the Nazi social order. These children were determined to have poor Gemüt and Asperger aimed to 
give them a rich and full Gemüt once again. A lack of full historical examination had led to Asperger being seen as 
a kind of saviour: a rebellious man who saved his patients from death or experimentation. As Sheffer notes, Asperger 
sent many children to their deaths, many of them girls and adolescents whose behaviour he did not see as part of 
autistic psychopathy but rather describing some of these girls as ‘hateful’, ‘vulgar’ and ‘rude’ (Sheffer, p.151). 
Asperger’s Syndrome thus arose from the rigid norms which guided Nazi occupied countries and unavoidably 
intersected with existing gendered ideals for girls and boys.  
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Asperger’s but nevertheless argues that the struggles that many face with the latter condition would 
benefit from the widening of the category of autism to include people who have less support needs on 
a daily basis. As Wing (1981) writes:   
 
[…]  is there any justification for identifying Asperger syndrome as a separate entity? Until the 
aetiologies of such conditions [autism and Asperger’s syndrome] are known, the term is helpful 
when explaining the problems of children and adults who have autistic features, but who talk 
grammatically and who are not socially aloof. Such people are perplexing to parents, teachers and 
work supervisors, who often cannot believe in a diagnosis of autism, which they equate with 
muteness and total social withdrawal. The use of a diagnostic term and reference to Asperger's 
clinical descriptions help to convince the people concerned that there is a real problem involving 
subtle, but important, intellectual impairments, and needing careful management and education. 
(Published online, no pagination)9 
 
From the reintroduction of Asperger’s mid-century documentations of his young patients in the early 
1980s to the present day many more changes have occurred in how autism is understood and, how it 
is named. Autism has shifted from being considered to be a debilitating disorder of the psyche or a 
type of schizoid personality which only affected infants and children to a pervasive developmental 
disorder rooted in neurobiology. Autism is increasingly recognised in adults who go on to receive a 
diagnosis many years after childhood (Mandy et al 2009). Asperger’s syndrome was included in the 
DSM as a distinct diagnosis in the mid 1990s. In 2013 it was removed again and now the umbrella term 
‘autistic spectrum disorder’ will be given in its place. This encompasses autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
syndrome and pervasive developmental disorder (not otherwise specified) (National Institute of 
Mental Health, 2018). Throughout these changes in the nomenclature, autism has consequently 
 
9 When we come to discussing the ways that autism presents in AFAB people in the first analysis chapter the idea 
of belief in autism comes to play a major role in whether AFAB people receive a timely diagnosis or not.  
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transformed from being solely considered as a profound and debilitating psychiatric disorder to being 
conceptualised as a ‘spectrum’ with people with a variety of support needs falling into its catchment 
criteria.  
 
Despite Asperger’s Syndrome being removed from the diagnostic manual it is still often used by those 
who have been diagnosed with it, and a pride as emerged around the identity (see, for example, Aspies 
for Freedom, 2019).10  However, I have chosen to only use the terms autism and autism spectrum 
condition because following discussions with autistic people it seems that these are the preferred 
terms as it removes some the complicated and often incorrect assumptions around sectioning off 
autism into ‘low’ and ‘high’ functioning subsets (Kenny, et al, 2016). I have likewise decided against 
using the term autism spectrum disorder in favour of autism spectrum condition (ASC). This is to limit 
the pathologising effects of the term disorder whilst in the same time acknowledging the difficulties 
which may arise from being autistic. However, there is a certain value in viewing autism as a disorder 
in terms of the disruptions and openings it creates to the social order. This is much like the reclaimed 
terms queer or crip. Yet, we are not at a point of reclaiming disorder as a political position since we 




The participants of this research are people who were assigned female at birth. Seven participants 
identify as the sex/gender they were assigned at birth. It was ascertained in the initial questionnaire 
which gender identity the participants feel most comfortable using. Cisgender refers to people who 
feel that their gender identity matches the sex assigned to them at birth. This terminology has come 
from trans activist groups and communities. Cis is counterposed with those who are transgender. As 
 
10 Since Sheffer’s research on Asperger’s involvement in the Nazi eugenic projects of nation cleansing became 
widespread many autistic people have rejected the term on these grounds (de Hooge, 2019).  
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Vincent (2016) writes: ‘[T]he construction of this word was made in reference to the Latin etymology 
of ‘trans’, meaning ‘across’ or ‘on the other side’ – with cis correspondingly meaning ‘on the same 
side’’ (p.6).  Using the term cis or cisgender is a way of destabilising the ways we position people whose 
gender identity does not match the cultural and social designation of their assigned sex as pathological 
or other.  
 
Non-Binary  
 One participant of this study identifies as non-binary. Non-binary is a term in use by those who do not 
feel that using the binary terms of man or woman fully describes their gendered experience (Richards, 
et al., 2015). Non-binary can also be described as gender queer (Richards, et al., 2015).  Importantly 
non-binary gender is not connected to sexuality. A non-binary person can be heterosexual, 
homosexual, bisexual, asexual and so on. It is also important to note that being non-binary can be used 
by people who do not feel any sense of gender and do not see gender as an important identity. Non-
binary individuals often make use of different pronouns than she/he in in order to state their gender 
positioning. For example, the non-binary participant in this study asked to be referred to as they/them.  
 
Neurotypical/Neurodivergent  
Neurotypical, a convergence of the two words neurological and typical, generally refers to people who 
do not have autism or other developmental conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
dyspraxia and dyslexia (Silberman, 2015).11 In contrast, neurodivergent, from neurologically divergent, 
refers to those who do have autism or some other developmental condition.  Both terms emerged in 
autistic led activist communities, though neurotypical is a newer term (Singer, 1999).12 Neurotypical 
 
11 Importantly there is a large overlap between these conditions, many autistic people will be diagnosed with some 
combination of these conditions not just solely autism (The National Autistic society, 2019).  
12 Some autistic people prefer the term allistic to refer to those who don’t have autism. Allistic further destabilises 
those without neurological conditions as the norm as it works to position those who don’t have autism as allies to 
those who are autistic rather than creating further boundaries. However, I am using the term neurotypical in order 
to highlight the social world as being one which works along neurotypical regimes and not just something one is.  
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functions in much the same way as cisgender does. It challenges the belief that those who do not have 
any neurological or mental health conditions should be positioned as the norm. In this way we can 
destabilise the normalcy of not being autistic and attempt to break down the hierarchies that structure 
those with neurological conditions and those without. From its roots in autistic led activism, 
neurotypical and neurodivergent are now commonly used in academic research (Brewer, 2016, Sasson, 
2017, Jakab, 2013). I will use neurotypical in this thesis to highlight the norms which govern our 
societies rather than to refer to any particular individual/s. This is in part because we cannot determine 
whether someone is or is not neurotypical without prior knowledge, but we can state that certain 
behaviours or ways of being in the world fit within neurotypical parameters. For example, an autistic 
person can behave in neurotypical ways in order to fit in to some environments. 
 
Queer  
I use the term queer at certain points in the analysis and I have considered certain individuals as 
engaging in, or embodying, queering practices. Queer can be taken on as an identity, but more 
importantly for this thesis it ‘also describes a certain critical relationship to heteronormativity’ 
(McRuer, 2006, p.13). This relationship with heteronormativity is where I utilise the word queer in 
order to highlight the destabilising effects some participants produce through their gender identity 
and interactions in the social world.  
 
1.3 Outline of Chapters 
The structure of this thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter one has formed the introduction. 
Chapter two provides a brief overview of what autism is, or, at least what we know about autism. This 
chapter will also include a landscaping of key sociological interventions into autism research. The 
specificity of diagnosis and how sociology has approached diagnosis as a window onto a wider scene 
of ability/disability and health/illness will be addressed here. Thus, this section will engage with those 
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works of sociology which think about autism in the ways most useful to the project at hand; those 
which think about how autism has been able to emerge as a distinct category of diagnosis of the 
twentieth and twenty first century and how the diagnosis itself functions in creating both the condition 
and distinct autistic subjectivities. This literature has been chosen as the most relevant from the social 
sciences because it shows how autisms materialisation, in individuals and as a diagnostic category, is 
contingent upon the contemporaneous knowledge of the condition.  
 
Chapter three continues the analysis of literature from chapter two in order to highlight the key areas 
of research which addresses gender and its connection to autism. This literature has been selected as 
relevant because it speaks directly to the question of what role gender plays in autism research and 
discourses. In presenting this literature I will show the gap in the current research that this thesis has 
taken up: namely, the subjective experience of autistic people’s relation to their diagnosis as it exists 
as a gendered discursive formation.  
 
Chapter four is the methodology chapter. Particular attention is paid to rethinking traditional 
qualitative interview techniques which presumes normative interlocuters. Conducting qualitative 
research with autistic participants demands considerable discussion. The social and communication 
difficulties common to many with autism makes interviews the least likely option to utilise. However, 
adaptations such as changes to the interview environment and the option of online or paper 
communication gave choice to participants so that lack of ease of verbal communication was not 
presumed.  
 
Chapter five is the first of two analysis chapters. This chapter outlines the life prior to diagnosis as 
remembered for the autistic adults interviewed in this study. This chapter adds to existing research 
which has predominantly focussed on experiences of AFAB individuals as autistic children and 
adolescents (Little, et al., 2017, Pisula,2017, Sutherland, et al., 2017). A distinct empirical finding of 
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thesis is that the participants self-perceived difference was centred around the sexed body. Many of 
the participants mobilised intensive disciplinary techniques to deal with bodily development in order 
manage to their un/known difference, in the process demonstrating both the building of bodies and 
the building of worlds. Furthermore, many participants discussed using ‘masking’ techniques in order 
to fit into a neurotypical world. This will be discussed with reference to the politics of passing, 
similarities and key divergences will be noted.  
 
Chapter six is the second analysis chapter and it examines how the participants came to their diagnosis 
and their experiences of coming to understand themselves as autistic. A significant focus is placed on 
what happens to perceptions and understandings of gender identity after the diagnosis. A key theme 
emerged which suggested that the diagnosis, for many of the participants, opened a space for different 
gendered expressions. Counterposed with the first analysis chapter which suggested that gender and 
the sexed body became a site of intense management and control, I argue that for some participants 
the diagnosis of autism acted as a ‘coming out’. This meant that a sense of negative difference which 
had been centred on the body and its gendered constructions began to become a positive difference 
through the autism diagnosis which legitimised, or gave name to, issues which had been tied to 
sex/gender. This is problematised through a consideration of the prior interpolations which, I argue, 
prevent the full ‘becoming’ of an autistic subjectivity.  
 
Chapter seven is the conclusion which ends the thesis. It provides an overview of the research 
questions which guided the thesis and the key findings. I present a narrative of the qualitative findings 
of this project. I discuss the contributions this thesis has made to the field of sociology of autism and I 
close the chapter with key areas that can be taken up in future research both by myself and other 
researchers in the field. Appendices close the thesis. I have included recruitment and interview 




What is Autism? 
 
We know more about autism now than at any other point in history … yet, at the same time, if we’re 
honest, the foundational observation that we might make, ‘the central fact’ about autism with which 
we should probably start, is that we don’t know very much about it at all. 
 
(Stuart Murray, 2011, p.1, as cited in Des Fitzgerald, 2017, p.28) 
 
2.1 What is autism?  
If one were to ask someone what autism is, a number of terms, perceived facts or identifiers would 
most likely be presented as markers of autism. It might be suggested that autistic people require round 
the clock support, or, on the other hand, they could be high achieving, but aloof and eccentric, 
professors at the top Universities. It will probably be stated that they are more likely to be men and 
boys. It might be stated that autism is a series of perceived masculine traits (collecting, esoteric 
interests, inability to empathise appropriately) and that they are more likely to struggle with social 
interaction and that they struggle making friends or romantic partnerships, and  that they might prefer 
computers or technology over people or animals. It might also be suggested that if a parent is autistic, 
they are more likely to have autistic children due to hereditary autism genes. However, despite what 
we know, or what we think we know, about autism there is still so much more that is not known. 
Furthermore, autism, what it is and what it feels like or looks like, is different across all those who are 
autistic. Autism is a slippery and changeable concept and though mentions of autism may bring to 




In the majority of contemporary Western societies, the medical understanding of autism is that it is a 
neurodevelopmental condition which, whilst it may not be present from birth, must be recognisable 
from a child’s early years of life usually between two to three (International Classification of Diseases-
10, 2019). In the biomedical understanding of the condition a dyad of impairment must be present for 
a diagnosis to be made. As the Diagnostic Statistical Manual V (DSM V) determines it, the two 
fundamental categories of impairment must present ‘persistent difficulties’ within: social 
communication and social interaction, and restrictive and repetitive patterns of behaviour (Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual V, 2013, The National Autistic Society, 2017).  As mentioned, in 2013 the category 
of Asperger Syndrome was removed from the DSM 5 and now autistic spectrum disorder will be given 
as a primary diagnosis. Asperger Syndrome is unlikely to be given as a formal diagnosis in the United 
Kingdom, though it may be mentioned informally to an individual who has just been diagnosed as a 
clarification term. Autism is not degenerative and is not a mental illness or a mental health condition. 
As Uta Frith (2003) suggests, autism will manifest differently over the course of someone’s life with 
periods of ‘adaptation and compensation’ but, it is important to note that the condition will always be 
present (p.16).  
 
Whilst the differentiating categories of autism no longer exist in the DSM V, they are still useful 
categories for understanding the varying abilities and difficulties which people with autism may have. 
The main distinction between the previous categories of autism and Asperger’s syndrome is that to 
receive a diagnosis of the former there had to be considerable delay in the child’s acquisition of 
language, and they may not have acquired speech at all, there may also be other learning or intellectual 
disabilities present (National Autism Society, 2019). Those who would have been given an Asperger’s 
diagnosis will have had no delay in speech acquisition. Some people with Asperger’s Syndrome may 
develop an understanding of complex written language far surpassing their peers and consequently 
gain a diagnosis of hyperlexia (The National Autistic Society, 2019). Hyperlexia may be given when 
 31 
reading and written language is developed precociously yet spoken language does not develop to the 
same degree and abnormal patterns of speech or an inability to engage socially with peers is present..   
 
Neither autism nor Asperger’s syndrome are considered a learning disability; however, this may be 
given as a co-occurring diagnosis. Secondary impairment categories such as intellectual impairment, 
language impairment and catatonia can be given alongside the ASD diagnosis (The National Autistic 
Society, 2017). As mentioned, the decision to combine the subcategories of autism has come after 
many years of considering whether Asperger’s Syndrome can be considered autism (Frith, 1991 p.11). 
However, a shared set of deviations from the norm differentiated by the extent to which they effect 
the individual meant that autism could be conceived of as a spectrum (Wing, 1981).  For those 
diagnosed with what would have been termed Asperger’s Syndrome, despite being considered to 
present with lower support needs, it can still present great difficulties across a person’s life course. For 
some individuals it can be difficult to fit in at school or work, they can struggle to make friends and 
relationships and they can fail to achieve their goals which can be the cause of distress. Indeed, The 
National Autism Society (2019) suggests that only 16% of autistic adults are in full time work. 
Individuals may also have periods of being non-verbal or of crisis. For this reason, as noted, I want to 
argue for a move away from thinking about autism as a spectrum and toward a conception of an 
autistic space. By thinking of autism as a space rather than spectrum we have a further conceptual tool 
to disrupt the high or low functioning model and can therefore situate difficulties, and indeed 
strengths, as temporal and relational.  
 
What is common to autism, regardless of where it falls within the autistic space, are the medically 
defined impairments of ‘social interaction and imagination, and restricted and repetitive actions’ (DSM 
V, 2013). What this means for the autistic individual can vary widely. Restricted and repetitive actions 
may encompass ritualised behaviours which are directed toward objects in the world; lining toys up as 
a child instead of playing with them or being distressed when plans change even slightly are generally 
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cited as key markers. Restricted and repetitive actions may also include certain embodied behaviours 
such as arm flapping, curling hands and fingers and spinning or rocking. These behaviours are known 
as stimming by many in the autism community (Runswick-Cole, 2019). Some of these actions are said 
to be a way of coping with sensory overload which has now been added as a subheading in the DSM V 
where previously it was not considered as a core part of autism (Diagnostic Statistical Manual V, 2013).   
 
‘Impairments of social interaction and imagination’ encompasses difficulties in verbal and nonverbal 
communication (DSM, V, 2013). Autistic people may struggle to learn how to socialise and behave in 
different situations, they may also understand language literally and have trouble working out other 
people’s intentions (Baron-Cohen, 1997). Autistic people may struggle to express ‘appropriate’ 
emotions and may have difficulty in making and maintaining meaningful relationships. It is important 
to note that contra to the prior belief that autistic people lack empathy, or inner emotions or desires, 
autistic people do, of course, have a full and rich inner life; it is the communication aspect of 
articulating appropriate responses which presents difficulty (Happé, 1991).  This short summary is, 
however, not all autism is composed of, and these, and other, traits will be manifested differently in 
each individual who has autism and at different stages in life and in different relational spaces.   It is a 
complex condition which encompasses a wide range of abilities and difficulties and as such each person 
ought to be understood as an individual whose difficulties and strengths will manifest to a greater or 
lesser degree in differing areas.  
 
This heterogeneity of how autistic people experience their embodiment and their engagement in the 
social world is also mirrored in the search for autism as a discrete biological entity.  Like many 
researchers of autism working within the social sciences or medical humanities this thesis does not 
situate autism as a homogenous entity, which emanates from a discreet neurological and genetic 
makeup of a person. Indeed, there has not been any ‘breakthrough’ in determining the neurological 
aetiology of autism (Runswick-Cole, 2012, Mallet and Timini, 2016, Nadesan, 2005). Rather, autism is 
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increasingly considered to be related to multiple genetic differences from the norm. Even these recent 
genetic developments cannot be definitive due the lack of the genetic database needed, and the 
heterogeneity of the genomic make-up found within each individual (Miles, 2011, Nadesan, 2005).  
 
This seems to present the impossibility of determining autism as a discreet genetic pathology and it is 
more likely to emerge as a mixture of multiple genetic vulnerabilities and their interaction with 
environmental factors (Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young, 2011, Hollin, 2016). Even so, the lack of 
certain empirical data to position autism categorically as a biological and neurological condition has 
not stopped it being conceptualised as such in scientific, medical, legal and lay understandings of 
autism. Thus, heterogeneity is perhaps a key word to hold in one’s mind when thinking about autism, 
as slippery and as definitively undefinable that may be. For, as Fitzgerald (2016), citing Ian Hacking, 
states, when we talk about autism, we have to be aware that we are discussing a ‘moving target’ (p.28). 
Thus, we must be aware of how autism is framed, where the boundary markers are drawn of normative 
and pathological, for what ends and, ultimately, how this subsequently impacts on people’s lived 
experiences.  
 
2.2 The Sociology of Autism 
Autism is a particularly fruitful object of research for those working in sociology because of its 
positioning as a social and interactional impairment, a neurological condition and a diagnostic category 
which is increasingly represented in popular culture. This positioning enables sociological research to 
be undertaken in numerous ways and for varying aspects of autism to be interrogated.  The two main 
areas which research into autism focuses upon are the increase in autism diagnoses and whether there 
is indeed an ‘autism epidemic’ and, secondly, the gender disparity of diagnosis rates (Eyal et al, 2010, 




Real increase or diagnostic substitution? 
Over the last few decades rates of autism diagnosis have increased dramatically leading to what has 
been cited by many as an ‘autism epidemic’ (Eyal et al, 2010, p.2). As Bonnie Evans (2013) suggests 
rates of autism diagnosis have increased dramatically from Victor Lotter’s first epidemiological study 
on autism which cited 4.5 cases of autism to every 10,000 children, to a 2006 Lancet article which 
suggests those figures are around 116.1 cases of autism to every 10,000 children (p.4). This dramatic 
increase in rates of diagnosis from what was once considered a rare disorder of childhood has sparked 
interest in numerous fields including medicine, neuroscience, literary analysis and the social sciences 
(Evans, 2013, p.4). The increase of autism rates has been a major focus from which research seeks to 
find a theory which will enable some understanding of why autism has become so widely diagnosed in 
the last half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty first.  
 
These debates centre around whether autism has had a ‘real’ (i.e. biologically situated) increase in 
actual cases or whether autism has become a diagnostic substitution for previously homogenously 
defined intellectual disability or ‘mental retardation’ (Eyal, 2010). Theories of those who advocate for 
the former position range from arguments that autism is caused by MMR vaccines or environmental 
influence, or that the increase in the tech industries labour force are causing babies to be born with 
autism due to the pairing of couples with cognitive profiles that are highly technologically proficient, 
Baron-Cohen (2006) has discussed the latter as a ‘assortive mating of two systematising cognitive 
profiles’ (Silberman, 2015, Donovan and Zucker, 2016). Theories from the diagnostic substitution 
position suggest that the category of autism has expanded and that closures of state institutions meant 
a more defined diagnosis than retardation, for example, had to be created in order to successfully 
implement community care (Eyal, 2010). Within the diagnostic substitution position there are some 
who maintain that we have to consider autism as first and foremost a socially constructed category 
and thus only understandable through an analysis of the social world (Runswick-Cole, 2016).  All these 
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differing positionalities demonstrate just how much the study and the history of autism needs to be 
considered sociologically. Autism is a condition of social impairment and it is shaped and formed 
through the social and political histories which its current configuration is contingent upon. As Jutel 
(2015) argues, to consider something sociologically and to ‘do sociology’ means to seek to find wider 
understandings, meanings and methods from the object of knowledge with which you work. Thus, 
autism can never be taken as an object in isolation, it speaks to, or illuminates, wider concerns at the 
same time as it is produced by them (p.845).  
 
Bonnie Evans (2013) takes up the question of the dramatic increase in diagnosis rates and suggests 
that autism has a central positioning in the history of child psychology and psychiatry in the U.K and 
that the shifts in the historical modes of understanding autism in child development psychology have 
widened the categories, not only of autism, but of many related cognitive categories of impairment.  
To make this argument Evans traces the history of autism back to the inception of the term coined in 
1911 by Eugen Bleuler. Bleuler’s work was heavily influenced by Sigmund Freud and the sexologist 
Havelock Ellis (Evans, 2013, p.6). Freud’s work on childhood psychopathy argued that the cause of 
certain mental disorders was within a disordered splitting of the self from the environment, with a 
specific interest on how the self sees itself as autonomous and distinct from both its environment and 
its primary caregiver (Freud, 2005). This led Freud to infer and then interpret the psychic symbolic life 
of a child prior to all language and prior to the child being able to give an account of itself. This 
understanding of the working of subjectivity, the psyche and the self and its relations with others, at 
the turn of the twentieth century influenced Bleuler to state that autism was a condition wherein the 
child could not come to experience itself and its environment coherently. Instead, the child had a rich 
symbolic life and experienced fantasy and hallucinations as a result of infantile wishes to ‘avoid 
unsatisfactory realities and replace them with fantasies and hallucinations’ (Evans, 2013, p.4).  
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The main deficit of the autistic child not being able to form reciprocal human relationships was 
understood theoretically as an inability of the child to properly engage with reality (Evans, 2013, p.17). 
Importantly as Evans (2013) suggests, these earlier theories and ideas about autism were based upon 
individual cases, and causes for autistic behaviour were inferred and interpreted through the early 
psychological knowledges which sought to understand how subjectivity is formed and not through the 
observable and empirical behavioural tests which would emerge (p.7). 
 
As Evans cites it, a major change came in the conceptualisation of autism when instead of being a 
condition understood through excessive fantasy and hallucinatory experience it became, conversely, 
categorised as a ‘complete lack of unconscious symbolic life (p.4).’ As Michael Rutter, head of the first 
genetic study of autism in 1972 writes: ‘the autistic child has a deficiency of fantasy rather than an 
excess’ (Rutter in Evans, 2013, p.4). With the removal of the psychoanalytic techniques to interpret 
the symbolic life of a child and the reasons for the deficits in his or her relationships with others, the 
study of autism could be opened up to standardised tests and empiricism through the observation of 
visible behaviour. With the creation of a standardised diagnostic criteria autism could be understood 
as a delimited set of behavioural impairments (p.14). This allowed for many more children to be 
counted under the diagnosis of autism as it became distinguished from a rare form of childhood 
schizophrenia. The standardisation of autism as a diagnostic category could then be used for 
epidemiological studies not only to determine prevalence but to determine causation as separate from 
the psychoanalytic theories of affective disturbance and the inability of the ego to develop a 
differentiation of fantasy and reality (Evan, 2013, p.15).  
 
The shift in understanding from that of autism being a condition categorised by a retreat into the self 
into fantasy and to the consequent positivist methods that were deployed after allowed speech to 
come to hold an important place in autism. Not only must a child account his or her own psychic life 
and only then could hallucination, or lack of, in childhood be verified, but language became a central 
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category in identifying the cognitive deficit of autism (Evans, 2013, p.19). As Evans (2013) writes ‘[those 
researching autism] did not know the exact form of the central sensory disorder which caused autism, 
they were all united in the view that the condition was not caused by emotional reactions or 
hallucinations but what instead characterised by a deficit in certain aspects of linguistic thought’ (p.19). 
Furthermore, as Evans (2013) writes ‘[T]hese changes were contemporaneous with a wider interest in 
the ‘communication’ problems of children as opposed to their emotional problems’ (p.19). 
 
 Autism psychologists Lorna Wing and Judith Gould (1979) suggested that autism needed to be re-
categorised as a condition of social impairment. Wing and Gould (1979) devised a triad of observable 
behavioural phenomena: impairment in social interaction, communication and imagination (p.27). 
These were positioned as against the norm of childhood development and were mapped against the 
impairments of associated conditions and this allowed for autism to be positioned as a central problem 
through which to understand other conditions. Removed from its association to psychosis and 
hallucinatory states and positioned as a behavioural and communication disorder autism could be 
mapped epidemiologically and statistically against the norm of childhood behaviour, likewise it could 
be observed through behaviours rather that psychological theoretical inference. In this new 
framework of ‘cognitive deficits’, the scope of who could be given an autism diagnosis was widened 
dramatically (Evans, 2013, p. 23). 
 
Gil Eyal et al’s (2010) book The Autism Matrix also begins with the increase of autism rates. Eyal et al, 
suggest that the question of whether there is a so called ‘autism epidemic’ has led to a huge increase 
in research and money being given over to the area. If the cause of the epidemic can be found, then 
this would suggest autism can be contained as would be similar to the outcome of other so-called 
health epidemics. As Eyal et al argue there are two positions which are taken in the argument of 
whether or not there is an autism epidemic. On the one side, there is position that autism is a disease 
entity which is spreading (cause unknown) and this must be identified and brought under control and 
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the other side of the argument that autism is a solely socially constructed discourse which has been 
enacted and materialised by the increase in the focus on the condition. From the latter position 
questions are asked which think about how could we better think about autism in such a way that 
provides a more holistic knowledge which takes into the account the conditions of its emergence.  
Would we be better placed to understand autism if we look at conditions of society rather than brain 
imaging and genetics? Can the increase in diagnoses be found within the political and social world 
rather than environmental or biological mutations caused by vaccinations or dietary changes?  
 
Critical autism studies positions autism as a social category to argue that autism is socially constructed 
and bound up in political power and big pharma. Thus, questions emerge around whether autism as a 
diagnosis is ‘scientifically valid’ and whether this diagnosis is indeed helpful for those diagnosed 
(Runswick-Cole, et al., 2016, p.7). Re-thinking Autism, an edited collection of articles, cites itself as 
being the first such book in the new field of critical autism studies. However, as Damien Milton (2016) 
states, critical autism studies has been around as an intervention into traditional ways of thinking 
about autism for many years before the publication of this book and that this collection of essays 
repeats past mistakes of autism, in Milton’s terms, of misunderstanding the biomedical model of 
autism and of failing to engage with autistic scholars. Furthermore, Milton suggests that many authors 
of the chapters in the collection seem to agree that autism is only scientifically valid as a ‘natural kind’ 
and systematically ignore the history of autism in the U.K as being diagnosed and identifiable based on 
behavioural observations (p.1414). 
 
Taking what they cite as a ‘radical position’, Katherine Runswick-Cole et al (2016) argue that by 
assuming autism to have a biological aetiology, even if we consider the social nature of it as interacting 
with a certain biological reality, we can never fully understand what autism is. To understand autism, 
they argue, we must relinquish the idea that autism has a singular biological basis which can be found 
in ‘nature’ and that it may one day become visible and thus located as a discreet observable entity. As 
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Runswick-Cole et al state: ‘[T]he recurrent failures of any visible progress in academic attempts at 
discovering what autism is serve to obscure a simpler and more likely possibility – that the reason that 
science is not uncovering what autism is, because it doesn’t exist at the biological level’ (2016, p.9). 
The position they advocate is to fully explicate autism from scientific expertise and knowledge and 
firmly place it in the social world. As they write: ‘[…] autism can only be understood through examining 
‘it’ as a socially/culturally produced phenomena’ (p.9). What is more likely to be true is that a discrete 
aetiology for autism hasn’t been found because autism is not one thing but that it is multiple and that 
autism spectrum conditions are so heterogeneous as to be pinned down to a shared biological or social 
cause common to all individuals who come under the category of the autistic spectrum disorders 
(Hollin, 2016, Timmi and McCabe, 2016).  
 
Eyal et al (2010), suggest that the question of whether there is an autism epidemic and of the 
opposition of those who believe in the biological and disease origin of autism to those who have faith 
that autism is constructed solely in the social world is not the correct place to  understand what autism 
is (p.3). Rather Eyal et al (2010) suggests that we think about how categories of disorder and 
impairment are formed. As these debates endlessly circle around trying to define the ‘real’ of autism 
Eyal et al (2010) suggests that sociologists are in a good position to think about what autism is and how 
we understand it because ‘[sociologists] can take as our object the total population of actual autism 
diagnoses, treating it as a real phenomenon in need of an explanation (p.20)’ 
 
Eyal et al’s (2010) main argument which runs throughout The Autism Matrix is that increased autism 
rates are the direct result of the deinstitutionalisation in the 1960s which placed many who had 
previously been categorised under the homogenous title of ‘mentally retarded’ into community care. 
Specialised care and support was needed for individuals, thus the unhelpful and generalised category 
of ‘mental retardation’ was broken up into various categories of atypical conditions. As Eyal et al (2010) 
write: ‘[T]he current rise in autism diagnoses, we argue, should be understood as an aftershock of the 
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real earthquake, which was the deinstitutionalization of mental retardation that began in the late 
1960s. The deinstitutionalization of mental retardation was a massive change, not only materially […] 
but symbolically’ (p.3). That meant that autism became brought into public visibility as a distinct 
diagnosis and one could be sought by parents, or imposed upon parents, to give a name to their 
children’s problems. It is the specificity of the diagnosis, or ‘giving the name’, and the sociological 
understanding of diagnosis which I will turn to next (Brown 1990).  
 
2.3 The Sociology of Diagnosis  
A diagnosis exists on multiple levels. It is a conceptual tool for making sense of someone’s complaints 
or ‘suffering’ when they are encountered in a medical setting. It is a social tool that demarcates 
normality from pathology, and it can function as a form of social control. It re-produces the hierarchical 
position of the doctor and it produces subjectivities; the sick person, the dying person, the autistic 
person (Nussbaum, 2013, Brown, 1990, Jutel, 2009).  As Annemarie Jutel (2015) suggests, diagnosis is 
an important object for study from a sociological perspective because a diagnosis is never simply just 
a diagnosis. As Jutel (2015) writes:  
 
[‘doing’ sociology on diagnosis] is unearthing and revealing an object as a way of adumbrating an 
even broader scene […] sociology should shine light on concepts, processes, and practices, which 
are otherwise not seen or not recognized for the impact they have on more general issues such 
as, in this case, health, illness and disease.  
(p.843) 
Jutel (2009) states: ‘diagnoses are the classification tools of medicine’ (p.285). These tools do the work 
of ordering bodies into categories of sickness, health and disease. Or, in the case of neurological 
conditions, such as autism, dyslexia, attention deficit disorders, they classify a certain abnormality of 
behaviour or ability as being a medical concern (Hollin and Pilnick, 2015, Conrad, 2007).  Diagnoses 
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really matter; they shape social structures such as medical and care institutions, social security 
structures and wider support and educational policies. They provide the recipient of a diagnosis with 
access to care or support pathways designated as being ‘useful’ to them (Nussbaum, 2013). They are 
also cultural and social tools which not only demarcate people into sickness and health, but they do 
social boundary making work. The power of the diagnosis extends far beyond the individual patient.  
 
The patrolling function of diagnosis 
In the psychiatric branch of diagnosis, a commonly discussed, or critiqued, area is the important 
role this institution has, and has had historically, in wider process of social control (Brown, 1990). 
As Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached (2013) discuss, in particular the sociological study of deviance 
has focussed on the controlling and patrolling functions of pathology as legitimised by the authority 
of psychiatry (p.113). Phil Brown (1990) in his foundational paper The Name Game: Towards a 
Sociology of Diagnosis noted that much of the historical work that criticises the social control aspect 
of psychiatry had not taken into account the importance of the diagnosis as ‘central component of 
this social control’ (p.387).  
 
Brown (1990) discusses several historical examples which are notable for the ease of their analysis 
as diagnoses given specifically for a societal and political function, for example: witchcraft, sexual 
immorality and absconding slaves (p.386). These categories, with the benefit of hindsight, allow a 
clear insight into the hegemonic goals and aims of the society in which these behaviours were 
deemed to be deviant and undesirable. Yet, as Brown (1990) states what has not been so clearly 
understood, nor analysed is that; ‘[G]iving the name has been the starting point for social labellers. 
The power to give the name has been a core element in the social control nature of the mental 
health professionals and institutions’ (p.387).  
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Discussing the perceived social control aims of psychiatry Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached (2013) 
cite the infamous experiment by David Rosenhan where ‘pseudopatients’ (students without any 
history of mental illness) were admitted to a psychiatric ward by stating that they heard voices 
(p.113). This particular exercise focussed attention on the diagnosis as a social tool that defines 
normality and pathology imprecisely and according to the social norms and codes of conduct in 
existence. In the process it demonstrated how difficult it is to ‘diagnose normality’ and points to 
the instability of both sides of the binary of illness and health (p.113). Importantly, Rosenhan’s 
study also points to the importance of shared narratives in the process of diagnosing. All the 
participants in the experiment were instructed to make use of words understandable in a wider 
framework of mental illness, as it itself made use of existential philosophical understandings of 
selfhood.  It is of particular interest to this project to understand if the participants engaged with 
the narratives – or the discourses- which allow autism to be diagnosable in a clinical setting, much 
like Sandy Stone’s (1991) argument that trans people must tell the dominant trans origin story to 
access healthcare and be recognised as trans.  
 
is important to note, that whilst critiques of psychological normalisation are valid in many ways, 
they are also overly general and uniformly present medical professionals as malevolent 
handmaidens for the hegemonic political social order. As Brown (1990) and Rose and Abi-Rached 
(2013) note, many psychiatrists and other front-line health care professionals are also ‘troubled’ by 
psychiatric diagnosis and uphold an ethics of care (Brown, p.387, Rose and Abi- Rached, p.113). As 
Abraham Nassbaum, writes in the introduction to a guidebook for young clinicians The Pocket Guide 
to the DSM-5 Diagnostic Exam:  […] even if a person endorses all the symptoms of a particular 
disorder, if the disorder does not usefully inform  that person’s treatment process, or prognosis, 
then the diagnosis is considered inappropriate’ (p.10, own italics). However, Nassbaum’s (2013) 




Brown (1990) also notes that many professionals with diagnosing authority will work around some 
of the rigidity found in standardised diagnostic manuals in order to enable an individual to access 
things of ‘use’ (p.387). Gould and Ashton-Smith (2011) likewise argue that the autism diagnostic 
tools are not designed to diagnosis assigned female at birth individuals, as such they suggest that 
adaptions in diagnostic techniques should be made to account for gender differences in autism 
presentation (p.34).  Brown (1990) refers to the official standardised framework for diagnosis (as 
found in the ICD or the DSM, for example) as ‘diagnostic technique’ and the actual process of 
diagnosis within the clinic by individual actors as ‘diagnostic work’ (p.391).  
 
The interactional and interpretative work of diagnosis  
Though Brown (1990) did not explicitly refer to the interactional space of the clinic with his phrase 
‘diagnostic work’, it calls for an exploration of the work that is actually being done in diagnostic 
examinations. I will focus on autism diagnosis here. Maynard and Turowetz’s (2019) critical analysis of 
how clinicians determine diagnosis in local encounters uses historical case data to ask how ‘the 
interaction order of the clinic articulates with a larger-scale historical forces affecting the definition 
and distribution of ASD’ (p.89).  Maynard and Turowetz (2019) wish to develop an understanding of 
abstraction to complicate the tendency, as they see it, to a Foucauldian analysis of the production of 
categories of people through diagnosing and medicalising practices acting on passive subjects, or what 
could otherwise be called ‘institutional determinism’  (Hollin and Pilnick, 2018, p.1216).  
 
Abstraction refers to the interpretation of patient-doctor interactions as removing the holistic 
individual from their environment, their other social identities and simply looking ‘beneath the skin’ 
with a medical gaze, to borrow Barbara Duden’s (1998) phrase. This perceived power relation between 
the clinician/s and the patient has been addressed critically as being common to medical interactions 
and as constitutive of medical power in much scholarly work, especially that which is critical to 
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medicalisation processes and the social labelling of constructed deviance, as discussed above 
(Foucault, 1994, Foucault, 1988). These criticisms have often focused on gender relations and address 
the already hierarchical power dynamic between the woman patient and the (male) doctor (Duden, 
1998, Cross, 2010, Ehrenreich and English, 2005). These criticisms are relevant to understanding how 
the male phenotype of autism has come to be understood as the normative presentation of autism 
and consequently the one that is looked for in diagnostic examinations (Murray et al, 2016). Across 
their body of work on autism diagnosis Maynard and Turowetz (2019, 2017, 2015) suggest that rather 
we should recognise the interactional aspect of, what they cite as, ‘“doing” autism diagnosis’. 
Whereby, social encounters, speech and ways of narrating are co-produced in the clinic itself in 
relation to social structures such as ‘changing diagnostic terminology and criteria, altered networks of 
expertise, and services for handling disease, illness and disability’ (Maynard and Turowetz, 2019, p.92, 
p.109).  Thus, the process of diagnosing is always relational. 
 
Hollin and Pilnick (2018) also argue for an understanding of how the interaction between the ‘patient’ 
and the professional in the clinic actively produces a distinct profile that becomes named as autism. 
This naming is done through interpretations of social behaviours as measured against standardised 
tests. Building a coherent framework out of a patchwork of multiple behaviours into a singular 
category of pathology ‘reifies’ disparate and apparently disconnected behaviours by producing a 
nameable entity into which they fit.  As Hayes, et al, (2020) writes: ‘[F]or autism, this process of 
reification transforms what is sometimes an inconsistent or intangible set of social behaviours into a 
concrete condition, perceived as an inherent attribute of an individual’ (Hayes, et al, 2020, p.3)’. Hollin 
(2017) argues that autism is best understood as an ‘ontological uncertainty’ which is ‘determined by 
its indeterminacy’ (p.214). Though autism is especially indeterminate, (it has no biological or genetic 
markers, no direct identifiable cause from the social or the biological) if not indeterminacy but 
multiplicity can be attributed to a broader range of diagnoses. In her work on atherosclerosis, (an 
obstruction of the arteries), Annemarie Mol (2002) asserts that the disease entity itself is ‘not one, but 
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multiple’. Obstructed veins under a microscope are distinct from the pain that a patient signals to their 
doctor and this is again distinct from the readings on a blood pressure monitor. The disease 
atherosclerosis is concretised through the various interactions between patient, clinicians, researchers 
and wider institutional interests, through this ‘reality [is] enacted’ (p.44) 
Producing Affects 
As Hayes, et al (2020) note the transformation of multiple social behaviors  into the singular condition 
of autism becomes figured then as an ‘inherent attribute of an individual’, thus, a person who enters 
a diagnostic clinic leaves as an autistic person (or a cancer patient, or an AIDS patient, and so on). This 
diagnosis of autism can provoke affective responses by the patient herself or those who interact with 
her. These affects range from sympathy, shame, paternalism, grief to indifference and anything in 
between. These emotive reactions can potentially produce negative effects; loss of employment, 
family breakdown, societal ostracization. Affective reactions to a diagnosis are always culturally and 
socially specific (Jutel, 2009, p.279).  It is not necessarily the condition, or its prognosis, itself which 
produces these affects but often it is the metaphorical construction of the condition, illness or disease 
which one is diagnosed with. Susan Sontag (1989) in her seminal work Illness and Metaphor describes 
the impact that the metaphoric constructions of cancer have on the experience of the cancer patient 
in relation to wider social conceptualisations of the disease. As Sontag writes (1989), ‘[I]t is not the 
naming as such that is pejorative or damning, but the name “cancer”.  As long as a particular disease 
is treated as an evil, invincible predator, not just a disease, most people will indeed be demoralised by 
learning what disease they have’ (p.7).  
 
Melanie Yergeau (2018) also states that it matters when one is diagnosed, not only with what. Once 
believed to be solely a childhood condition, rates of diagnosis of autism in adulthood are increasing 
(Murray, 2008, p.139, Murphy et al, 2016). Despite this phenomenon of adult diagnosis, popular 
perceptions of autism as a condition of childhood persist. These perceptions persist not only in the 
idea of autism as delayed development which leaves those diagnosed as forever in a childlike state 
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but, through a disbelief that one can truly be autistic if diagnosed in adulthood.  Melanie Yegeau (2018) 
writes: ‘[C]laiming, for instance, that one was diagnosed with autism as an adult is often read as 
misdiagnosis – one’s autism must not be real enough or terrible enough if it hadn’t been cataloged 
during early childhood’ (p.156).   
 
Then discussing the tendency for autistic adults to have received autism in the place of another 
diagnosis Yergeau (2018) writes, echoing Eyal et al (2010):  
 
Of course, these stereotypes ignore, for instance, that many autistic adult diagnoses take shape 
as reclassifications, replacing and/or complementing prior diagnoses such as intellectual 
disability, verbal apraxia, schizophrenia, ADHD, borderline personality disorder, selective 
mutism, cerebral palsy, Tourette’s and beyond. Deinstitutionalization brought as many 
diagnostic shifts as did revisions to the DSM  
(p.156) 
This tendency to not quite believe an adult can be autistic if diagnosed in adulthood can shape how 
the individual relates to their autism diagnosis and the ways they feel compelled to prove their 
autism, as will be discussed in the ‘masking and passing’ section of the next chapter. At the same 
time that a diagnosis of autism can produce a sense of great relief, a sense of disbelief can be 
present within the individual (Stagg and Belcher, 2019).  In autism diagnoses a commonly discussed 
reason for the ‘misdiagnosis or missed diagnosis’, as Ashton-Smith and Gould (2011) cite it, in those 
who were assigned female at birth is that gendered biases shapes access to diagnosis and to the 
construction of the diagnosis itself. Ashton-Smith and Gould (2011), as noted earlier, have proposed 
the creation of a new model for diagnosis based on a ‘female phenotype’ of autism. However, as 
Brown (1990) notes:  
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‘[…] race, sex, and class bias- which have long been central features of psychiatric diagnosis- are 
much more value-laden- and will undoubtedly be even harder to eradicate with technical 
classification. These biases are part of the overall culture and will invariably show up in major 
social institutions. 
 (p.391).   
Self-diagnosis  
In part due, no doubt, to a history of gendered bias at play in diagnosis processes, self-diagnosis among 
assigned female at birth individuals appears to be common (Lewis, 2016). The authoritative stamp of 
diagnosis can be hard to come by and self-diagnosis is a chosen path for some. Reasons for self-
diagnosis may include; previously being misdiagnosed, not being diagnosed in childhood, fear of 
workplace discrimination, class, race or gender barriers in place, or not considering autism a disease 
which needs to be diagnosed (Sarrett, 2015).  As Jutel (2015) notes, whilst diagnosis still relies on the 
doctor to make the final call on whether a name can be given, diagnoses are not the sole preserve of 
the medical sphere. Brown (1990) stated that ‘diagnoses are the language of psychiatry’ and, as 
language is never the sole property of an individual or an institution it is always subject to 
appropriation and adaptation from the officiating medical sphere.  As Jutel (2015) writes: 
 
 Diagnoses are no longer (if they ever were) something you get uniquely from the doctor and 
apply in medical conversation alone. They spill into daily life, batted back and forth between 
friends, discussed on radio and newspapers […] diagnoses are also something one might now 
bring to the doctor, rather than request of her: realms of papers with suggestions from Dr 
Google, patient advocacy groups, and big pharma.  
(p.846) 
 
Like many other diagnoses that come under the broad areas of interest to psychology and psychiatry, 
autism has become a diagnosis that many lay claim to without any medical assistance. There are 
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numerous self-test frameworks and interactive tests online which anyone can take, and it will score 
them on a points system that is similar- if not the identical- to the one used in preliminary tests used 
by gatekeepers to the specialist diagnostic services.  For many people these tests can be the first steps 
to going to a general practitioner to ask to be referred to specialist services, for others the tests are 
enough in their own right (Sarrett, 2016). This, I believe, makes the diagnosis of autism especially 
interesting. Since a self-diagnosis cannot open pathways to services or support, we must ask what the 
specific desire to have a diagnosis of autism is. Even gaining a medical diagnosis of autism is not a 
guarantee that structural provisions can be accessed. As the authors of the current National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence guidelines (2012) state, though assistive provisions ought to follow the 
diagnosis, these cannot always be implemented. As the authors (2012) write: ‘[C]urrently, widespread 
inconsistency in access to and provision of care and effective interventions (for autism and for physical 
and mental health problems) are potential challenges to guideline implementation’. Crane et al (2018) 
have also noted a lack of resources for autistic adults and services which were cited as inadequate by 
adults who received a diagnosis and wanted access to aftercare or support.  
 
The Transformative Power of Diagnosis 
For many adults who are diagnosed with what we could call autism with lower support needs there is 
a common story being told; that the diagnosis helps them understand who they are. It makes sense of 
signs, traits, and of feelings that something is not quite right (The Guardian, 2016, Hickey et al 2017, 
The BBC, 2018).  In many instances when individuals discuss receiving an autism diagnosis it is framed 
as though the diagnosis gives access to a self that was always there but not quite knowable (Williams, 
1999). Or a self that had been covered up through years of self-imposed, not-quite conscious attempts 
of neurotypicality, this will also be discussed in the ‘masking and passing’ section of the literature 
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review (Holliday-Wiley,1999, Wylie, 2014, Mandy, 2019). There are numerous self-help books, 
autobiographies and personal accounts by autistic people which cite this as a common trope.13 
 
 
This demonstrates what Jutel (2015), describes as the ‘transformative power of diagnosis’:  
 
[…] the diagnostic moment imposes an indelible division of “before” and “after” onto an 
individual’s life story despite the absence of any material change in condition (Blaxter 2009; Bury 
1982; Fleishmann 1999; Frank 1995). The impact of the diagnostic pronouncement is as 
important as the disease itself, altering the sense of identity and, of future potential.  
(p.848) 
 
After an autism diagnosis in adulthood, for those who with lower support needs, it is quite often that 
the act of receiving the diagnosis terminates interactions with different social structures. This is not 
always by choice but, as noted, because of the lack of support provisions (National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence, 2012). The diagnosis for those with lower support needs, whether self or 
medically diagnosed, often marks the end point rather than the beginning of treatment plans, care 
pathways and other institutional encounters. A diagnosis can also act as a safety net which can be 
brought out in relation to specific needs when required, such as in the workplace or educational 
institutions. This makes the diagnosis a highly individualised event as in many ways it is left to the 
individual to work out their own coping strategies and ways of being in the world. The diagnosis of 
autism is the tool to do this with.  
 
13 Autistic writer Donna Williams (1999) describes the period before diagnosis as a ‘war’ and describing the 
experience of discovering a different version of the self through diagnosis writes; ‘[W]ithin each of us there is a 
stranger (or strangers) lurking in the shadows of our subconscious minds. They know of us but do not know us. 
And the only thing that keeps them ‘back there’ is a sense of self (self-possession). Not all of us are born aware 
we have this’ (p.6).  Phillip Wylie (2014) is even more explicit, he compiles a list of bullet points that document the 
periods of time leading up to, and beyond diagnosis. The list cites; ‘knowing we are different’ […] clues we have 
ASD […] pretending to be normal […] reaching tipping point of self-identification (acknowledgment of ASD) […], 
receiving a diagnosis of ASD […] ‘coming out’ […], finding self-acceptance’ (p.29).  
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The autism diagnosis (self or medical) may lend itself to forms of community building and to building 
an autism politics. As Chong (2001) notes, diagnosis may ‘confer collective identity on patients, 
removing them from the isolation of their own suffering and providing them with new networks of 
support’ (cited in Jutel, 2009, p.288). Since the medical or social assistance that is in existence has little 
to offer to a lower support needs autistic adult then other autistic adults often become a support 
system. Online resources, self-help books, Twitter, Reddit, Facebook or Wrong Planet conversations 
can often be some of the only materials that autistic adults have to work with (Benford, 2008, Bagatell, 
2010). This is, in part, why neurodiversity and other autistic-led political movements have taken off in 
the way that they have. Autism-led politics take place predominantly in online spaces where the 
individual who received a diagnosis has to take it on themselves to discover what exactly autism is and 
what it means to be an autistic person. If we view an autism diagnosis (self or medical) in this way then 
interaction with medical services or with medical tools, such as diagnosis, functions less obviously as a 
categorising regime of normativity and pathology and, instead, as a tool for emancipation and a 
potential gateway to a political project aimed at liberation for autistic people through the creation of 
a distinct autistic subjectivity.14  However, it is important to note, as Jutel (2009) has, that these autism-
led narratives and the identity politics that have emerged around the autism diagnosis cannot be 
divorced from the ordering ‘regime’ of the diagnosis and continuously refer back to the ‘cultural, 
spatial and historical practices associated with a diagnosis’ (Jutel, 2009, p.288).   
2.4 The introduction of Asperger’s syndrome and neurodivergent identities  
Nadesan (2005) argues that the increase of autism diagnoses is correlative with the opening of the 
autism category to ‘the eccentric shades of normality’ which are found within Asperger’s syndrome 
 
14 There is a clear difference here between those with low support needs and those with higher support needs. For 
some autistic people and their families, neurodiversity politics are not accepted as a useful way to approach autism. 
Indeed, the neurodiversity movement has been framed as producing an accepted version of autism (namely what 
was called Asperger’s Syndrome) and neglecting or wilfully ignoring autistic people who are non-verbal and 
requiring round the clock care (Clements, 2017).  This highlights the internal struggles of diagnostic definition within 
the autism community. 
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(Frith, 2003, p.11). Nadesan’s (2005) interest is specifically toward Asperger’s syndrome and as she 
argues the widening of the criteria of autism and increasing paediatric care in the very early years of 
life allows for more children to be identified as autistic. Nadesan (2005) does not engage with the 
circular arguments around whether autism is biological or constructed, she rather suggests that autism 
has a biological aetiology.  However, the best place to understand autism as it is lived, experienced 
and understood is through examining conditions of the social world. As she argues, to understand 
autism we must recognise that it is contingent upon historical and contemporaneous configurations 
of the social world and our conceptualisations of ourselves as social beings. As Nadesan (2005) writes:  
 
[…] autism, or more specifically, the idea of autism is fundamentally socially constructed. [This 
claim] is not to reject a biological basis for the condition or symptoms that come to be labelled as 
“autistic”. Rather, I use the phrase socially constructed to point to the social conditions of possibility 
for the naming of autism as a distinct disorder and to the social conditions of possibility for our 
methods of interpreting the disorder, representing it, remediating it, and even for performing it 
(p.2) 
 
Nadesan (2005) suggests that autism is fundamentally a condition of the twentieth century, and 
Asperger’s syndrome is fundamentally a condition of the late twentieth and early twenty first century. 
Furthermore, Nadesan argues that the emergence of Asperger’s syndrome and the so-called autism 
epidemic has led to autism being simultaneously a fascination and a threat (p.108). This 
fascination/fear of autism comes from the idea of the ‘autism epidemic’ and from narratives of lost 
children stolen by the condition. It also stems from the idea of the so called ‘higher functioning’ autistic 
person or person with Asperger’s syndrome as somehow being temporally displaced through their 
connection to the machine in their perceived technological and computing superiority.  
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Elizabeth Grosz (1994) has written on how some conceptions of the human being are only possible 
because of the prevailing technological advancements (p.9). The conception of the autistic person as 
rational, logical and systematic with deficits in emotion, empathy and reciprocal engagement in the 
social world configures autistic people at one and the same time more than human and less than 
human through their connection to the prevailing technological modes of the last forty years. This is, 
too, a gendered framing of co-existing patterns of male genius and pathological maleness. This will be 
returned to in the third chapter of this thesis.  
 
This conception of autism as, if not superior in certain areas, then certainly ‘different’ has also been 
taken up by certain demographics of the autistic community who identify, as a group, as neurodiverse 
and individually as neurodivergent (Singer, 2016, Meyerding, 1998, Blume, 1998, Bumiller, 2008). 
Indeed, the very language which configures the autistic subject as closer to the machine than the 
human is taken up by some sections of the autistic community. The neurodiversity model suggests that 
those with autism should not be categorised as pathological but rather that they are neurologically 
different and this is ‘hardwired’ into their genetic and neurological make-up from birth (Brownlow and 
O’Dell in Ortega, 2009, p.439). The neurodiversity movement is formulated upon the knowledge of the 
self as what Vidal (2009) cites as a ‘cerebral subject’. 
 
 It is partially through this knowledge of the neurological aetiology of autism that it could move away 
from its historical categorisation as psychopathy as framed within psychological and psychoanalytic 
discourses (Bettelheim, 1972, Asperger in Frith, 1991).  Rather than being a condition of the mind, 
autism becomes a condition of the body through its attachment to the brain. Thus, it is argued that 
there is no person underneath the autism, having autism is their subjectivity. Through this ontological 
positionality blame and responsibility can potentially be removed from all parties involved with the 
autistic person and the autistic person themselves (this is especially the case for caregivers of those 
with autism who were previously blamed for their child’s autism (Bettelheim, 1960)). Autism can be 
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positioned as morally innocent and can be reframed as a difference rather than a pathology 
(Lurhmann, 2012, p.37).  
 
To say that we understand ourselves and our consciousness as the product of biological processes of 
our brains is not to say that this is an ontological fact or a pre-existing reality, nor does it mean that 
this is truly the case with all individuals (Latimer, 2013). Rather, it makes sense to think about this 
emergent subjectification as Ortega does, as ‘an anthropological figure’ and one which is constituted 
by performative enactments. As Ortega writes: ‘[…] to analyse the cerebral subject, one should focus 
on its formation and the practices of self-constitution through which individual’s fashion themselves 
in cerebral terms’ (p.426). Neurodiversity is one of the ways that a cerebral ontology is constituted 
through performative enactments of this discourse.  
 
Rather than suggesting that neurodiversity and the neurodivergent subjectivities it enables are a direct 
consequence of the neurosciences it makes more sense to think of the two as influencing one another, 
in a form of what Ian Hacking (2006) cites as ‘looping’. As Ortega has suggested it is not that 
neuroscientific ‘discoveries’ have created the ‘cerebral subject’ which has in turn enabled the 
neurodivergent subject but that increasing visibility, in which we can include numerous 
autobiographical works, and the work of activists and self-advocates that have built new possible 
categories of human identity which then the various fields of the neurosciences engage with. This 
connectivity continues to ‘loop’ within complex institutional and interpersonal networks (Ortega, 
p.426, Hacking, 1999, pp.103-104). As Chloe Silverman (2008) states, if the neurodiversity model 
positions itself as a biosocial culture then social science research ought to be thinking about how it is 
conceptualised and put into practise through using resources from externally produced medical 
understandings, guides and information by those with autism and popular representations of autism.  
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2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter began with a discussion of what we know about autism, and, by doing so it is clearer all 
that we do not know. A presentation of some of the relevant literature from the sociology of autism 
and related fields followed. This literature primarily discussed one of the key areas of inquiry in autism 
research: are rates of diagnosis going up or has there been a diagnostic substitution? The answer to 
this question is most likely that this is not an either/or question. Due to the changes in the ways in 
which autism is understood and consequently diagnosed we can infer that diagnoses of individuals are 
more likely to occur. Terms such mental retardation became broken up into more specific diagnoses 
and child psychology became more prevalent which enabled autism to become subject to 
epidemiological studies and consequently tested for more precisely. The historical and social practices 
of diagnosing autism demonstrate its entanglement within the social. Sociologists such as Nadesan 
(2005) and Runswick-Cole (2016) argue that we must approach autism through this lens in order to aid 
understanding its complexity.  
 
A specific focus was placed on the literature which determines the specificity of a diagnosis as ‘giving 
the name’ (Brown, 1990). A diagnosis is never as simple as it seems and examining the effects of a 
diagnosis allow a unique vantage point onto other areas. A key area that is of interest to certain social 
theory is that a diagnosis is placed on passive bodies and functions as a device to aid social order. In 
this sense the diagnosis produces the disease or condition it claims to simply be naming (Brown, 1990, 
Duden, 1998). This labelling theory is often how autism – especially Asperger’s Syndrome- has been 
discussed (Conrad, 2007). I argued in this section that this must be complicated to understand how 
autism diagnosis are ‘done’ and to discuss how they are always relational. I argued that the diagnosis 
of autism is interesting specifically because the diagnosis itself is often the end point of support and 
care, therefore the diagnosis is creating autistic people, but that this has a certain political and 
communal potential distinct from the negative understanding of medical power acting on passive 
bodies. Consequently, the final section of the chapter discussed how these knowledges of autism do 
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not only exist at the level of diagnosis or sociological analysis but come to create subject positionings 
and identity formations through the idea of neurological difference. These subject positionings are 
reliant upon the formations of diagnosis and of wider conceptions of the human.  
 
The next chapter ‘Autism and Gender’ will address the key literature around the second big question 
in autism research: is the gender diagnostic ratio the correct picture? As I will discuss in this chapter, 
many AFAB people engage in processes of normalisation through ‘masking’ or ‘camouflaging’. This 
presents a key challenge to what the category of autism is if it can no longer be observed in behavioural 
diagnostic settings. This privileging of visibility being the key to both the identity one assumes and is 


















Chapter Three  
Autism and Gender 
 
3.1 The gender disparity in diagnosis rates: Is it the correct picture? 
The history of autism has always cited a gender ratio which documents higher rates of boys and men 
(Frith, 2003, p.59, pp.65-66).  Understanding this disparity in the gender ratio is the second main area 
in autism research (Hollin, 2016, p.210). The National Autistic Society cites a speculative gender ratio 
of anywhere between 2:1/15:1 male/female split (The National Autistic Society, 2017).  These figures 
have led to numerous debates around whether they are an accurate representation of the gender 
division in the UK’s autistic population (Atwood, 2006, Hurley, 2014, Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011, 
Wing, 1981). These considerations centre around two ideas: is autism simply less prevalent in women 
and girls, or does autism occur to the same, or similar rates, to men and boys but it is simply being 
missed.  
 
Questions consequently arise around the following areas: have those assigned female at birth (AFAB) 
have always been autistic and now the category has widened once again through increasing knowledge 
to be able to include them? Do AFAB individuals, through socialisation or biological differences, display 
autism differently so they are not visible as autistic? Is autism framed through its connection to 
maleness which in turn makes autism in AFAB people unthinkable and unidentifiable? Or, is there 
something inherently and biologically male about autism? Suggestions as to whether autism is being 
missed in AFAB individuals often cite a failure of the medical community who are the first point of 
referral for an autism diagnosis (usually from primary care such as a GP or possibly from secondary 
care such as a Community Mental Health Nurse) to consider the gender norms which may force girls 




 That autistic AFAB individuals mask their autism by mimicking other AFAB individuals is a prominent 
emerging argument in research from psychology and neurology which has recently gained traction 
(Belcher, 2016, Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011, Attwood, 2000, Livingston, 2020, Mandy, 2019, Hull et 
al, 2017, Lai et al, 2017, Cage and Troxell-Whitman, 2019).  Gould and Ashton-Smith (2011) argue that 
autistic girls and women watch other women and girls and learn how to copy the social norms common 
to their gender so that suspicion that they may have the condition does not arise. The suggestion that 
AFAB individuals with autism must perform their genders to mask their autistic traits is also presented 
in high profile autobiographical accounts by women on the autistic spectrum, for example, Liane 
Holliday-Wiley’s (2014) influential autobiography Pretending to be Normal. This discussion on masking 
will be continued at the end of this chapter when it is considered in relation to theories around passing 
and ‘coming out’.  
 
There are also discussions around whether autism as experienced by AFAB individuals has differing 
manifestations and, whether bias in the diagnostic category itself is producing the gender disparity 
due to the diagnostic criteria being based on a male model of autism (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011, 
Belcher, 2016). Bargiela et al (2016) has suggested that there that may be a female phenotype of 
autism which the diagnostic tests do not account for. Thus, we must think about whether the tests 
devised to identify autism enact gender as a fundamental part, or even the aetiology, of autism. As 
Bargiela et al (2016) discuss, the tests to diagnose autism are highly standardised but that because 
these tests have been implemented through overwhelming male samples they do not allow for the 
possibility of a female phenotype when testing women and girls, and thus this may account for a 
greater gender disparity (Bargiela et al, 2016, p.3282).  I would argue that not only do the diagnostic 
tools miss the specificity of AFAB individual’s manifestation of autism, but that a masculine phenotype 
of gender is enacted through certain diagnostic tests. The ways autism is diagnosed is deeply 
embedded within existing frameworks of gendered norms.  
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For all the reasons mentioned above there is a large temporal disparity between the ages that boys 
and girls are diagnosed (Bargiela, 2016). On the so-called ‘higher functioning’ end of the autism 
spectrum when AFAB individuals are diagnosed with autism it is far more likely to take place in 
adulthood or in adolescence than in early childhood as is often the case for those assigned male at 
birth (AMAB) (Giarelli, et al, 2010). Bargiela et al, (2010) suggest that there is also an increased 
likelihood of AFAB individuals being misdiagnosed with a number of a variety of mental health 
diagnoses (for example, Bipolar Affective Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder) before the autism diagnosis is assigned. This alerts us to how gender disrupts 
and confounds the normative and prevalent understanding of autism and potentially to come some 
way to understanding that overrepresentation in AMAB individuals is not the correct picture. It also 
highlights that AFAB individuals may experience higher rates of mental distress and have concurrent 
disorders or previous mental health difficulties as a result of a temporal lag in diagnosis as opposed to 
their male peers.  It is clear that being identified as autistic when one is AFAB is contingent upon various 
factors which rely heavily upon what we already understand autism to be. It demands that those 
closest to them have sufficient knowledge of autism to recognise the condition as it manifests in AFAB 
individuals and that the individual has adequate support to advise on seeking diagnosis. This is 
particularly important as many with autism do not recognise the condition in themselves, especially as 
younger children and teenagers.  
 
This lack of self-knowledge prior to diagnosis is referenced in the numerous autobiographies or self-
help texts which document the sense of clarity that arises when a person who knew they was different 
or struggled but never considered autism finds out they have the condition (Dunne, 2016, James, 
2017). As Bargiela et al (2016) states from findings in her qualitative research project on late diagnosis 
in AFAB individuals, many with autism simply do not recognise it in themselves because it is assumed 
to be a male condition. Likewise, GPs, parents and educators are unlikely to assume autism in AFAB 
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individuals (although this is changing slowly) thus leaving the individual to the fate of chancing upon 
somebody with knowledge of the condition as it presents in AFAB people.   
 
Therefore, it is also important that the AFAB individual has access to knowledges about the condition 
to, in the first instance, think they may have autism and in the second instance, have access to 
knowledges about their condition to better understand themselves as an autistic person. These 
interpersonal, educational and institutional factors connect together to allow autism to be diagnosed 
in AFAB individuals. Thus, understanding the gender disparity is only possible by understanding the 
contingencies which lead to diagnosis. This bares similarities to what Goffman wrote of the mental 
patients he worked with: ‘[O]ne could say that mental patients suffer not from mental illnesses, but 
from contingencies’ (Goffman cited in Eyal et al, 2010, p.21). Though this is not to state that autism is 
not a ‘real’ entity and one that only arises through linguistic nomenclature, but rather, that these 
factors must be addressed to understand how autism is knowable, and consequently diagnosable, in 
AFAB individuals.  
 
3.2 Simon Baron-Cohen and the Extreme Male Brain 
Simon Baron-Cohen takes up the position that there is something inherently male common to autism. 
Baron-Cohen is currently the director of Cambridge’s autism research centre and a professor of 
neurodevelopmental psychopathy. Baron-Cohen (1997) took up Hans Asperger’s theories of autism 
being an extreme variant of male intelligence to suggest that aetiology of autism is to be found in the 
male brain. To do this Baron-Cohen proposed a theory of essential sex difference. Baron-Cohen’s 
starting point is the over representation of boys and men with autism. Taking this as the problem to 
be solved, Baron-Cohen (2002) suggests that the reason for this over representation is that those who 
are male are predisposed genetically and biologically to having autism. Baron-Cohen argues this from 
the starting hypothesis that the non-autistic male population have lowered empathic and higher 
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systematising traits and consequently the autistic brain is an exaggerated version of this (p. 249, 1997, 
p.8). Baron-Cohen argues that these traits are the result of exposure to excess pre-natal testosterone 
(2005, p.9). These heightened levels of exposure, states Baron-Cohen: ‘[…] may be pushing the autistic 
brain to develop beyond the typical male […]’ (p.90). Thus, it is not a great leap for boys to have autism, 
but it is much harder for girls to have autism. There may be certain biological and genetic ‘protective’ 
factors for girls which may offer partial reasons for the gender disparity in autism diagnosis, but Baron-
Cohen problematically suggests that gender differences should be understood as biological sex 
differences and that the two are one and the same.  
 
To make his claims that autism is a version of the ‘extreme male brain’, Mcabe and Timmini (2016) 
suggest that Baron-Cohen took up ideas from his influential work on the Theory of Mind Module 
(ToMM) (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Baron-Cohen theorised that those with autism lack an ability to 
understand what is going on in the mind of another person and that understanding why this deficit 
exists would be the key to understanding where autism emanates from (Mcabe and Timmini, 2016). 
However, used as a tool to uncover a biological aetiology of autism, ToMM was not successful so 
Baron-Cohen turned to thinking about what motivates and allows for human beings to have a theory 
of another’s mind. Baron-Cohen suggested that what we ought to be thinking about is whether autistic 
people lack empathy and that this is the reason for a lack of ToMM.  Baron-Cohen hypothesised that 
the focus on objects over people and the impaired sociality of the autistic mind suggested a highly 
systematic, logical and rational way of thinking and perceiving, much like the non-autistic man. 
Women, in his opinion, are much more likely to be empathic and have highly developed social skills. 
As Baron-Cohen (2002) writes: ‘[T]he male brain is defined psychometrically as those individuals in 
whom systematising is significantly better than empathising, and the female brain is defined as the 
opposite cognitive profile. Using these definitions, autism can be considered an extreme of the normal 
male profile’ (p.248, italics in original).  
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Baron-Cohen does not suggest that all those assigned female at birth have a female brain, or all 
assigned male at birth have a male brain, but rather in his triad of asocial free floating brains there is 
the female, the male and the autistic brain (1997, p.3, 2002, p.249). Thus, an assigned female can have 
a male brain and vice versa. This of course makes a very simple way for Baron-Cohen to account for 
autism in women whilst still maintaining autism’s connection to essential maleness. This also, as Evans 
(2013) suggests, allows for Baron-Cohen to engage with some of the earlier theories of autism as a 
disorder of ego but it does not attempt to infer or speculate on the psychic processes (p.24). Through 
this conflation of gender differences and sex differences, Baron-Cohen enacts gender as a part of what 
autism is and gender becomes an observable set of behaviours which can be assessed for autism.  
 
As Baron-Cohen (2005) writes: ‘[T]he EMB [extreme male brain] theory was first formulated by Hans 
Asperger as a clinical anecdote more than sixty years ago. In the last decade it has been reformulated 
to be psychologically testable. Using psychometric definitions of typical male and female brain, people 
with autistic spectrum conditions show an exaggeration of the male profile’ (p.13, own emphasis). This 
enables Baron-Cohen’s research to be implemented in standardised behavioural tests such as the 
Sally-Anne test and the Empathy Quotient (EQ) which also have the potential to utilised for 
epidemiological and statistical data collection.  
 
The EQ is one of the initial questionnaires that is given to individuals who may have autism and is 
implemented as standard in the NHS.15 If there is a high score on the EQ further assessment may be 
considered (Asperger’s in Frith, 1999, Baron-Cohen, 2002). If we agree with the arguments that autism 
may manifest differently in women or that women mask their autistic traits, then Baron-Cohen’s EQ 
test based around his hypothesis on an extreme male brain may gather results of a higher male to 
 
15 This test and variants of it can be found online for self-diagnosis. See: https://psychology-tools.com/empathy-
quotient/  
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female split. The EQ test may not allow for AFAB manifestations of autism to be picked up upon if they 
exist outside of this framework of maleness.   
 
More recently in 2018, Baron-Cohen made the headlines again when he suggested that a new and 
larger study confirmed the extreme male brain hypothesis (The Conversation, 2018). From findings 
devised from 7,000 online survey participants hosted by the website for the U.K TV channel ‘4’, Baron-
Cohen argues that being autistic does not make one ‘more male’ but that the traits map onto shared 
masculine traits and a lack of empathy. Baron-Cohen and his team do not situate these masculine traits 
as purely social or biological but as an entanglement with the social and biological. Although again, 
Baron-Cohen fails to note the inclusion of the bias of the medical professionals in the construction and 
materialisation of autism.  Baron-Cohen notes that AFAB people have been overlooked and concedes 
that many AFAB people are likely to be undiagnosed, but he holds fast to the idea that sex difference 
is partially responsible for diagnostic rates citing more men than women.  
 
It has been historically difficult to notice women and girls with autism as they operate outside of this 
framework of maleness. In Hans Asperger’s (1991) case notes it is evident that he could not see autism 
in women even when he was confronted with a mother who manifested the same behaviours and 
affect as her autistic son who was in his care (p.51). Edith Sheffer’s (2018) historical study discusses 
Asperger’s apparent contempt for the girls in his care who displayed ASC tendencies. Asperger 
described them as ‘disruptive, manipulative and untreatable’ (Sheffer, 2018).  Stuart Murray (2008) 
has further stated ‘[A]utism, it appears, can be understood best when seems in terms of the male 
character, and while its presence in females cannot be denied, it seems more difficult to map an idea 
of the condition on to the generalised sense of what we believe women and girls to be’ (p.140).  Giarelli 
et al (2010) suggest that this reliance on autism being manifested in typical masculine patterns of 
behaviour is partially to be held accountable for diagnosis disparity between boys and girls. Giarelli et 
al (2010) also suggest, as have others, that there is sometimes an unwillingness for those in close 
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professional capacity (such as teachers, nurses, social workers and sports coaches) to suggest that an 
AFAB person begin the referral process for diagnosis due to an ignorance about the occurrence of 
autism in girls or an inability to see certain behaviours manifested by girls as autistic traits (Posserud 
et al, 2006).  
 
3.3 Sociological Responses 
Gillis-Buck and Richardson (2014) have argued autism shows a gender ratio disparity as equal to other 
cognitive disabilities when we reach the so called ‘lower functioning’ end of the spectrum (around 2:1 
male to female) (p.2). So, we must ask, why the specific interest in gender and sex difference and its 
relation to autism? Autism holds a strange place both medically and in our cultural and social 
understanding of the condition. It seems to offer a window onto something uniquely human, our ability 
to socialise and form connections and bonds with other human beings. Gillis-Buck and Richardson 
(2014) argue that the inclusion of Asperger Syndrome into the autistic spectrum in the 1990s allowed 
for autisms specific connection to maleness to be formalised (p.3).  At present, the Asperger Syndrome 
gender ratio is anywhere from 16:1 to 3:1 and there are no accurate figures due to there being no 
studies done on a large enough scale to validate or invalidate this disparity (National Autistic Society, 
2019). Asperger’s Syndrome is tied to cultural understandings of genius, of rationality, of 
overachievement in the educational and vocational areas of science, technology, engineering and 
maths, and the over representation of boys and men with the condition is taken up to suggest there is 
something inherently male about autism. Due to the inability of many with autism to engage easily in 
normative identifiers of social behaviour and coupled with the excellent and diverse skills many have; 
autism is positioned as allowing an insight into both the excess and the limits of our existence as human 
beings. Specifically, as Dan Goodley (2016) argues, it offers an insight into the excess and limits of 
normative, European rational man born in Enlightenment (no pagination, Kindle edition).  
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Goodley (2016) suggests that the connection of maleness that Baron-Cohen gives to autism through 
his work at Cambridge University lends autism a level of ‘prestige and recognition’ which has been 
little afforded to other learning disability and related conditions (no pagination, Kindle edition).  Yet, 
of course this prestige and recognition doesn’t necessarily extend to improving the lives of those who 
are autistic. Autism is said to speak to the human condition, but if the universal human is a priori man, 
then it can only be in dialogue with a very narrow idea of the human. Goodley suggests Baron-Cohen’s 
research depoliticises gender as it individualises and essentialises maleness, with femaleness as its 
binary opposite (no pagination, Kindle edition). Goodley’s critical engagement with autism and 
masculinity in modernity states that to understand what autism is, we must also interrogate our 
current configurations of what a man and women are and how autism comes to represent the 
limitations and the potential of maleness within the gender binary.  
 
Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young (2012) take up the overrepresentation of boys and men with 
autism to argue in their paper Autism Spectrum Disorders: Towards a Gendered Embodiment Model 
that the scientific methods and empiricism used to identity the sex differences often believed to be 
the aetiology of autism conflate sex with gender in an unproblematised way. They begin by giving a 
breakdown why being assigned female at birth may have protective factors. Namely, that when a co-
morbid intellectual disability is diagnosed (an IQ below 70) then the gender disparity goes as low as 
1:2 male/female divide, this could account for the overrepresentation of men and boys with what was 
called Asperger’s Syndrome because the disparity levels out significantly when diagnosing 
classic/Kanner’s autism (p.1668). Likewise, two X chromosomes are cited as a protective factor in girls 
not developing certain disorders which are X-linked. Fragile X disorder is cited as an example because 
it is far more often diagnosed in boys and if it occurs in girls it is far less severe, but when it does occur 
up to 30% of them are cited to have a co-occuring autism diagnosis (p.1668).  
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Although Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young cite these as potential protective factors in select 
assigned female cases, they suggest this is not sufficient to suggest that there is a fundamental 
biological male/female difference which can be said to cause autism. They argue that the behaviours 
of autism which are commonly discussed as though they were innate biological sex differences, such 
as in Baron-Cohen’s research, cannot be separated from the social gendered environment. Engaging 
with Fausto-Sterling’s (2005) feminist work on the intraconnectivity of biology and the social on bone 
density across different social and cultural demographics, Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young argue 
that autism needs a detailed consideration of the gendered social world as it interacts with the 
biological matter of the body, as this may be at least partially accountable for the gender disparity in 
autism diagnosis rates.  
 
Sex based biological and genetic differences are generally distinguished from socially (re)produced 
gender roles. Yet, Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young suggest that in many research projects around 
autism sex and gender become one, and gender ceases to exist. As they suggest: ‘[T]hough sex and 
gender may be conceptually distinct they are often in practice inseparable’ (p.1668). Baron-Cohen’s 
research that suggests that the systematising brain is a mainstay of the male brain is one example. 
Baron-Cohen’s evidence to back up his claims that male and female brains are solely genetic and 
hormonally constituted relies upon socially and culturally normative understandings of men and 
women. Baron-Cohen (2002) suggests that the fact that more women work in care jobs or educating 
roles and more men in the STEM subjects forms objective evidence that men and women have 
different brains with different aptitudes and limitations. It is as though the social world and social 
oppression and sex/gender/class/race-based privilege did not exist for Baron-Cohen (though he may 
slowly be coming around to the idea in his later research (The Conversation, 2018)).   
 
Cheslack-Postava and Jordan-Young suggest that rather than rehashing the sex is biological and gender 
is socially constructed argument we ought to consider the possibility that there is an impossibility of 
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separating the two into distinct spheres of influence. Rather we should refer to sex and gender as 
sex/gender to highlight the inseparability of the two as they interact in and on the locus of the body. 
As they state: ‘… it is not possible to separate the individual’s gendered biography from their biology 
– in fact from the moment of birth, gendered processes literally become biological’ (p.1668). Thus, a 
framework better suited for understanding autism would be one which looked to more complex social 
interactions on infants which pay attention to neuroplasticity and the effects that gendered 
interactions have on the developing mind. Indeed, it is strange to consider that whilst our brains are 
considered to be plastic, in these essentialised sex-based configurations neurosex/gender is not 
affected by the social world.  Gillis-Buck and Richardson (2014) follow on from this argument to suggest 
that the conflation of sex and gender within autism research suggests that autism is becoming a lens 
through which to identity the aetiology of essential sex difference. In this way autism becomes a 
disorder of gender (p.2, own emphasis).  
 
3.4 Gender Trouble in Autism 
Taking up the suggestion that gender is given far too much importance in autism research and that this 
interest in gender and sex differences does not match how autistic people think about their gendered 
identities, Davidson and Tamas (2016) present an interesting argument about the performative nature 
of gender in autism. They argue that because autism is a condition of social impairment and gender is 
a social construct which is produced and reproduced through the repetition of gendered acts that the 
performative nature of gender is made visible most clearly through those with autism. As they suggest, 
for autistic people gender is performance rather than performative. Davidson and Tamas (2016) 
suggest that this central positioning of gender as it relates to autism should be reconsidered through 
the gendered experiences of those within the autistic space. They argue that for autistic individuals, 
gender never becomes reified in a normative form. This they suggest, offers both an argument against 
the pathological connection of gender to autism and simultaneously offers a critical tool for feminist 
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theory. As they argue: ‘[C]learly, the approach makes something strange not just out of autism, but of 
gender itself, drawing the phenomena out of the social ether to give it an oddly prominent form and 
place in autistic lives, that […] it doesn’t quite deserve to have’ (p.61).  They draw attention to the ways 
that autism people experience their gender highlights the way that gender becomes reified and 
naturalised.  
 
Indeed, through my research I have discovered that there is something about autism that troubles 
gender and that many on the autistic spectrum do not identify solely as cis gendered women or within 
the gender binary. Recent figures from the Tavistock Gender Identity Development Services, suggest 
that there is a doubling of young people accessing the services each year since 2010, and within this 
group there is an overrepresentation of those with autism or those who are clinically observed to have 
autistic traits (unpublished, own correspondence). Those accessing gender clinics with autism have 
been placed as high as 19% in the years 2015-2016 by the Tavistock (unpublished figures, own 
correspondence). Historically there have always been greater numbers of AMAB individuals accessing 
gender identity services, however in the last five years there has been an increase in assigned females 
accessing gender clinics and figures currently cite around 30 percent assigned male and 70 percent 
assigned female accessing these services. Of those assigned female, Tavistock research suggests, as 
high as 19 percent present with co-occurring GD and ASD. Of course, these figures only identify those 
who attend gender clinics and are known to clinical teams and many others may never come to the 
attention of gender clinics for a variety of reasons.16  This overrepresentation of people with ASD and 
gender identity is taken up by Davidson and Tamas (2016). Through their usage of online social media 
sites as researchers they found autistic people to be representing themselves and their gendered 
identity online as far more likely to be gender queer, non-binary or trans.  
 
 
16 I discovered that certain gender clinics give the EQ test as part of the referral process. Anecdotally, this 
highlights the prominence that this correlation has and how gender identity and autism are being considered as 
potentially related.  
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Drawing on Judith Butler, Davidson and Tamas (2016) suggest that thinking about gender through and 
with people who have autism the ‘incessant enactment’ or the performative nature of gender becomes 
transparent (p.62). As the authors argue, there is ‘[…] no more articulate and radical account of the 
entirely fictional thing that gender is, than that which emerges from people who don’t have to unlearn 
its rules’ (p.63). By this they mean that for autistic people doing gender, assumed to be learnt naturally 
and unthinkingly by non-autistic people, is a conscious effort. People with autism must learn to 
perform normative genders in a way which is a great ‘emotional labour’ for them (p.59). The 
unquestioned assumption that gender is unconsciously performed by those without autism could, of 
course, be challenged by thinking about lesbian or gay subjectivities. Some of whom may trouble 
gender in non-normative performances which subvert the heterosexual matrix either by choice or not 
(Butler, 1993, p.313). Yet, Davidson and Tamas (2016) argue that it is precisely because autism is a 
fundamental condition of social impairment that the social nature of gender becomes apparent. They 
argue that the overrepresentation of autistic individuals who cite some form of gender trouble affirms 
this position (p.60-61).  
 
Davidson and Tamas (2016) suggest feminist and gender theory could engage with gender as it is 
experienced through those with autism in a way through which the naturalised modes of doing gender 
can be undone and thus the fictive nature of gender can be shown. Thus, the figure of the gender 
queer autistic could be used to further certain sections of feminism’s assertion that gender is 
linguistically and socially determined. However, there is a theoretical contradiction in terms at work 
within this paper. Whilst, on the one hand, gender is set up as being purely imaginary and fictive, on 
the other they position reification as the process in which gender becomes separated from reality. 
They name gender as experienced by autistic people a ghost or a spectre. This naming as it is used 
pertaining to reification cannot help but to position the autistic individual as some kind of historical 
prophet, one who in dialectical fashion opens the way to a new genderless world.  This, as I shall show 
briefly, is what the rhetorician Jordynn Jack (2012) does in her figuration of a gender copia.   
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Consequently, Davidson and Tamas (2016), perhaps uncritically (unwittingly?),  engage with the idea 
of reification in a way which rather than undoing and untangling the institutional and ideological 
modes in which gender becomes both materialised and naturalised, they reiterate the idea of some 
essentialness to gender, having something pre-social and individualised which through the autistic 
individual we may have access to the truth about gender, even if that truth is that there is no such 
thing outside of the social.  This perhaps fetishises autism and its connection to gender by using it for 
the aims of gender theory and could also be said to be suggesting that autistic individual’s gender 
trouble is a result of their autism. The idea that autism causes confusion to one’s gender identity is 
seen by many as a reduction of their identity to pathology once more. This argument has also featured 
in several problematic medical case studies which reduce trans identities to being caused solely by the 
patient being autistic (Landen and Rasmussen, 1997).                                                                  
 
A similar position to Davidson and Tamas (2016) is taken by Jordynn Jack (2011). Jack also focuses on 
the overrepresentation of non-binary identities in the autistic community.  The people who Jordynn 
Jack chooses to reference from online blogs do, indeed, overwhelmingly confound binary 
understandings of gender. Jack suggests that the social character of gender is not intuitively 
understood by autistic people and has to be learnt and repeated consciously. As Jack (2011) writes:  
 
Due both to their ability to denaturalise social norms and to their neurological differences, autistic 
individuals can offer novel insights into gender as a social process. Examining gender from an 
autistic perspective highlights some elements as socially constructed which may otherwise seem 




 Jack takes a position similar to Davison and Tamas (2016) in that she suggests that feminist and gender 
studies scholars can mobilise an autistic perspective of gender to understand how gender is formed, 
created and understood through utilising a range of available discourses. Jack (2011), also using 
Butler’s terms, suggests that gender is a performance for autistic people rather than it being 
performative. Jack (2011) seems to position a utopic space of gender whereby one can choose their 
gendered identity. However, there is something missing in Jack’s (2011) analysis in that whilst she 
explicitly highlights that her sample of autobiographical writings has been selected from online forums 
and blogs, she neglects to discuss this particular medium as being important in the freedom to express 
one’s chosen gender. It is unlikely that this utopic space of gendered multiplicities (what Jack terms as 
a ‘copia’) could exist offline.  In Jack’s (2011) discussion a radical gender trouble is positioned within 
the individual autistic. Jack ignores the social norms and restrictions that are at play in the offline world 
which may, and most likely do, restrict the offline autistic embodiment of gender queer identities.  
 
3.5 Masking, Passing and Coming Out  
 
Medical understandings of masking 
Where gender makes another appearance in autism research from the fields of psychology and 
neurology is in discussions of ‘masking’, otherwise known as ‘camouflaging’ or ‘compensation’ (Hull et 
al, 2019, Livingston et al, 2020). As discussed briefly in the beginning of this chapter, in recent years 
the purely observational diagnostic techniques for diagnosing autism have been challenged by an 
emerging understanding that many autistic people do not always demonstrate their autism visually 
and that they may ‘mask’ their autistic traits by copying learned neurotypical behaviours (Atwood, 
2006, Cassidy, 2018). This has specifically been related to AFAB individuals and it is argued that AFAB 
people are said to mask more and to cover their autism through exerted efforts of gendered 
normalisation (Mandy, 2016, Lai et al, 2017).  
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A recent study suggests up to 70% of autistic adults mask their perceived differences (Cage and Troxell-
Whitman, 2019). Masking has been documented as being more prevalent in AFAB individuals (Hull, et 
al, 2019, Atwood, 2007). Leading autism psychologists Judith Gould and Jacqui Ashton-Smith (2011), 
Tony Attwood (2006, 2007) and Simon Baron-Cohen (2019) have all suggested that some autistic 
people- predominantly AFAB individuals- may ‘mask’ their autistic traits through performing normative 
gendered behaviours and roles to avoid being seen as strange or not normal (Holliday-Wiley, 1999) .  
As Gould and Ashton-Smith (2011) have argued, this leads to  predominantly AFAB individuals being 
‘missed’ from diagnosis or ‘misdiagnosed’. A different phenotype of autism as it manifests in AFAB 
individuals has been proposed by some as needed to understand this phenomenon and that, as such, 
diagnostic materials are needed to change accordingly (Kopp and Gilberg, 2011, Milner, et al, 2019). 
 
A recent comparative study by autism psychologists Livingston et al (2020) examines what they cite as 
‘compensatory strategies in adults with and without autism’. The authors suggest that the 
compensatory theory may be relevant to understanding why many autistic individuals are not 
diagnosed until adulthood due to the diagnostic focus on observable behaviour.  Compensation theory 
acts as an umbrella term which encompasses masking alongside several other categories which 
address the processes of hiding difference or working around perceived problematic behaviours for 
the individual. A key finding from Livingston et al (2020) suggests that compensation techniques are 
not strongly related to the diagnosis of autism. As the authors (2020) write: ‘is it not diagnosis per se 
that prompts compensatory strategies’ and that ‘[T]his novel finding indicates that it is more autistic 
traits (or insight into these), rather than a feature of diagnosable autism (e.g. knowing you have a 
diagnosis that makes you different from others) that is linked with greater compensation’ (p.14, p.13).  
 
This suggests that autistic people feel compelled to ‘mask’ much more consistently and intensively 
prior to the diagnosis. This is significant for this present thesis because it suggests a potential for the 
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diagnosis itself to alleviate some of the pressure of trying to fit in. If it is more prevalent for assigned 
female at birth individuals to mask then we can presume a gender component to this imperative, this 
will be examined in the analysis chapters.  The idea that prior to diagnosis masking is more prevalent 
is further suggested by discourses around masking emerging from the autistic online community, as 
will be discussed shortly.  This also relates to the discussion from the sociology of diagnosis section of 
the literature review in that the diagnosis functions as an emancipatory tool.  
 
These cited medical explorations do not ask why undiagnosed autistic people feel they must mask, 
camouflage or compensate, why AFAB individuals might mask more, nor why the diagnosis may 
engender a feeling that masking is no longer so important.  In not critiquing the governing norms of 
the social as producing normative bodies, these studies could be argued to be reproducing the ableist 
hegemonic norm and can be arguably a site of the reproduction of stigma. In this sense, Erving 
Goffman’s (1990) work on stigma from 1963 still bears relevance in thinking about how the individual 
comes to experience themselves as non-normative or in some way stigmatised. As Goffman writes: 
‘[…] the stigmatised individual is likely to feel like he is ‘on’, having to be self-conscious and calculating 
about the impression he is making, to a degree and in areas of conduct which he assumes others are 
not’ (p.25). Stigma is mapped onto certain embodiments (e.g. burns victims, amputees, cancer 
patients) and identities (e.g. race, sexuality, class) through ongoing productions of hierarchised 
identities and this, of course, impacts on the individual’s understanding of the self. Thus, masking or 
camouflaging can, then, be understood as the ‘management of a spoiled identity’ (Goffman, 1990). 
What is different to much of Goffman’s understanding of stigma is that what the stigmatised difference 
is is not fully known by those who mask because prior to diagnosis – or self-recognition of autism- the 
difference is not visible nor has it yet been named. There is a sense that what is being masked is an as 
yet unnamed difference from normality. Attempts to enact normativity often focus on enacting a 
gendered normativity because of the foundational importance gender has to subject formation.  As 
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Judith Roof (2016) has noted: ‘[…] to gender is to signal, mask, obscure, suggest, mislead, misrecognize 
[…]  Gender’s job is to make the subject fit’ (p.1). 
 
Taking the mask off 
Understanding masking techniques and strategies as engaging with, and reproducing, discourses that 
inadvertently or explicitly present non-normativity as a ‘spoiled identity’ has been taken up by autistic 
campaigners as a form of political resistance through online activism. A recent campaign on the social 
networking site Twitter called for autistic individuals ‘to take the mask off’. A hashtag 
(#TakeTheMaskoff) was used for several weeks intensely over the Summer of 2018 and has continued 
to be used, albeit more sporadically (Mandy, 2019). The intention of the six week long campaign was 
to encourage individuals to share their experiences of masking via Tweets and to also begin to enact 
some autistic behaviours in their everyday lives. Much of the discourse centred around how AFAB 
individuals were seen as bearing the brunt of the pressures of masking.  The political resistance 
strategies that underpinned this campaign were aimed both at the psychiatric professions who many 
saw as enforcing masking through a diagnostic denial of alterative presentations of autism (e.g. 
racialised, gendered, lower support needs) and at wider society that stigmatised visible autistic 
embodiment. A diagnosis (self or medical) was positioned as the point where an autistic person should 
relieve some of the pressures of conscious normalisation, this speaks to Livingston et al’s (2020) 
findings.  
 
The call on Twitter to ‘take the mask off’, whilst aimed at enabling autistic people to liberate 
themselves from enforcing a normative bodily regime on themselves, conversely engenders a sense 
that autism politics is only able to arise from a visible (to others) difference and thus creates another 
normative regime. The paradox of constructing another normative regime in response to the 
hegemonic normative regime is summed up by Lisa Walker in her discussion on lesbian femme 
identities, cited in Martindale, (1997):  
 74 
 
The impulse to privilege the visible often arises out of the need to reclaim signifiers of difference 
which dominant ideologies have used to define minority identities negatively. But while this 
strategy of reclamation is often affirming, it can also replicate the practices of the dominant 
ideologies which use visibility to create social categories on the basis of exclusion […] members 
of a given population who do not bear that signifier of difference or who bear visible signs of 




In the above quotation Walker (cited in Martindale, 1997) is discussing femme lesbian identities when 
one confounds what a lesbian is supposed to look like and therefore faces being made invisible and 
excluded from both outside and within the LGBT community. To find entry and acceptance into LGBT 
or queer spaces one must often demonstrate their queerness through visual signifiers. This generally 
takes the form of some kind of gender deconstruction or subversion (Samuels, 2003, p.240). Ellen 
Samuels notes that one can wear pins and patches with queer insignia on them if one’s gender identity 
is not understood to be subversive (p.240). Melanie Yergeau (2018) notes a correlation between 
signifying her queerness and her autism through the use of pin badges; an autistic pride badge adorns 
her backpack (p.135-137). Later in her book, Yergeau (2018) briefly mentions that autistic people 
recognise one another instinctually and makes an analogy with gaydar (a belief one can sense that 
another is queer): ‘[R]esonance is a crippity feeling. In autistic communities, this gut feeling- this “lust 
born of recognition” – is at times called A-dar or aut-dar, terms that are clever plays on gaydar. We 
encounter one another, and we know’ (p.193). Gaydar is often formulated as something that queer 
people feel in relation to each other where they ‘just know’ instinctually that the other is also queer. 
The underlying – often very subtle - signifiers which enable this ‘knowing’ are not commonly identified. 
However, it is by sharing a culture that shared signifiers become known and it is therefore a distinctly 
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social and cultural phenomenon which privileges the visual field and the body as the site of identity. 
When this analogy becomes overlaid on to autism politics, we must ask what are the signs of autistic 
visibility and what does it mean to enforce visual signs as markers of belonging and does this position 
some as more justified in claiming an autistic identity?  
 
Masking as a form of passing 
In the sense that we can understand autistic masking as a series of temporally and relationally 
deployed embodied techniques which aim at passing as neurotypical, it points to similarities with 
theories of passing and, ‘the flip side’, coming out (Samuels, 2003, p.239). Notably, the embodied 
techniques of masking cannot be divorced from normative gender roles. Autistic difference can be 
hidden through passing as normatively and correctly gendered (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011).  This 
is, as yet, an under researched area of autistic experience and embodiment. Whilst Yergeau (2017) 
argues that autism constitutes a form of neurological queerness, and autism psychologists such as 
Tony Atwood (2006), Simon Baron-Cohen (2016) and Gould and Ashton-Smith (2011) all suggest that 
gender is mobilised to obscure autistic difference, to my knowledge no study has taken this up as a 
central concern. I argue that it is important to consider how gender as an always-already normative 
category can be positioned as a form of passing, this will discussed in the analysis chapters of this 
thesis.  
 
There is a wealth of literature into passing from race studies (Lorde, 2017, hooks, 1992, Ginsburg, 1996, 
Smith, 1994, Dawkins, 2012). Passing in race theory refers to unintended or intentional acts of passing 
as white. Passing has also become a very popular experiential explanatory device within disability 
studies (Wilson and Brune, 2012, Selznick, 2014, Samuels, 2003, Titchkosky, 2001, Barnes and Mercer, 
2016, Michalko, 2002). Passing has been negatively described as a method whereby an individual 
conceals their particular subjugated identity in favour of receiving some of the benefits of a more 
privileged identity (Titchkosky, 2001). This understanding of passing as depoliticised and as a passive 
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acceptance of oppression has been described as reproducing stigma. As Titchkosky (2001) writes: 
‘[through passing] stigmatized conceptions of disability, at best, remain undisturbed, at worst, are re-
deployed’ (no pagination, online version). Passing has been used as a theory to describe assimilationist 
strategies commonly along the lines of race.  Audre Lorde (2017) gives an example of the political 
resistance that underpins calls to be visible and to refuse to pass any longer:  
 
But most of all, I think, we fear the visibility without which we cannot truly live. Within this country 
where racial difference creates a constant, if unspoken, distortion of vision, black women have on 
the one hand always been highly visible, and so, on the other hand have been rendered invisible 
through the depersonalisation of racism. Even within the women’s movement, we have had to 
fight, and still do for that very visibility which also renders us most vulnerable, our blackness. […] 




There is, also, a particular anti-assimilationist political imperative when this rallying cry is aimed at 
disabled people. As Swain and Cameron (2003) write:  
 
Coming out, then, for disabled people, is a process of redefinition of one’s personal identity through 
rejecting the tyranny of the normate, positive recognition of one’s impairment and embracing 
disability as a valid social identity. Having come out, the disabled person no longer regards disability 
for a reason for self-disgust, or as something to be denied or hidden, but rather as an imposed 
oppressive social category to be challenge and broken down … coming out, in our analysis, involves 
a political commitment. Acceptance of a medical model of disability and being categorized by other 
others as disabled does not constitute coming out as disabled 
(cited in Samuels, p.237, italics in original) 
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There are many things to unpack with this statement from Swain and Cameron (2003, cited in Samuels, 
p.237). In the first instance, they presume an unproblematised ‘coming out’ process where one 
proclaims an ‘authentic’ identity, and this consequently becomes a static state. This is not, of course, 
how coming out in the instance of coming out as non-normatively sexually orientated happens. Coming 
out is not a one-time event. Coming out presumes an endless reiteration to numerous others across 
an entire lifetime and in a variety of expected and unexpected contexts (Butler, 1990). Many LGBT 
people weigh up the consequences of coming out on the basis of any given encounter which implicitly 
or explicitly demands them to come out (Gutowitz, 2019). As Samuels (2003) writes ‘[…] even after a 
dozen gay pride marches, we must still make decisions about coming out on a daily basis, in personal, 
professional and political contexts’ (p.237).  
 
Furthermore, we must ask what changes when a disability is not visible. Both Lorde (2017) and Swain 
and Cameron (2002) position visibility – namely visible difference- as being the locus of political 
resistance. For Lorde (2017) the black woman is already hyper visible, so it is about acknowledging that 
visibility through strength and courage to make oneself vulnerable in difference and this vulnerability 
becomes the starting point for politics. Swain and Cameron’s (2002) argument is similar; it is about 
reclamation of one’s ‘spoiled identity’ as a form of political resistance through pride and being visibly 
different. Both Swain and Cameron (2003) and Lorde (2017) presume an already visible difference that 
one stakes a claim to as an identity by being critical to the subjugated position that has been marked 
out for those who fit its category. As Rosemary Garland Thompson, cited in Titchkosky, (2001) writes: 
‘’[T]he notion that someone with a very visible disability might “come out” perhaps seems oxymoronic 
to those for who the cultural assumptions that structure the normal remain unquestioned’ (online 
version, no pagination). In this sense coming out means to come out ‘from the seductive power of 
normalcy’ (Titchkosky, 2011, online version, no pagination).  
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 Samuels (2003) notes that there are two different kinds of coming out; ‘coming out to’ (which much 
include an object) and ‘coming out (without an object)’ (p.237). We could argue that ‘coming out’ is 
necessary to come out ‘to’; individual acceptance or knowledge of identity is necessary to ‘come out 
to’. Yet, implicit within both the individual and communal notion of coming out is the idea that passing 
is inherently wrong; that it is wrong for the individual to consider her identity as something to be 
evaded and furthermore, that it is detrimental to wider political movements. However, it is perhaps 
through passing that we have the clearest view of stigma and the production of othered identities. By 
examining the reasons, processes, pleasures and pains of passing we can see the political, social and 
cultural configurations which mark the boundary lines of the normal and the abnormal most clearly. 
Passing can give us a vantage point into how, where and why society must ‘repress the embodiment 
of difference’ (Siebers, 2004, p.3). Samuels (2003) also notes that passing may have its own subversive 
power in that it reveals both the production of identity boundaries and their instability; ‘[…] the passing 
subject may not be read as an assimilationist victim but as a defiant figure who, by crossing the 
boundaries of identities reveals their instabilities’ (p.243).  
 
Proving difference 
Coming out as disabled when the disability is not visible brings with it a new set of challenges to those 
faced when one’s disability, or difference, is visible. One could be charged with fraud, or not being 
‘disabled enough to count’ (Lightman, et al, 2009). These admonishments can come from the disabled 
community or the wider community who do not assert or demonstrate a disabled identity. What one 
says one’s identity is, is often not as convincing as what one’s identity appears to be. As Titchkosky 
(2001) agues: ‘[I]n the face of trying to make visible to others what does not appear to them, the typical 
set of practices pursued is the seeking and offering of “proof”’ (online version, no pagination). Or Gage, 
who writes: ‘[S]ome people offer such acceptance readily, others greet every statement of limitation 
with scepticism, and most need to be reminded from time to time’ (cited in Samuels, p.239). 
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For non-visible differences or disabilities proof can be hard to come by, a medical diagnosis certificate 
can be offered in some situations, but in the majority of situations it will be through the visible 
movements, behaviours, speech patterns, and so on, where proof is sought and demonstratable.  
What passing and masking have in common is the shared insistence on the body as the key site where 
identity can be found. In the case of masking, a non-normative mode of being in the world is covered 
up by attempts of perceived normativity. Both passing and masking can be the result of choice 
(choosing to mask or pass in any given situation), they can also be a position that an individual is placed 
into (Carrington, 2020). Masking seems to suggest an individual actor who wilfully covers up a more 
natural, or ‘authentic’, way of being, however masking can be- or become- unwilful. As Livingston et 
al (2020) note, compensation techniques can become naturalised through repetition over many years 
(p.11).  
 
The naturalisation of certain neurotypical behaviours and modes of being in the social world does not 
mean that the person is no longer autistic, but rather points to the mechanisms through which the 
body becomes normalised. This is not to say that there is a non-docile body that can be found 
underneath the normalised one, but that each normalising regime brings with its own regulations of 
embodiment (Wehrle, 2016, p.60). Thus, thinking with the idea of unmasking as a form of ‘coming out’ 
means autism must be demonstrated through the body in order to be visible to others, and even to 
oneself, as autistic. Though ‘unmasking’ could be said to be entering another normative regime, this is 
also the subversive power that unmasking is positioned as holding by those who promote it. As Wehrle 
(2016) writes: ‘[I]f the body has a subversive potential, then it consists in the fact that even through 
forced habituation the body gains forces and skills, which it can use otherwise than in the usual, 
normalized manner’ (p.64).  Consequently, coming out does not uncritically mean freedom from 
normalcy or from normative regimes. It does, however, mean being in a position to question normalcy 
and normative regimes and, to potentially, use the body otherwise. As Rod Michalko (2001) (cited in 
Titchkosky, online version, no pagination) states, "[T]he least normal thing we can do is to think about 
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normalcy." In the case of masking being related to using normative gender to cover difference, then it 
stands that gender might be the place where one can assert their autistic difference.  
 
3.6 Conclusion and research questions  
This chapter discussed the key areas where research is being conducted around gender and its 
connection, or entanglement, with autism. Beginning with the gender diagnostic ratio which has 
always presented higher figures of AMAB individuals, I asked the question, as others have, is this the 
correct picture? Several researchers from psychology and clinical psychology speculate that autism is 
missed in AFAB people or it is misdiagnosed (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011). Much research is being 
conducted into whether pre-existing gender bias prevents AFAB people from receiving a timely 
diagnosis. Despite this, certain pockets of autism research are interested in discussing whether autism 
can tell us something about gender; specifically, something about essential sex difference. This has led 
to autism becoming, in Gillis-Buck and Richardson’s terms, ‘a disorder of gender’. Davidson and Tamas 
(2016) and Jack (2011) argue that gender does not hold such an important in place in how autistic 
people think about their identities. However, they have too argued that autism can be used as a mirror 
for understanding how normative ideals around heterosexual gender become reified and enacted. 
Thus, I argued that less than showing the processes of reification and materialisation of normative 
gender regimes they individualise gender trouble within the autistic person.  
 
A crucial aspect missing from this literature is a focus on how the self is created through temporality 
with a defining point in narrative time being medical diagnosis. Consequently, this thesis situates the 
process and act of diagnosis as an interpolation which brings into being, at the same time as it pertains 
to give access to, a hidden truth about the individual. This idea of uncovering the truth of the subject 
can be found replicated in many autobiographical accounts, such as this quote on the back of a recent 
autobiography of a late diagnosed woman with autism: ‘what do you do when you wake up in your 
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mid-forties and realise you’ve been living a lie your whole life?’ (James, 2017). Furthermore, through 
the neurological aetiology of autism the brain is brought into sharp focus, as James writes: ‘[..] I obsess 
about the structure of my brain […]’ (p.11).   
 
In this sense autism is positioned as an essence or ontology of the person diagnosed, and, as I 
speculatively argue, one that is a priori gendered. As autism is a neurological condition and firmly 
attached to the brain, does the diagnostic event come to bear upon how the individual thinks about 
their gendered identity? When Ashton-Smith and Gould (2011) and Belcher (2016) discuss the reasons 
that AFAB individuals are missed from diagnosis and suggest that they mimic or mask their autism they 
do not make any great leaps to challenge the normative gender regime which is at play within the 
discourses that make autism knowable. Likewise, they do not challenge the underlying claims to a 
gendered ontology of autism, rather they suggest that by diagnosis the ‘truth’ of the individual can be 
uncovered and that the act of diagnosing will be emancipatory, not merely in terms of accessing 
services and support but in coming to know and understand oneself under the label of autistic.  I argue 
that this understanding relies upon an autistic subjectivity being revealed (through diagnosis) as a 
stable identity and this must be interrogated in terms of how one comes to understand and produce 
their subjectivity through the discourses that structure what autism is.  
 
In the discussion around masking and its relationship to passing and ‘coming out’ we see that there is 
the potential for thinking about the diagnosis as not simply a moment where one’s autism is revealed 
but as a potential imperative to enter into a new normative regime of autistic embodiment through 
discursive practices. What is missing in the literature cited is an examination of the ways that gender 
becomes implicated within masking techniques and unmasking techniques. If Hull, et al (2017) , Gould 
and Ashton-Smith (2011),  Lai, et al (2017), Atwood (2007, 2006) Baron-Cohen, et al (2015)  and 
Cassidy, et al (2018) are correct in their assertions that AFAB individuals are more likely to mask to 
pass as non-autistic then gender needs to be presented as an analytical category and  important 
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intersection of autistic embodiment.  I do not mean simply using sex/gender difference as a stable 
category for understanding the causality of masking in relation to sex/gender difference, but to 
understand if masking and unmasking is always-already entangled with gender. For example, if one 
utilises their gender to pass as non-autistic by performing normative gendered behaviours and roles 
as has been suggested, then does that mean that an autistic embodiment necessarily queers gender?  
 
Therefore, what is needed is an understanding of what the category of autistic means, how is it framed 
medically, socially and culturally. How do these understandings of autism become used by diagnosed 
individuals to construct their identities and how are they resisted? And, indeed, do they even come to 
matter in how autistic people think about their gendered identity? Does the pathological masculinity, 
or the gender trouble, that is attached to the neurology of the individual diagnosed need to be 
reconciled with their existing understanding of themselves? What are the stories that people tell about 
themselves in relation to autism and their gender identity? 
 
 Autism, on the so-called ‘higher functioning’ end of the spectrum is given most commonly to 
individuals assigned female at birth as adults. Thus, the diagnostic event holds an important place in 
the narrative of someone’s life. Autism is positioned as a lifelong condition, present from childhood, 
and thus the act of naming autism in an individual takes on a retroactive role. This means it has the 
potential to explain certain behaviours, difficulties or traits which may be reconstructed into a legible 
autism narrative by the individual diagnosed. Given the temporal significance of many AFAB individuals  
being diagnosed as adults and the fact that many did not ‘know’ they have autism until the diagnosis, 
the process of diagnosis and the act of naming autism in an individual is significant. What parts of the 
popular and medical understandings of autism are taken on to form subjectivities and which are 
rejected or resisted? How is gendered identity bound within this? What is the relationship between 
the gendered rationalisation of autism and discursive power? These are the questions that this thesis 
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asks. For, as Margret Shildrick (1997) writes: ‘[…] the one who acts is not a pre-existent bounded being, 




























4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will reflect on the research design which guided the data collection for this thesis. The 
theoretical underpinnings of this research were considered in terms of how to best answer the 
research questions. This chapter will begin by expanding upon the theoretical lens through which I 
read and interpreted my data. It will be explained why this theoretical guidance alongside the chosen 
methods were the most useful for this. Following this, information about recruitment will be discussed. 
Then, the demographics of the participants along with some background information about each one 
will be presented. Why this information was necessary for the analysis will be briefly discussed.  
 
A critical discussion around the interview as the chosen method to answer the research questions will 
follow. A large portion of this chapter will be dedicated to reflecting upon the specificity of the research 
participants being autistic and how this comes to problematise the use of standard qualitative 
methodological frameworks, due to the difficulties in normative interactional communication autistic 
people might have. Consequently, different modes of communication were offered to my participants: 
the interview could take place in person, online via Skype through text based or image and speech or 
it could be written on an adapted interview questionnaire which was emailed to me or,  it could take 
the form of an ‘object focused’ interview. A descriptive account of how the interview data was 
analysed and interpreted will follow this subsection. Certain accessibility measures were also 
implemented. These measures disrupted the idea of the reciprocal and interactional space of the 
qualitative interview as it works along normative lines, this will be discussed during the sections on the 
interview and the analysis of the data.  
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4.2 Analytical framework and research objectives  
The focus of this thesis is to discover whether gendered discursive knowledges of autism are utilised 
in order to construct an understanding of the autistic subject by those diagnosed in adulthood. And, 
whether this has any bearing on how the autistic subject thinks about their gendered identity post 
diagnosis. Particular focus is placed upon the essentialised masculinity that is constructed through the 
medicalised, popular and cultural discourses of autism. Put in Foucauldian (1972) terms, the aims of 
this thesis are to understand ‘the processes in which dominant reality comes into being’ (p.22). The 
dominant reality is presented here as being the masculinised character of autism which consequently 
becomes essentialised through its neurological underpinning. The processes are the resources and 
interactions (medical engagement, technologies, internet technologies, blogs, Twitter, conversations, 
books, self-discipline, discursive practices etc.) which bring autism into being in a relational and 
ontological sense.  
 
 The ‘dominant reality’ of autism is not to be presumed to be all encompassing nor static. There is 
always room to create new formations through the dominant discourse. This works within the initial 
framework of power but can provide alternate modes of being and knowledge (Hall, 2001). With the 
case of autism and the production of autistic subjects I aim to uncover to what extent assigned female 
at birth individuals (AFAB) interact with the dominant discourse and to what extent they push the 
boundaries of what we understand autism to be. As I have stated previously in this thesis, I do not 
dispute that there is a ‘real’ to autism. However, one must be clear when they use the term ‘real’. 
What is the real to which one refers; which conceptual and philosophical framework is used to 
understand the ‘real’? This is important to reiterate when one is assuming a seemingly socially 
constructed view of things. A major dispute to the notion of performativity and discursive regimes is 
the notion that nothing exists beyond the ‘text’ (Xie, 2014, Nussbaum, 1999).  
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The two objects concerned in this thesis, autism and gender, are both so subjected to intense scrutiny 
and consequently it is not necessarily the best approach to argue that these categories are solely 
socially constructed without fully elucidating what is made by this claim. This approach in the wrong 
hands can be used to deny the reality of autistic experience and of gendered experience. Nor, can it 
strictly be said to be true. Social constructionists do not have to necessarily deny that certain things 
exist but that we understand, produce and negate them through our existence as social beings. In this  
I am thinking with scholars such as Elizabeth Grosz (1994), Anne Fausto-Sterling (2012), Annemarie 
Mol (2003),  Elizabeth Wilson (2015) and Des Fitzgerald (2017) who argue for the understanding of the 
entanglement of categories rather than a binary of nature/culture or ontological/epistemological. 
Moreover, they unshrinkingly move our focus from questions of origin, depth or Truth, to an analysis 
of the complexity and nuance of the objects we study, even if that move forces the inevitable 
uncomfortableness and unsurety when one is no longer standing on solid ground.  
 
As I noted in the introduction chapter, I do not feel beholden to sticking regimentally to one particular 
theoretical framework or to one particular thinker. Though I am working within the broad field of social 
constructionist thought, I have borrowed (and perhaps mutated) certain modes of thinking to find the 
evidence of the stitchery that holds together the dominant discourses of autism and gender (Haraway, 
1991). As such, this thesis treats autism as a condition that is not simply socially constructed but one 
that can only be fully understand through examining the social conditions which enable certain 
conditions to emerge. I also understand autism as being deeply and inextricably connected to 
normative social regimes which produce autism as a category of social impairment. I understand the 
category of autism, once it is named and diagnosed in an individual, as being productive of ways of 
understanding the self and productive of new categories of people. Others have, of course, treated 
disability categories in similar ways (see Campbell, 2013, Nadesan, 2005, McGrath, 2016). In particular, 
Thomas Campbell’s (2013) genealogical approach to dyslexia provided guidance to this project. 
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However, this thesis is not a genealogical one and it focuses primarily upon embodiment and how 
subjectivities are formed. I focus on the processes through which the individuals who took part in this 
project were able to come to the point where they could state: ‘I am autistic’. This thesis is one which 
centres around the idea of becoming, taking as essential a Deleuzian field whereby ontologies are 
formed through their relationality to other things, bodies, knowledges and so on. I maintain that whilst 
the experiences shared by the participants in the project might be said to come from a specific 
difference in neurological biology, we cannot claim some singular essence to either what autism is, or 
how autistic embodiment is experienced (Hollin, 2017). Thinking in this way autism can be considered 
as multiple. As Deleuze (2004) writes:   
 
‘[M]ultiplicity,’ when used as a substantive, designates a domain where the Idea, of itself, is much 
closer to the accident than to the abstract essence, and can be determined only with the 
question who? how? where and when? in which case? – forms that sketch the genuine spatio-
temporal coordinates of the Idea’.  
(p.95-96) 
 
I argue that we cannot understand autism at all unless we ask the questions that Deleuze poses. Should 
we find a genetic origin of autism it would be useless for understanding autism because autism is a 
human condition, lived by humans, produced by humans and therefore only understood through 
examining the wider conditions of human life which are able to convince of ‘this thing called autism’ 
at this moment in time (Fitzgerald, 2016).  
 
The concern of this thesis is not, however, an overview of the material, social, political conditions which 
enable this, but I am focusing primarily on gender, arguably, the foundational social category that 
orders societies, produces subjects and is the most susceptible to essentialist origin stories (Haraway, 
1985). I have argued so far in this thesis that gender has been positioned as a potential cause for autism 
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and, vice versa, gender trouble can be attributed to autism. These two origin stories are making it 
difficult to see what else is at play with autistic people’s understanding of their gendered identities 
and their autism diagnosis. Thus, this thesis looks at the objects being considered – autism and gender- 
from a slightly difference angle, not to find causes or ‘reasons why’, but to see the ways that autism 
and gender are always a work in progress; a becoming of.  
 
The concept of gender I rely most heavily upon is Judith Butler’s (2006, 2011, 2004) early Foucauldian 
influenced work; that gender is a continuous repetition and needs to be continuously reinforced and 
reproduced. As Butler wrote; ‘gender ought not to be conceived of as a noun or a substantive thing or 
a static cultural marker, but rather as an incessant and repeated action of some sort’ (2006, p.146). 
However, in much of Butler’s work on gender it is hard to see how certain modes of gender become 
embodied as discursive practices and there is not a particular focus on temporality within 
performativity. In Foucault’s conception of power, it is defined as ‘everywhere’ and ‘comes from 
everyone’ (Foucault, 1982). Thus, I argue in order to add to these understanding of power, the analysis 
of this thesis has paid attention to how autism becomes materialised as a reality for the participants 
of this study and aims to understand how the disparate and distinct traits of autism become 
understood by autistic subjects as autism. As such the interview questions were not heavily orientated 
to how it felt for the participants to have the experiences they had, but rather what those experiences 
were. Moreover, what was important to me was not just an analysis of how people discursively 
understood their gender before and after their autism diagnosis but how this affects their lives and, 
what material, institutional and political powers became impacted by this change. 
 
I brought embodiment and the spatial and temporal elements of the life course to the fore in the 
interview to gain a sense of how and where power becomes a material phenomenon. In this way I was 
able to determine whether a diagnosis of autism brings into being new categories of people and new 
categories of the self.  I am not arguing that the moment of diagnosis will necessary function as simply 
 89 
as a singular event but that it may act as an interpolation which must be repeated and habit forming 
before one can say: ‘I am autistic’.  It might not necessarily mean that the participants will consider 
themselves as neurological subjects, and as masculinised ones through virtue of this, but, this research 
seeks to uncover what is done with these knowledges about autism: are they discarded, are they taken 
on as modes of being or as discursive practices, are they resisted and in what ways?  Does autism as a 
diagnostic category, as it is embedded within power networks, engender any change in the subject? 
Did the diagnosis function as a diagnostic event? That is, did it bring a new reality into being in the 
form of a new set of discursive practices enacted through and on the body? In what ways is gender 
and gendered embodiment entangled with autism?  
 
 
As such, the research questions which guide this thesis are as follows:  
 
1) Does the diagnostic category of autism act as a discursive event and a gendered technology of 
power for late diagnosed autistic people?  
2) How do autistic people assigned female at birth produce a sense of the autistic self through 
the existing discourses of autism?  
 
4.3 Recruitment of participants 
Recruitment for the study utilised a mixture of online and offline standard practices in recruitment 
(Eide, 2008, Macdougall, C., and Fudge, E., 2001). Two posters were designed for the study, including 
one which was ‘dyslexia friendly’ (see appendix 1). Autism and dyslexia are commonly found together 
and even if dyslexia is not present, using text and colour in line with dyslexic accessibility measures can 
aid reading ease for people who have sensory issues which are also common to autistic people (Autism 
Help, 2019, Bogdashina, 2016). This poster was free of information other than the necessary key 
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criteria for interested participants and an email address to express an interest for more information. 
The poster was printed on coloured paper and used a larger font type with spacings in accordance with 
dyslexia guidelines (British Dyslexia Association, 2019). This consideration of the accessibility of 
recruitment material is essential for gaining a wide range of participants with varying accessibility 
and/or support needs and it is seemingly neglected in wider psychological and sociological (primarily) 
non-autistic researcher led autism recruitment guidelines, of which there are few (see: Gowen, E., et 
al., 2017, Fletcher-Watson, et al., 2018). The second poster included more information including more 
details around the project and organisations which provide support for autistic and LGBTQ autistic 
people. The two posters were placed close to one another in public places.  
 
The posters were placed by the researcher in a variety of places across Leeds. LGBTQ friendly spaces 
were chosen as research suggests that a higher proportion of autistic than non-autistic people identify 
as LGBTQ (Georges and Stokes, 2018). Addiction services and homeless organisations were also 
targeted as the scant preliminary research on the area suggests that autistic people are 
disproportionately affected by drug and alcohol addiction and homelessness (Churchard et al., 2018). 
Leaving posters at these organisations was also tactical in order to attempt to gather a mixture of class 
and racial backgrounds for the study. As recent government reports suggest racial and ethnic 
minorities are disproportionality effected by homelessness (Race Disparity Office, 2018). Those from 
working class backgrounds are more likely to utilise these services, in part due to poverty and essential 
service cuts disproportionately affecting that demographic (Shelter, 2019).  Posters were also left in 
several Universities, colleges, arts organisations, social spaces and music venues across the city of 
Leeds, U.K.  
 
When it was not possible to visit an organisation or venue to leave recruitment materials these were 
emailed to the appropriate stakeholder to circulate the information. Posters were also mailed to 
several organisations with a request to place the posters in an appropriate space. The main concern 
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with asking organisers or support service management to circulate information was that they, in effect, 
act as a gatekeeper to recruitment and there may be a level of coercion if a participant felt inclined to 
contact me because of personal relationships with the gatekeeper. To alleviate this risk, I requested 
that posters be put up but that I did not need the information to be verbally relayed or discussed in a 
group or individual setting. This encouraged full informed consent on the part of the interested 
participant and the project could not be seen to be specifically endorsed by key workers or support 
group workers.  
 
However, despite the physical presence of these posters across the U.K, including the major cities of 
London, Edinburgh, Leeds, Bradford and Birmingham, the most successful method for recruitment was 
on social media and, in particular, the networking platform Twitter. All eight participants who have 
taken part in this project responded to the recruitment call through Twitter (see appendix 2). As has 
been noted by Benford (2008), increased use of the internet technologies has functioned as a great 
emancipatory tool for those with autism. For those who cannot often leave the house due to physical 
disabilities or sensory issues and those for whom social and communication disabilities make it difficult 
to meet and communicate with others, the internet functions as an incredibly powerful assistive 
technology. What became clear in the recruitment stage of the research is how incredibly important 
the internet to those with social or physical accessibility issues. I engaged in autistic online 
communities on Twitter, I was clear about my status as a researcher who isn’t autistic, and it is through 
these autistic led discussions that I believe many challenges to the stereotypes of autism are emerging 
and that these are influencing research aims and areas, including this particular research,  in a form of 
‘looping’ as Ian Hacking (2006) names it. This presents the idea that participants in research such as 
this are not merely objects of study or resources to be mined, but are active participants in the shaping 
of research designs and theoretical enquiry of the study of so-called human kinds (Hacking, 2006).  
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What is most illuminating is the challenge that internet based autistic modes of communication bring 
to the stereotype that the autistic mind is lacking reciprocity, due to a lack or deficit in empathy (Baron-
Cohen, 2001, 2012). What is shown time and again online is the ability that autistic people have for 
humour, empathy and reciprocal conversation. As Yergeau (2018) writes if you talk with or observe 
these online communities all residual caricatures and outmoded stereotypes fade away. Indeed, to 
refer back to Hacking (2006) we might suggest that the use of internet by autistic individuals, 
communities and autistic activists has aided in debunking this historical understanding of the autistic 
mind. In part, the belief in the deficit of empathy and lack of what Baron-Cohen cited as ‘theory of 
mind’ stems not from the autistic individual but from the behavioural modes of identifying autism in a 
hierarchised clinical setting. As I have discussed in the literature review, the shift to behavioural 
observational techniques in the clinic placed the focus away from the psyche or the inner thoughts of 
the patient onto the observable and visible ways in which she deviated from the norm (Evans, 2013).  
 
The autistic voice (here voice points to interiority, to subjectivity) was not often heard in the form of 
signifying meaning outside of signifying simply autism (Dolar, 2006, Yergeau, 2017). Indeed, the trope 
of the speechless autistic individual and the experts who are necessary to speak for them is 
represented through the very naming of the Autism Speaks organisation which reifies autism as distinct 
from autistic people and, ironically, the organisation has no autistic people on its board (McGrath, 
2016, p.4). It is of course not correct that all autistic people can speak in the sense of verbal 
communication, but we might rightfully argue that all autistic people (and non-verbal  people who do 
not sign)  can communicate in one way or another (see Melanie Yergeau’s (2017) discussion on ‘shit 
smearing’; or consider utterances, tics and echoalia, for example).  
 
Moreover, when those with autism can speak such as with many people who would have been given 
an Asperger’s diagnosis, then that speech is still pathologised and, though not included in the 
diagnostic criteria, used as one of the non-official indicators for potential autism (Autism Society, 
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2019). The speaking autistic person has an untimely voice: they are verbose before their years; they 
are ‘little professors’ lecturing on their chosen subjects from small children; they are not so distant 
future hybrids of machines/humans with their ‘robotic voices’; or they are stuck in time with ‘childlike’ 
voices way into adulthood (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p.189, Bonneh, Y, et al., 2011, Marshall, 2013).  
 
Whilst some autistic people can communicate verbally, others may not be able to communicate 
verbally either at all, others still can communication through spoken language but only with great 
difficulty. The widespread usage of the internet technologies and the particular use of them by autistic 
people compels us to update and rethink how we engage with autistic communities as researchers in 
order to begin to hear autistic concerns and issues from autistic people themselves. We must pay 
attention to the ways that autistic people feel most comfortable and are able to relay information.  
The interactions I have had with had with autistic people online led me to adapt my data collection 
methods to include the possibility for engaging with the research questions via a text based medium, 
either through online platforms such as the Twitter chat function or Skype, or by filling out the 
interview questions and posting or emailing them back to me. I also offered the option of having an 
‘object based’ interview; this will be elaborated upon further in the ‘interview’ section of this chapter. 
Certain adaptations to the interview space where also made; these techniques will likewise be 
returned to in the interview section of this chapter.  
 
Consequently, Twitter became the main platform for recruitment. However, using this platform is of 
course not without its limitations. Despite seeking to find a participant group which was representative 
of a wider group of autistic adults diagnosed in adulthood I only received requests for information 
from those who had received higher educational training and who were in steady employment. 
Racialised and working-class voices are missing from autism research more generally. Recruiting via 
Twitter meant that I also received interest from those with the social and cultural capital to be able to 
engage with a researcher and also the means to use a computer and to have the time and freedom to 
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take part in an interview, which likewise delimits the range of participants I connected with. Another 
demographic that is missing is those who have more support needs. As Mark Osteen (2007) comments, 
autism research from the humanities and social sciences whilst often being routed in foundational 
disability politics often fails to engage with those who have higher cognitive or intellectual support 
needs. In autism research this is very often the case. There is more research that examines those who 
are termed ‘higher functioning’ than those who do not fit this criterion (Osteen, 2007). This latter point 
will likewise be returned to within this chapter.  
 
As Potter and Hepburn (2012) have suggested the recruitment process and its materials must be made 
transparent. This is in order to understand how the data collection was possible, who was attracted to 
take part and who was not, and to understand the ways in which the interview constructed the 
knowledges which form a research project. A selection of tweets, the recruitment posters and message 
board posts which I wrote have been included in the appendices of this thesis. By examining these it 
is clear that a very specific and pre-demarcated group emerged. The language I have used around 
autism and the gender terminology utilised only pertains to a select group of the autistic community, 
specifically those autistic people who have the social and cultural capital to engage with the 
recruitment material, and perhaps those for whom gender and autism politics are already important 
aspects of their lives. The particular group of people who took part in this project suggest this to be 
the case. This is undoubtedly an oversight in this research, and to gain a wider representational group 
different phrasings of recruitment material should have been used. This will be amended in future 
research I conduct in the future and should be a consideration for others conducting similar research.  
 
4.4 Participant demographics and identifications 
The following table shows the demographics and additional relevant information of the eight 
participants. All participants were given a basic questionnaire which asked for background information 
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(see appendix 3). Previous mental health conditions and previous neurological conditions were asked 
for as well as demographic information pertaining to location, class, gender and sexuality. This 
question was asked in order to ascertain whether a transition from a mental health diagnosis to a 
neurological one (if relevant to the participant) had any bearing on the individual’s understanding of 
self.  
 
Research conducted to date has suggested that late diagnosed autistic individuals are likely to have 
received input from mental health services as a result of an untimely autism diagnosis, thus I also 
wished to add to these statistics if this were the case (Gould, 2017., Crane, et al., 2018). The categories 
of gender, sexuality and class identity were all self-identified by the participants. A further question 
asked what the participants caregivers or parents were employed as when they were growing up as 
one way to determine class positioning through -albeit unnuanced in relation to the data- reference 
to economic wealth and security nets (Manstead, 2018). All names are pseudonyms and were chosen 









































Sally 42 41 Female Bisexual Working 
class 
Alcoholism; Anxiety; 
Depression; suicidal and 
self-harm behaviours 
Aime* 18 18 Non-Binary Asexual Middle 
class 
N/A 
Hannah 24 21 Female Bisexual Lower 
middle 
class 
Eating disorder; OCD; 
Anxiety 






44 41 Female Asexual Working 
class 
Anxiety; Depression; 
Suicidal and self-harm 
behaviours 
(table showing demographics and previous neurological or mental illness diagnsoses) 
 
4.5 Why interviews? 
 
If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and understandable, then I 
might begin with a narrative account of my life, but this narrative will be disorientated by what is 
not mine, or is not mine alone […] The narrative authority of the “I” must give way to the 
perspective and temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story. 
(Butler, 2005, p.26) 
 
 97 
Although, it may seem unnecessary to discuss a research methodology so commonly deployed and 
written about so much, I want to do so in order to destablise the idea of the so-called normative 
communicator being the individual owner of language and of the narrative they tell about themselves. 
I start this section with this quotation from Judith Butler in order to highlight how necessary it is to 
take the ‘I’ to task and interrogate the discourses, spaces of interaction and relationality which enable 
a temporally specific ‘I’ to come into being. It also addresses the issue of narration as a process which 
is addressed to another. Narration is never a process one undertakes by oneself; another is always 
present. Narration is, likewise, never an act of giving the ‘truth’ of yourself to another. Not only is this 
because narrative needs an interlocutor or an addressee, ‘real or imaginary’, who will interpret and 
analysis what has been narrated in a multiplicity of divergent ways, but also because as Butler suggests, 
in the act of narrating the truth of the self the self becomes separated from us (Butler, 2001, p.26).  
 
To create a coherent ‘I’ the self must always make use of norms which construct it as legible and as 
understandable. Thus, much of what constructs a narrative cannot be the property of the one who 
speaks but it is constructed and constituted in its relation to others, (human and non-human), 
institutions, laws and so on. Butler’s position is not one of a fatalistic social constructionist one 
whereby the self can never be known and accountable for itself, thus rendering social scientific 
qualitative methods useless. Rather, Butler suggests that we examine the relationality between the 
self and the addressee, or examine the similarities that emerge between the self and the other. This, 
for Butler, is an ethical problem and, for this particular research project it is useful for thinking about 
the ethics of interaction within an interview setting; though of course Butler did not mean it this 
literally. By beginning with this quotation from Butler we are also reminded that we are not owners of 
our communication; that it is it is not a property of an individualised autonomous self. This enables a 
re-thinking of the normative nature of communication which privileges certain people; those who can 
speak, see, hear, walk, within the normative lines.  
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Thus, in many ways, how I theoretically position myself in regard to thinking about autism and gender 
came prior to the collection of data and, even prior to the framing of the initial research questions 
themselves. Butlerian and Foucauldian interpretations have guided the conception and construction 
of this thesis. As Kvale and Brinkman (2009) state: ‘[W]e understand conceptions of knowledge as prior 
to issues of method […]’ (p.xviii).  These knowledges have in doubt shaped the findings of these thesis. 
However, though I entered the research with a specific set of beliefs, assumptions and philosophical 
knowledge which I oriented myself towards epistemologically, I have aimed to be as open as possible 
to what I might find throughout the data collection process and to change the ways in which I position 
myself epistemologically if required. This openness and willingness to have my assumptions altered 
guided the entirety of the project and, not least, the way in which I approached interviews and the 
questions which I asked. As will be discussed, this methodological and epistemological openness is 
essential for interviews with autistic people who have been historically situated as without power to 
shape the discourses which intimately affect their lives. A semi-structured interview was constructed 
as the tool for guiding the conversations I had with my participants and it was continuously updated 
and added to throughout the process (see appendix 4). Interviewees were likewise asked to contribute 
to the building of the questionnaire (‘what would you like to have been asked?’, ‘Is there anything you 
think I have missed?’, ‘How were the questions to answer?’). Where relevant these interview sections 
are included in the analysis chapters.  
 
The interview was loosely structured around the temporality of childhood to adulthood with the 
medical diagnosis of autism forming a loose central point. The aim of the interview was to understand 
how the individual considered their gender identity pre-and -post the diagnosis of autism. A key focus 
to the interview was understanding whether the autism diagnosis had any effect on the individual’s 
gendered embodiment and, whether the diagnosis acted as a discursive event bringing into being new 
discursive gendered regimes. It is important to note that in the interviews I did not ask specific 
questions around the essentialised and masculinised discourses of autism. How gender was 
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experienced as a direct line of questioning also only featured lightly, as I wished to see if it emerged in 
the conversation without prompting.  In this approach I follow Müller et al (2017).  who advise caution 
against assuming that what happens in medical research will be directly integrated as identity and 
collective understandings of the self in what Müller et al, (2017) term ‘biosociality’.  
 
Interviews were chosen as the data collection method for this research for two key reasons: firstly, to 
gather information about autistic people’s lived experiences and their engagement with the discourses 
that construct autism, interviews offered the clearest way possible to ascertain this information within 
the time frame of this project. This information would then go on to guide the analyses and conclusions 
that this thesis makes.  For as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) suggest: 
 
[Q]ualitative methods in general have […] become endemic today in many disciplines […] At the 
backdrop to the increasing popularity of qualitative methods stands what may be called a 
qualitative stance. From this stance, the processes and phenomena of the world are described 
before theorized, understood before explained, and seen as concrete qualities before abstract 
qualities. The qualitative stance involves focusing on the cultural, every day, and situated aspects 
of human thinking, learning, knowing, acting, and ways of understanding ourselves as persons […] 
 (p.12) 
 
The second key reason for choosing to do a qualitative research project with autistic people is to come 
to some way to what Fletcher-Watson et al (2018) term ‘participatory research methods’. As Fletcher-
Watson et al (2018) discuss, autism research is proliferating rapidly in many disciplines however the 
research is not often guided by the core issues which matter to autistic people nor is it necessarily 
informed ‘by the values of the community’ (p.2). What is at the core of participatory research is a 
revisioning of traditional researcher/object relationships and a practical application thereof in order 
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to address how power is unequally distributed between the researcher and participant.  As Fletcher-
Watson et al (2018) define it:  
 
By participatory research, we mean incorporating the views of autistic people and their allies about 
what research gets done, how it is done and how it is implemented (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995). A 
key principle of participatory research is the recognition, and undermining, of the traditional power 
imbalance between researcher and participant (Nelson and Wright, 1995)’ 
 ( p.1, italics in original) 
 
However, including autistic people in research project is not enough for this to be considered 
participatory, for this can fall foul of what Fletcher-Watson et al define as ‘tokenism’ (Fletcher-Watson 
et al, 2018, p.2). That is, it is not enough to claim the ethical validity or participatory nature of a 
research project simply because it incorporates the interview data of autistic people. Including autistic 
people into an already demarcated and finalised research project which, for example, perhaps 
inadvertently utilises normative and consequently potentially inaccessible methodological techniques 
will ensure that the power imbalance of the autistic subject and the researcher remains intact. 
Fletcher- Watson, et al (2018) suggest the following as key to doing ethical research that works for 
aims of autistic people:  
 
Specific manifestations of participatory research might include leadership by autistic researchers, 
partnership with autistic people or allies as co-creators of knowledge, engagement with the 
community in general (e.g. via social media) and consultation with relevant individuals or 
community organisations. Another key feature of participatory research is inclusiveness including 
adapting the research environment, methodology and dissemination routes to permit the widest 




I argue that this particular research project and its design has not come far enough in challenging the 
power structures inherent within qualitative research. I have not co-worked with an autistic 
collaborator for example. However, this is not possible within the remit of such a thesis. However, 
efforts have been made to ensure that autistic people have played a part in shaping the project. I have 
engaged with autistic people and communities online and offline since the inception of this project. I 
have sought to understand what issues concern the autistic community to shape the relevance of this 
project and I have updated terminology to that which is preferred and in use by the people I have 
engaged with. I have consulted with autistic autism experts and sought their informal guidance. I have 
attended autistic-led conferences in order to pay attention to the key concerns of the community.  
 
I can perhaps sense here that it might be argued that this thesis is too abstract to be of any value to 
autistic communities. However, I would argue that the fundamental concern of this thesis is to discover 
how the medical, popular, and cultural discourses of autism shape autistic people’s experiences in both 
positive and negative ways. This does not remain on the level of abstraction but alerts us to how 
important the ways that diagnoses are framed and constructed are to autistic people gaining both 
access to timely support through diagnosis which is preceded by gatekeepers holding correct 
information about autism.  Moreover, it aids in an understanding of the self. Pellicano et al’s (2014) 
study asked key stakeholders of autism research which issues were important to them and ‘accurate 
public awareness about autism’ was cited as high on the scale of relevance (p.76).  
 
As Atkinson and Silverman (1997) state ‘[i]nterviewing is the central resource through which 
contemporary social science engages with issues that concern it’ (cited in Rapley et al, 2004, p.16). It 
can be presumed that the majority of people understand what is meant by an interview. Interviews 
are all around us and they form an important part of our lives. From celebrity interviews, through to 
job interviews; the interviews function is to gather information which is deemed to be an authentic 
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representation of the interviewee’s interiority, their past and present experiences and the ways they 
envisage their future selves. However, as has been stated at the start of this section, as researchers 
we must problematise this notion of the interview as having privileged access to the ‘real’ of the thing 
which we research. The interview must be situated as an important part of the construction of the 
overall procedure of data collection. It is through the interview that the narratives and discourses can 
be known, and it is perhaps only in that space/time that they exist for the interviewee. As Dingwall 
(1997) cited in Rapley (2004) suggests: ‘[t]he interview is an artefact, a joint accomplishment of 
interviewer and respondent. As such, its relationship to any “real” experience is not merely unknown 
but in some senses unknowable’ (p.16) 
 
There is considerable debate that suggests that the interview can never produce ‘naturalistic’ data, for 
the interview produces the data (Nikander, 2012). If the interviewer composes the questions and sets 
the scene, literally and figuratively, then of course it cannot be known whether the discussions that 
follow actually have any bearing on an individual’s experience outside of the interview space. Though 
as Nikander (2012) suggests we should be wary of there being such a thing as naturalistic or unbiased 
data since all data, whether produced through interaction with human or non-human participants, has 
always been produced by human actors. The question of bias will be returned to later in this chapter. 
As this project is positioning interviews as a mode of discovering how discourse and discursive 
formations become embodied or interact with autistic individuals, we cannot think that the interview 
is a value free space where information is simply relayed and an authenticity of subjectivity emerges. 
The interview is one of the spaces where these discourses which are being interrogated are in a sense 
magnified and even created in the dialogue between the interviewer and interviewee.  
 
In recognising these considerations around the role and purpose of interviews as a data collection 
method, I follow Potter and Hepburn’s (2012) guides for making clear that the interview is both an 
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interactional space and a discursive space. As Potter and Hepburn (2012) write, key concerns for 
producing rigorous research that can add to academic knowledge include:  
1. improving the transparency of the interview setup, 
2. more fully displaying the active role of the interviewer, 
3. using representational forms that show the interactional production of interviews, and 
4. tying analytic observations to specific inter- view elements 
 (p. 556). 
 
Following these guidelines enable the research project in its entirety to be evaluated ‘more 
comprehensively by readers’ (Potter and Hepburn, 2012, p.556). This in turn enables research to be 
followed up by interested scholars, adding to the body of knowledge. Moreover, these guidelines place 
the interviewer in the frame, and thus encourages better analyses and understandings of the data both 
by the lead researcher and critical readers of the project by providing transparency from the 
recruitment process to the interview. As Tim Rapley (2004) writes:  
 
When it comes to analysing interviews, I argue that you should analyse what actually happened 
– how your interaction produced that trajectory of talk, how specific versions of reality are co-
constructed, how specific identities, discourses and narratives are produced.  
(p.16. italics in original) 
 
 Following Tim Rapley’s (2004) and Potter and Hepburn’s (2012) advice, when I first introduce each 
interview participant through their quotation in the analysis chapters I have included brief information 
about the interview space if possible. And, how I, as the researcher, and the participant interacted in 
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that space and how that enabled or didn’t allow discourse between us. I have included some of the 
interviewer’s questions for this reason. This is not simply to situate the specificity of the interview as 
key component in the production of meaning but also to show how adaptive methods can aid autistic 
people in participating with social scientific research. The specific considerations and accessibility 
measures of using semi structured interviews with autistic participants will now be discussed.  
 
4.6 Autism, communication and residual myths  
The interview as a methodological technique has been discussed critically but now, we must 
specifically address the issue of using interviews with the particular demographic of this project: 
autistic people. Autism is a condition which is identified by its core differences or difficulties within the 
realm of sociality. The medical definition which cites ‘impairments’ in social imagination and social 
communication suggests that an autistic individual may not have the ability for reciprocity in language 
and an ability to engage social situations (Wittke, et al., 2017). An autistic person may have a difficulty 
in knowing when it is their turn to speak, how long to speak for or when they have said enough on a 
topic. An autistic person may also have difficulties with sensory input and may struggle to ‘filter’ all the 
environmental information in such a way that they can concentrate on the primary task at hand 
(Pellicano, 2013, Bogdashina, 2003).  
 
For all these reasons, it could well be presumed that using interview techniques with autistic 
individuals would not be the best method for answering the research questions at hand. This is of 
course a key issue in terms of accessibility. The choice to utilise interview methods will be discussed 
from this position as it is clear that this has dramatically foreclosed the participants who were able to 
take part in this project.  However, before considering these differences from an ethical and 
accessibility point of view, I would like to briefly think about how these traits of autism have been 
reified in the discourses around disability and autism and how these have worked to figure the autistic 
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as that whom cannot give a full account of themselves. In this rhetoric and discourse of deficit in 
sociality, the autistic individual remains outside of language and isolated from an understanding of 
others and from a sense of the self (Yergeau, 2018). A discussion around accessibility and ethical 
considerations will follow this section. This will argue that in-depth considerations of accessibility 
issues specific to research with autistic participants, a reconsideration of what is meant by autistic 
sociality, and endeavouring to come as close as possible to what Damien Milton (2014) cited as 
‘interactional expertise’ need not preclude a certain section of this population from engaging in 
interview-based data collection methods. As has been mentioned above this research design was 
informed by the guiding principles of ‘participatory methods’ (Fletcher-Watson et al, 2018). 
 
 Autism has often been situated as a pattern of shared ‘impairments’ which are more or less common 
across the autistic population. Though the levels of difficulty the individual will face varies greatly 
(Happé and Frith, 2005). These impairments lie primary within the spheres of sociality and suggest that 
the autistic individual is lacking in certain areas which preclude them from engaging in normative social 
behaviour and communication. Some of these deficits have been outlined in the preceding paragraphs 
and others may include an inability to ‘read’ social situations including difficulties in understanding 
facial expressions, emotions and nuance in spoken and written communication (Luyster, et al., 2011). 
When existing together these traits have been theorised by Simon Baron-Cohen et al, (1995) as being 
symptomatic of a lack of theory of mind.  
 
The theory of mind module (ToMM) hypothesis suggests that the autistic individual has an inability to 
infer meaning from the behaviours and communication techniques of others in other to engage 
actively and fully in reciprocal communication. Famously, this was highlighted by the Sally-Anne test 
(Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985). Participants (importantly, the participants for this test are children, but 
tests using the same logic are still in use for adults in diagnostic screenings) are asked to watch a video 
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of two figures.17 A doll is lying in view on the table.  One figure, Sally-Anne, leaves the room and the 
other places the doll in a box so it is hidden from view. The participant is then asked where Sally-Anne 
will look for her doll when she returns to the room. An autistic participant is more likely to answer that 
Sally-Anne will look in the box. This is suggested to be because the participant cannot infer that Sally-
Anne will not have the same knowledge of where the doll is as she or he does. Answering in this manner 
is presumed to be indicative of a lack of theory of mind, or as it otherwise called, mind blindness 
(Baron-Cohen, 1997).  
 
 
Figure I, Scenario of Sally-Anne test. In: Uta Frith, 2001 
 
Autism psychologist Uta Frith (2001) has argued that whilst ToMM, or mind blindness, does imply a 
‘failure’ of communication to some degree it does not imply a ‘global lack of social ability’.  However, 
the idea of mind blindness has led to narratives of tragedy and irretrievable loss of bonds with other 
human beings. This can be seen in this quotation from John Tooby and Leda Cosmides in the foreword 
to Simon Baron-Cohen’s (1997) book Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind: 
 
 
17 Despite this test being conducted with children it still holds relevance, as many of the diagnostic screening tests 
have not yet been updated to work optimally for autistic adults (Murphy, et al. 2016).  
 107 
[…] someone whose ToMM is impaired is blind to the existence other minds, while still living in the 
same psychical, spatial, visual and many-hued world as unimpaired people do. For beings evolved 
to live woven into the minds of mothers, fathers, friends and companions, being blind to the 
existence of other’s minds is a catastrophic loss. 
(p.xvii, own italics) 
 
Uta Frith (2001) states that whilst mind blindness cannot account for certain behaviours common to 
autism, such as repetitive and restrictive behaviours and difficulties with motor skills, it can account 
for issues to do with language acquisition and language use such as ‘muteness, language delay, echoing 
of speech and idiosyncratic use of language ‘(p.10). This, Frith (2001) hypotheses, may be due to the 
inability of an autistic child to follow the ‘referential intention’ of a caregiver who is the child’s first 
guide in language acquisition. This can lead to objects being named incorrectly as the child does not 
pick up (or perhaps does pick up) on the arbitrary nature of signs and their referents.  This may 
continue into adulthood. Whilst Frith (2001) does suggest that with ‘appropriate allowances’ for mind 
blindness social interaction can still be meaningful for the autistic person, Frith suggests that the 
individual lacks a full understanding of the other and consequently often remains ‘egocentric’ and thus 
deficient in the attributes which enable reciprocal communication and social engagement into 
adulthood (Frith, 2001, p.970) 
 
Damien Milton (2012) has argued that ToMM needs to be critiqued for its prevailing ahistorical and 
acultural stance on sociality. As Milton (2012) suggests, the ToMM hypothesis and its connection to 
empathy; that is being able to infer, interpret and respond appropriately to another’s emotions, relies 
upon an incorrect understanding of the social world. As Milton (2012) understands it, ToMM presumes 
that people who don’t have autism and otherwise normative others have an instinctual understanding 
of the social norms and rules and are able to engage with them with ease. As Milton writes, this 
position relies upon a belief that society exists separately to individual actors, akin to how certain 
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functional sociologists interpret society (p.885). This ignores the interactional and relational nature of 
sociality which is culturally and historically produced and reproduced through the relations between 
human actors and thus, subject to change. Furthermore, it ignores the political organisation of 
communication norms. How we communicate, and why some forms of communication are 
hierarchised over others is politically and culturally significant. Indeed, the very term ‘mind blindness’ 
utilises the condition of blindness- a key sensory component of normative communication- as a 
metaphor. This presents us with the seeing, speaking and consequently thinking human as the 
normative and thus, fully human, human. As Melanie Yergeau argues: ‘I believe all incarnations of ToM 
to be decidedly inhumane’. Yergeau suggests that ToMM ‘stories’ autistic people, and it’s residual 
nature marks how autistic people understand themselves and how those who are not autistic 
understand them (p.19).  Therefore, Milton suggests that what is necessary is a consideration of how 
the relationality between the medical discourses and autistic individuals, individualises and 
ontologises this pathology of sociality.  
 
As Milton and Bracher (2013) have discussed, mind blindness and its correlative, empathy deficit are 
simply one part of a long history which has excluded the very people who have the condition. Milton 
and Bracher (2013) write: ‘autism remains a condition which is defined and diagnosed by observation’ 
and that historically autistic people ‘were objects of inspection, rather than active participants in the 
creation of knowledge relating to their own experiences’ (p.63)  As Milton, et al, (2014) suggest,  ‘[I]n 
this field, it is the voices and claims of autistic people regarding their own expertise in knowledge 
production concerning autism that is most recent in the debate; and traditionally the least attended 
to’ (p.794).   
 
Yet, as Melanie Yergeau (2018) points out, autistic people have been narrating their experiences 
through the written word since at least the 1950s. These have sometimes been written to inform non-
autistic people about their experiences. Or, more often, they have been written for other autistic 
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people; for support, to build community and create meaningful dialogues. The very social things that 
the lack of theory of mind discourses of autism would suggest are lacking in autistic people. There are 
numerous books written by autistic people, and increasingly autistic AFAB individuals (see, Temple 
Grandin (1986), Leanne Holliday-Wiley (1999), Melanie Yergeau (2018), Laura James (2017), Katherine 
May (2018), Jennifer O’ Toole (2019) - to name but a few). Since the internet became readily accessible 
autistic forums, vlogs and blogs have become multiple and they have come to play an integral role in 
autistic culture (Yergeau, 2018, p.39).  
 
Autistic people have been telling their stories for decades, yet still these myths or discourses about the 
inability of the autistic to present their experiences persist. As Yergeau (2018) argues, it is not simply 
that that these autistic narratives written by autistic people are unknown and need discovering or 
bringing to light by a non-autistic who can give them the status they deserve, it is that they are 
systematically devalued as being ‘true’ accounts of autism. For as Yergeau (2018) suggests, if one is 
able to write a narrative account, or cannot recount their experience verbally through the vlog format, 
then the narrator cannot truly be autistic, or perhaps they had autism, but they have now recovered. 
This narrative, as Yergeau (2018) recounts, is one which has followed autistic writer, scientist and 
innovator Temple Grandin.   For as the argument goes, autism is a condition which encompasses an 
impairment of sociality and reciprocity, and this does not lend itself to linguistic and oral feats such as 
vlogs, books and publishing books and articles. When autistic people tell their stories, they can be 
easily removed from the narrative of autism. As one autistic journalist states, when they tell their 
experiences of autism someone will always jump in and state something along the lines of: ‘but you’re 
not autistic enough to count’ (Kurchak, 2018, italics in original).   
 
Alternatively, if they happen to be deemed as ‘autistic enough’ then their narratives are de-coded and 
analysed for evidence of the self-absorbed, ego driven psyche of autism (Yergeau, 2018).  This reflects 
what Hans Asperger’s wrote in the 1940s: ‘[T]he autist is only himself […] and not an active member 
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of a greater organisation which he is influenced by and which he influences constantly’ (Asperger in 
Milton, 2014, p.796). They do not tell their experience or their subjectivities: they simply demonstrate 
the asociality of autism through their linguistic style. In these analyses, the autistic person has no 
depth; autism forms their subjectivity and de-limits their ability to provide anything other than an 
account of their autism. When seen through the deficit model then a holistic autistic subjectivity 
cannot never be said to be demonstrable through language. As Yergeau (2018) elaborates:  
 
Demi-rhetoricity is, I believe, the major topos from which clinicians draw when they wish to refute 
the desires or claims to identity of those whom they study. As a construct, demi-rhetoricity enables 
clinicians to claim the best of both worlds when they respond to autistic rhetors: 
1. They can argue that autistic people are not autistic enough to make claims about autism. 
2. They can likewise argue that autistic people are too autistic to make claims about autism 
(p.50)  
 
This understanding of autism does not allow for autism to be accountable for all the multiplicities in a 
person’s character and engagements with the world, but rather it provides a flat sense of identity 
constructed and knowable solely though the deficit model of autism.  Autism in this conception, as a 
neurological difference understand through lack, becomes the ever-deficient ontology of the autistic 
person. Lacking full entry into language they cannot give an account of human experience. This binary 
of biology and the social creates a paradoxical conception which suggests that non-autistics are 
somehow less driven by neurology and biology, which, of course, harks back to philosophical ideas of 
mind and reason. In this configuration the autistic is the ultimate figure of unreason and therefore 
outside of the realm of the storytelling social human.  
 
As Yergeau elucidates:  
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[U]nlike allistic rhetors, our narrative practices cannot be read outside neurology, for without 
neurology we cannot map or filter autism onto our narratives […] Autism’s rhetorical function- in 
genetics, neurology, psychology, philosophy, and more – is to contrast those who are otherwise 
presumed to be cognitively and thereby humanly whole 
 (p.23). 
 
‘Autism’, in this sense as a reified object, is often given more agency than autistic individuals. Whilst it 
becomes an ontology of deficit it removes intent and agency from the individual diagnosed. Autism 
has often been conceived of as a thief or a parasite which ‘steals’ a seemingly normatively developing 
child. As Ian Hacking argues: ‘[T]his is the ancient myth of the changeling, the troll child substituted in 
the dead of night for an infant sleeping in his cot at home’ (p.44).  This, suggests, Yergeau (2018) 
constructs autism as ‘essential involuntarity’ (p.8) Autism is an ontological category but what 
underpins it is an inability to account for oneself or to have a will, or the powers of reason. This 
involuntarity can be read in tics, seemingly irrational movements, echoalia, bursts of energy, irregular 
facial expressions, and so on. As Yergeau writes:  
 
Because autism isn’t a switch that can be turned off at will (trust me, I’ve tried), autism is frequently 
conceived as essentialised involuntarity. But beyond the illusion of choice, autism’s essence, if you 
will, has been clinically identified as a disorder that prevents individuals from exercising free will 
and precludes them from accessing self-knowledge and knowledge of human others. Its subjects 
are not subjects in the agentive sense of the word, but are rather passively subject to the motions 
of brains and dermis gone awry. 
 (p.8, own italics). 
 
What the above discourses of autistic rhetoricity, interaction and sociality suggest is that the autistic 
individual can never lay claim to themselves, much less narrate who they are to a researcher who is 
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not autistic.  The history of how autism has been produced through medical and cultural knowledges 
are residual and still shape how we think about autistic people. We must be careful not to fight these 
discourses along normative lines. By this I mean, we cannot simply argue against this by stating that 
autistic people can take part in all research and they have the abilities to do whatever a person who is 
not autistic can.  Nor can we simply ignore autistic specificity, tics, echoalia, stims, as to do so is to 
revert back to the norm and to work along ableist lines. Whilst an autistic person’s abilities may vary 
day by day or hour by hour there are some clear differences in the level of support that someone might 
need. Autistic people have significant difficulties and challenges that should not be overlooked. 
Likewise, communication by means of speech may never be possible for some autistic people. Written 
communication might likewise elude some autistic people. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher if she does not have autism must reflect upon the ways in which she not 
only runs the risk of not adequately addressing the communication needs of her participants, but that 
the interactional relationality of an autistic and non-autistic person may present communicative gaps 
that cannot be fully bridged. As Damien Milton (2012) outlines in his theorisation of the double 
empathy problem, full reciprocal interaction between an autistic individual and a non-autistic 
individual may be never be fully possible. Milton (2012) takes up the ToMM understanding of autistic 
cognition which I have outlined above and critiques this through a suggestion that interactional 
problems do not emerge from a deficit of empathy inherent to the autistic person but through a failure 
to consider communication as an interaction which is governed by social norms and rules which are 
fundamentally normative. Thus, as I have stated previously, this conceptualisation can only ever 
suggest that deficit of sociality lies within the autistic subject and cannot examine the conditions of 
interaction itself which are necessarily contingent upon cultural and social norms of communication. 
For, Milton (2012), this suggests that both parties (autistic and non-autistic) are ‘mind blind’ to the 
other. Though, as Milton (2012) suggests, the autistic individual is positioned in such a way that they 
have knowledge of non-autistic sociality and are often forced to learn the ‘rules’. Non-autistic people 
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are not often confronted with, or forced to engage, with autistic sociality and this lends the autistic 
individual an insight which is lacking in the non-autistic population. As Milton (2012) writes on the 
‘double empathy problem’:  
 
The ‘double empathy problem’: a disjuncture in reciprocity between two differently disposed social 
actors which becomes more marked the wider the disjuncture in dispositional perception of the 
lifeworld- perceived as a breach in ‘natural attitude’ of what constitutes ‘social reality’ for ‘non 
autism spectrum’ people and yet an everyday and often traumatic experience for ‘autistic people 
 (p.884) 
 
For autistic people to take part in research projects then, a destabilising or deconstruction of normative 
modes of communication must occur, and thus, a destabilising of differences which are always 
hierarchical. In this instance, a destabilising of what constitutes normative communication and 
normative sociality must be approached as integral to the project at hand. Normative interaction is 
just as much ontologised in the neurotypical individual as is deficit is in the neurodivergent. By this I 
mean it is situated as a property, or inherent skill or deficit, of the individual as they relate to the pre-
existing social world. I will turn now to a discussion on what methodological alterations were made 
during this research project to attempt to come someway to a form of ‘participatory research’ 







4.7 Practical application through methodological adaptations 
 
[…] autistic people have often become distrustful of researchers and their aims, and are 
frequently frozen out of the processes of knowledge production […] The involvement of autistic 
scholars in research and improvements in participatory methods can thus be seen as a 
requirement, if social research in the field of autism is to claim ethical and epistemological 
integrity. 
 (Milton, 2014, p.794). 
 
As I briefly stated earlier this chapter, from the inception of this research project I actively engaged 
with, or observed, online autistic communities on Reddit, Twitch, Wrong Planet, Twitter and Facebook. 
I posted on forums such as r/Aspergirls and r/Aspergers on Reddit and on Twitter using the popular 
hashtags #actuallyautistic, #autistic, #doilookautisticyet among others.  I have met with autistic 
friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. I have been to autistic-led conferences and informally spoken 
with autistic research consultants. During these online and offline encounters conversations were had 
about what modes and styles of communication would be preferable for them if they were to take 
part in a research project such as this.  I also sought to discover whether they saw relevance in my 
research questions and if the interview schedule was accessible. Several autistic taught postgraduate 
students in the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds were kind enough to run 
through practice interviews with me. We discussed whether the way I planned to conduct the 
interviews was conducive to them being able to answer the questions. From all these conversations 
with autistic people several points key to doing research that was mindful of autistic people’s needs 
came up:  
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- When recruiting via social media include the researcher’s email address so that a prospective 
participant doesn’t have to make public that they are autistic if they do not feel comfortable in 
doing so.  
- The interview space must be chosen by the participant if they require this. This enables the 
participant to know the space beforehand, to be able to know how much noise or sensory input 
there will be in the environment. If the participant does not want to choose a space, then maps 
and detailed information about the room/building should be given before. This information 
should include any noises or lights and accessibility considerations (such as extraction fans or 
strip lighting, wheelchair ramps, availability of disabled toilets). 
- A copy of the interview questions should be offered to the participants prior to the interview 
so that the interview isn’t completely unknown.18  Interview questions should be available to 
look at during the interview itself.  
- During the interview eye contact is not always necessary; for many autistic people eye contact 
becomes something to concentrate on and stops them from being able to think clearly.  Seats 
do not need to be arranged facing towards one another. The interviewer and interviewee can 
sit side by side, for example. The interview can also take place during an activity, such as 
walking. This should be ascertained prior to meeting with a participant.  
- The interview should be able to take any form, i.e., it can take place online through the Skype 
video chat function or through a text-based online platform. It can also be given in the form of 
an adapted questionnaire to be filled out alone and emailed or posted back to the researcher, 
or, it can take place as a standard face-to-face meeting.  
- Tone of voice, facial expressions, body movements of the participant are not to be analysed or 
interpreted within a normative neurotypical framework in the sense of offering meaningful 
information for discussion chapters, or to be analysed in accordance with deficit models of 
 
18 Interview questions were only offered to the participants of this study after all information about the project 
had been provided and consent forms had been signed.  
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autism. Movements can be discussed during the interview to ascertain whether the participant 
is anxious or struggling with the sensory environment.  
- The participant should be allowed and encouraged to bring a family member or friend to the 
interview if they require this.  
- Stimming, i.e., movements of the body such as rocking, flicking fingers, playing with fidget 
spinners should be acknowledged as accepted with the interview environment.  
- Questions should be as clear as possible with follow up questions readily available to clarify 
points. Metaphors and other linguistic idioms should only be used if clearly articulated to avoid 
confusion. Some autistic people might not know to elaborate on questions so the researcher 
should be clear on when they would like examples or elaboration.  
- Finally, to remember that each autistic person is different and will have different needs, thus 
each interview must be adapted based on the individual’s requests and needs. These should 
always be ascertained by the researcher prior to, and ongoing during the interview. It should 













The above points were considered and implemented (if required) during every interview. The following 





Each participant chose their preferred way to be interviewed, including whether video image was 
important, or indeed, if interpersonal communication worked for them. Mary was the only person who 
chose to not participate in any form of interpersonal communication. Due to the researcher being 
overseas during some points of the data collection Skype was offered as preferable to face to face 
meetings; this only affected two of the interviews, Aime and Esther, both of whom preferred a Skype 
meeting to a face to face interview. An ‘object focussed’ interview was offered as an option. This would 
be a discussion around an object or photograph that held meaning to the participant. It could also be 
discussion based around a particular activity or event. This option was to offer a more centred 
Participant Interview type Further 
communication 
Interview venue 
Esther Skype- phone no video Email  N/A 
Mary Written questionnaire N/A N/A 
Sarah  Skype- phone no video Twitter chat function N/A 
Sally Skype- phone no video N/A N/A 
Aime Skype- phone no video N/A N/A 
Hannah Face to face Email  Participant’s 
University library 
Sara Skype- phone no video Twitter chat function N/A 
jojo Face to face N/A Researcher’s 
University 
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conversation which could be given forethought by the individual. This option was not chosen by any 
participant. All participants were offered the interview schedule in advance. This aided in the individual 
knowing what to expect in the interview and to have a chance to think about what they would like to 
say. Giving the interview schedule in advance was agreed upon as being helpful by all participants.  
 
4.8 Data collection and analysis  
When an interview took place face to face or via a Skype call a Dictaphone was used to record the 
conversation. The Dictaphone was turned on from the moment that we had sat down in the room, or 
in our respective rooms. The recording included the introductions and the reiteration of the consent 
framework. Only Mary preferred to email her questionnaire sheet back to me, as such, no audio 
recordings are associated to Mary. I will discuss the in-person interviews before returning to Mary’s 
interview at the end of this section.  
 
After the interview had finished, I copied the audio files onto a University of Leeds computer and saved 
them on the ‘M’ drive to ensure privacy. These audio files were then transferred to a transcription 
program entitled ‘Express Scribe’. I transcribed the interviews without any outside assistance. As Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2009) note ‘[…] transcription is an interpretive process, where the differences 
between oral speech and written texts give rise to a series of practical and principle issues’ (p.177). 
Thus, certain decisions and considerations must be made with regards to how one deals with the audio 
recording in the transcription process. I made the decision to transcribe the interviews ‘almost- 
verbatim’, meaning I did not shorten, lengthen or otherwise alter the interviewees comments or 
answers. The only times I did so was when the audio cut out or speech could not be heard. In the later 
interviews I made the decision not to transcribe the introductions and concluding remarks where I 
discussed the consent form and practicalities, I did not transcribe conversational asides that were not 
relevant to the subsequent analysis. I included laughs, pauses, small sounds (e.g. mm, hmm) in the 
 119 
transcription process.  Sighs, laughter or sounds of crying were transcribed through using the verb or 
additional adverb to qualify, i.e; [laughs], [sobs], [sighs], [sobs briefly]. When I transcribed pauses, I 
used eclipses; […]. These have been included in the interview quotations in the analysis chapters. 
 
 I also kept field notes in which I wrote down my own interpretation of the interview in detail directly 
after the interview had finished. In these notes I included my interpretation of emotions, rapport and 
content. These field notes were essential for aiding my memory when it came to the analysis of the 
data. The reason for choosing to transcribe all that was said or uttered in the interview was to ensure 
I was able to detail how the interview functioned as an interactional space and to understand how the 
interview produced some of the content. I did not use a specialised form of transcription as I was 
looking for content predominantly rather than for data to analysis linguistic style or interaction as 
might be more common in a psychological research project (Maynard and Turowitz, 2017). All 
recordings, transcripts of the interviews, the single typed questionnaire form and demographic 
information was anonymised and stored securely on the University of Leeds drive. Signed consent 
forms were kept separately to all other information in a locked drawer at the University of Leeds and 
have since been destroyed. All emails which included consent forms or identifying information have 
been deleted.  
 
Analysis of the interview data followed Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) question; ‘[H]ow do I carry on 
the dialogue with the text I have co-authored with the interviewee’ (p.193 I understood the interview 
as a conversation which was co-constructed through ‘two persons talking about common theme of 
interest’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p.192). As such, I aimed at analysing the interviews in line with 
what I – as closely as possible- believed the interviewee to be saying to me and the intention behind 
their comment or statement. Whilst, as stated earlier, I began this project with an epistemological 
positioning, the interviews were not being conducted to prove or disprove the value of any given 
theoretical position. Though I should state, that this was not always the case. The first interview that I 
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had with jojo forced me to reconsider my position significantly on this matter. I had entered this project 
thinking that I would find evidence of the masculinisation of autism impacting on people’s lives in some 
way and, I had presupposed a negative way.  
 
When I spoke to jojo I immediately realised that something else was at play with regards to the 
entanglement of autism and gender. I subsequently attempted to come at my interviews with a 
somewhat grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 2009).  I realised after my first interview 
with jojo that I did not know what the participants were going to say to me before the interview and I 
attempted to allow the participants to produce the knowledge in the interview without my prior 
interpretations. This did not demand I change the research questions because I had written them 
without explicit reference to the gendered construction of autism, but it did demand that I ‘let go’ of 
that particular interpretation as I conducted the interviews. This most likely changed any follow-up 
questions I asked. Therefore, when I read and began coding the interviews, I utilised a mixture of 
inductive and deductive coding (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). There is limited research into the 
understanding of the co-production of gender and autism, thus it was necessary to allow new ways of 
thinking and theorising to emerge through the interviews (inductive), this was supplemented through 
thinking how the interviews spoke to theoretical positions that are in existence (deductive).  
 
Before coding, all the transcripts and Mary’s questionnaire were first read several times, I also listened 
again to the audio recordings. After becoming acquainted with the interviews, I then hand coded them 
with pen. They were marked for similarities and divergences which were cross referenced with the 
other interviews. I also mapped them for  similarities and differences in relation to the demographic 
information I had been given by each participant. Mary’s questionnaire was the only interview which 
was difficult to code in this way. Mary had written very little under each question and I had very limited 
information to work with. There were similarities and divergences with the other interviews when they 
were cross-referenced so I was able to use some of Mary’s interview. However, simply due to the 
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brevity of it, I was unfortunately not able to develop any new theoretical understandings from it. I did 
contact Mary via email to ask to follow up questions, but I did not get a response. The similarities and 
divergences became ‘key themes’ which were then used as subheadings to guide the analysis chapters.  
 
4.9 What is missed 
I hope here I have justified the case for utilising interview techniques, albeit adapted and made more 
accessible, with this particular group of research participants. I have acknowledged that certain sectors 
of the autistic population were excluded by this choice, thus, it must be stated that this project is not 
a generalisation of all autistic people. Rather, it is a snapshot of a particular group who fall within the 
broad diagnostic category and space of autism. The participants of this study were predominantly 
highly educated, all have taken, or were taking, higher education degrees, with several pursuing or 
undertaking graduate research programs. Two were professionals working in stable employment. This, 
as I have suggested, is partly a combination of the subject matters being discussed; gender and autism. 
Subjects, which whilst they affect the individuals in an everyday sense, are perhaps less likely to be 
considered on a conceptual and theoretical level unless one has already encountered these ways of 
thinking that were expanded upon in an educational setting, or more general habitus. 
 
Thus, I would argue that one of the main limitations of this research is the decision, from the point of 
recruitment, is to narrow the focus to those who have the prerequisite abilities required for taking 
part. This has necessarily narrowed the scope of what can be known about the subject by demarcating 
who can take part. Furthermore, this thesis could perhaps be accused of presenting yet another study 
into ‘high functioning’ autism. As Osteen (2007) has stated on both the lack of research into people 
with ‘serious’ cognitive disabilities and the lack of these individuals doing the research:  
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‘[P]eople with serious cognitive or neurological difficulties often cannot communicate well enough 
to advocate for themselves. This circumstance presents another reason for disability studies’ 
relative neglect of cognitive disabilities and may also help to explain why autism and other 
cognitively disabled people are often deemed incompetent to manage their own therapy, or their 
own daily lives, let alone write about those lives’  
      (p.6)  
 
Perhaps one way to think about the conflictions and ethical considerations which go into devising a 
research project such as this, and the justification for both its line of questioning and its modes of 
operation, is to think with Donna Haraway about the question of bias. Haraway (1992), writing in 
Primate Visions, addresses the question of how we can think about the ways we orientate ourselves 
towards objects to be studied and why we do so. In Primate Visions the case in point is the study of 
primates as not simply beings in the world to be studied objectively but ones whose behaviours and 
study have been constructed within gendered and racial parameters. Due to the not-quite-but-almost 
human-ness of primates, Haraway suggests the study of them has been mobilised to understand and 
produce naturalised racial and gendered modes of understanding and organising the human in its 
varying social contexts. Haraway pays particular due to the ways in which heterosexual and 
heteronormative norms as mobilised by human beings are given weight and naturalised by the 
examination of these norms as seemingly exhibited by our nearly human cousins.  
 
In order to think critically about this, Haraway suggests that we must ask how these scientific ideas 
emerged, and which actors were promoting them to what ends? Moreover, how can scientists 
challenge these ways of doing research and what results should be gathered if perspectives or 
orientations were changed? Altering the modes of gathering information, who is conducting the 
research, who is participating, and what research questions are being addressed enables a new reality 
to emerge. This is what Haraway (1988) calls ‘partial perspectives’. Moreover, we do not need to take 
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those who we deem to be exerting excessive power in determining the course of research and research 
relevance to task in the form of academic attacks or polemics but rather, simply put, bias cancels bias 
(Haraway, 1992, p.290). Thus, this project engages with a group of people who have been largely 
neglected by research: adult autistic people who were assigned female at birth. It is never in the scope 
of one research project to cover all demographics of a specific group of participants, though I hope I 
have done justice to the ones who are included in this one.  
 
4.10 Ethical clearance 
This project was reviewed and given ethical clearance by the ESSL, Environment and LUBS (AREA) 
Faculty Research Ethics Committee at the University of Leeds (AREA 17-075). Clearance was given 
12.03.2018.  
 
4.11 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided information about the research design of this project and its 
implementation. This chapter began with a discussion around the analytical framework which I have 
used to construct a narrative from the interview data. I then discussed how I recruited the participants 
of this study. Despite placing recruitment posters in a wide variety of places the key place where 
participants came forward to express interest in taking part in the project was through social media 
platforms. Subsequently, I discussed how the internet acts as a key emancipatory tool for those who 
are autistic. A considerable part of this chapter was given over to critiquing the residual myths which 
stick to autism and autistic people to suggest they cannot be the authors of their own experience. 
Though unconventional for a methodology chapter, which usually deal solely with the practical 
elements of a research design, I stand by this decision as necessary to show how I came to certain 
methodological decisions. In doing so I followed Potter and Hepburn’s (2012) guide to research 
transparency. Following these guidelines enables the reader to see how certain narratives were able 
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to be constructed from recruitment to analysis. This proved especially important with the demographic 
included in this project. Making the modes of research transparent enables further research with 
autistic people and about autistic experience to be improved upon. A descriptive account of the data 
collection and analysis utilised in this project was provided and a brief discussion into who has been 
excluded from this project by the nature of its design closed this chapter.  
 
The next chapter is the first of two analysis chapters and it examines the experiences of the participants 

















‘Like a Square Peg in a Round Hole’: Experiences of Growing Up with Un/known Autism 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This analysis chapter is the first of two. It looks at the key moments in the lives of the participants 
before diagnosis, or prior to the self-realisation that they were autistic19.  These key moments or 
periods of time were identified broadly as ‘childhood’, ‘adolescence’, ‘relationships’, and ‘gender 
identity’ (see appendix 4 for interview schedule). Throughout the discussion of these areas a theme 
shared by many of the participants was that a feeling of difference emerged in relation to others at 
different points in their lives. This difference was not yet named as autism and I argue that prior 
interpolations of the subject as girls led to a sense of ‘performing’ their sex/gender identities. This 
subsequently became subject to intense disciplinary regimes in order to somehow curb or manage this 
sense of un/known difference20. Many participants engaged in ‘masking’ their un/known autistic 
difference and performing certain neurotypical roles through a management of their sex/gender. In 
the second half of the chapter I discuss this in relation to the politics of passing and discuss the ways 
this is similar to theories of passing but it also diverges at certain important points.  
 
 
19 I have distinguished between the ‘official’ diagnosis and self-realisation because for many participants they were 
certain that they were autistic for a period of time before the diagnosis. As they had asked to be referred for a 
diagnosis through their GPs, they had already amassed knowledge around the condition which they had been 
utilising to make sense of their experience. In many cases the diagnosis was sought as a legitimation of what they 
already believed to be true.  
20 I use the term un/known here following Joanne Latimer (2009). Breaking the word enables knowing/known 
and unknowing/unknown to be considered outside of a dichotomous framework. I particularly wanted to reframe 
the idea of being undiagnosed through this terminology. ‘Undiagnosed’, at least in my considerations, removes the 
agency of the individual in having some understanding of their physical, mental and cognitive states, it gives power 
to the diagnostic team to uncover the truth of the individual. Using the phrase un/known allows a sense that autism 
as a neurological condition was always there prior to the individual being diagnosed. It enables the feeling of 
difference and otherness that the participants felt prior to diagnosis to be considered within a framework of enabling 
and acknowledging agency. It also highlights the sense that the body, mind and cognition are always partially out of 
reach to us as a scientific fact. Using un/known rather than undiagnosed enables the fluidity and instability of 
embodiment and scientific knowledges to come to the fore.  
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5.2 ‘My body didn’t feel like it belonged to me’: The un/knowing body and the un/known world 
 
The body is the palmary instance of the ambiguous 
 
 (James in Latour, 1996, p. 206) 
 
For the majority of participants feeling somehow, and unexplainably, different to others became 
centred at the site of the sexed/gendered body. This generally started around adolescence, though 
several participants were aware of their perceived difference in early childhood, and the body became 
a contested site.  The development of breasts, hips and increasing body fat constituted a spilling out 
into space and these bodies demanded considerable self-disciplinary techniques to be imposed. The 
body became the site of control and containment, it was circumvented or hidden. The sense that the 
development of bodies caused the participants to become more visible to others and this highlighted 
their sense of difference was a prevalent theme in the interviews. Moreover, a sense of lack of control 
of the body led to a feeling of alienation or of not ‘belonging’.  
 
This was the case for Aime. I spoke with Aime, an eighteen-year-old secondary school student over 
Skype. Aime identifies as non-binary because they do not identify with either the category of man or 
woman. At the time of our interview, they stated non-binary seems to work as the best description of 
their gender. Aime had mentioned feeling discomfort with their gender as a teenager and I asked them 
when this began:   
 
My main thing was my periods, because my body didn't feel like it belonged to me, so it felt 
physically painful because it was physically painful but it also made, I felt like I didn't belong, I felt 




Later in our conversation we discussed whether, retrospectively, Aime felt that their gender dysphoria 
and their autism were connected in any ways. Aime stated that the two were interlinked but that 
distinguishing one from the other was impossible as well as not necessary. Aime stated: ‘I am autistic 
in the same way as I am queer’ (I will return to this comment in the following chapter). I mention this 
because I don’t want to override Aime’s non-binary identity by suggesting it was caused by, or a 
symptom of, their autism. Non-binary, trans and other queer subjectivities frequently have their 
gender and sexual orientations questioned for causal origins and this is particularly the case for autistic 
queer people (The Atlantic, 2016, van der Miesen, 2018, Strang, et al, 2018).  Aime’s self-conflation of 
their autism and queerness allowed me to consider their gender identity as entangled with their autism 
in a way that meant I didn’t have to engage with origin questions (for example, is Aime non-binary 
because they are autistic?). Thus, I want to take Aime’s consideration that their body and the world 
simultaneously became hostile places as allowing a way in to thinking about how the processes of 
world building and the building of subjectivities take place through the body.  
 
Aime’s articulation of not belonging in social settings is centred around when their body began to 
change. Feminist scholars such as Marion-Young (2005) and Shildrick (1994) have argued that for all 
assigned female at birth people (they refer specifically to ‘women’)  the body becomes contested 
ground once one becomes aware of their social status as the result of living within a heterosexist 
society which positions assigned female at birth people as both privative and fetishished. This 
simultaneous making privative and fetishised is centred on the sexed/gendered body as that which is 
reproductive, desired and repudiated.  Aime’s sense of not belonging  began with the advent of their 
menstruation. Aime did not simply feel alienated from their body but they felt this change to be deeply 
indicative of their place in the social world. As Aime notes they felt as though they were ‘faking 
everything’. The sense that Aime felt as though they were ‘faking’ was noted by other participants who 
directly related this to a sense of ‘faking’ or ‘pretending’ to be a woman.  
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Sally said something similar when she stated that she felt, in her words, she was ‘pretending’ to be a 
woman and that she was a ‘crap one’ at that. Sally is in her forties and had only recently been 
diagnosed at the time of our interview, thus she has spent a lot longer than Aime, who was diagnosed 
at eighteen, without an understanding of what makes her different. Sally spoke to me about her 
attempts to find identities that she felt she could fit into:  
 
Sally: I did sort of hang myself on other identities in the past, but I worked out that recently that 
they were just means of me trying to find my place in the world.  
Emily: What were some of those other identities? 
Sally: So when I was in my twenties I threw myself into my work and I identified myself as very 
career orientated and very dedicated, um and I then, I went through a detox program for alcoholism 
six years ago and after that I tried to identify myself in a new age 'found myself' hippy way, but that 
still wasn't quite right.  
 
Sally, being one of the oldest participants, had a long history of trying to find her place in society and 
an identity that worked for her. Sally had also struggled with alcoholism. She told me that this began 
at University and became exacerbated when she began working due to the pressure of being social in 
order to be seen as a good member of the team. Alcohol enabled Sally to enact her various identities 
without feeling so exhausted from the efforts that this took. Sally’s various identities were often bound 
with her gender identity, she felt that she had to enact a certain persona in order to be understood as 
a normative woman. I will return to this point in the second half of this chapter. Sally talked to me 
about her experiences of University. Sally had adopted, in her words, a ‘rock persona’, she said this 
helped her feel at peace with her gender identity being one that is not overtly feminine. However, 
during her time at University and learning about the politics of sexuality and gender sparked off 
considerations about what her own gender identity was. As Sally states:  
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I spent quite a lot time … there was quite a big chunk of my University time where I definitely 
thought I must be in the wrong body, that I was boy, that I was better at being a boy and I kind of 
understood that in relation to the women that I wasn't like and it was those stereotypical things 
around the make-up and the dressing up and the presentation and the looking for boyfriends and 
the obsessions with the relationships, and also because I didn't get them, and retrospectively I 
didn't really get anyone, I got on a lot better with a bunch of the male physics students who lived 
in the same halls as me […] I felt I wasn't a girl and I felt I wasn't very good at being a girl. I had a 
couple of relationships with women which I felt reinforced this, so...  
[Sally, 2018] 
 
Here Sally makes reference to the sense that one’s gender identity is contingent upon the ways one 
orients their sexual desire. Sally alerts us to what Butler (2006) cites as the ‘heterosexual matrix’. To 
be intelligible then sexuality and gender must be mapped across a coherent framework. For Sally her 
desire for women led to a consideration that she was not ‘good at being a girl’. To be a ‘good girl’ is 
necessarily to be heterosexual. To feel physical and psychological desire towards the same gender 
exposes the sense that the body doesn’t fit. Much as Aime had considered, when the body seems to 
betray one’s sense of identity then it becomes the primary object which is positioned as needing 
adaptation in order to make oneself intelligible.  The quote from James cited in Latour (1996) which 
opened this chapter alerts us to the ways that our bodies ‘become aware’ through being affected and 
it points us the ambiguities of the worlds we construct and inhabit. The changes in Aime’s body alerted 
them to the sense that the world in which they were supposed to fit did not belong to them, thus they 
could not belong.  
 
Aime’s sense of not belonging is articulated by actual physical pain, not only the pain of menstruation 
but this is an embodied affective pain. Becoming alienated from their body through physical pain made 
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Amie aware of the world they inhabited. It made them feel a sense of not belonging and of only 
pretending to fit in. This affectual embodiment that Aime experienced sparked a consideration about 
the dominant gendered regime into which they could not fit. This was not solely focused on their own 
body but on the sense that there was no place for them in the social order. This was also noted by Sally 
whose body became subject to intense focus as she tried to find her place in the social world.  
Kansfiszer, et al (2017) have suggested that many autistic adolescents demonstrate an ‘awareness of 
a ‘mainstream’ world they are unable to access’ (p.662). There are numerous instances where we see 
the notion of worlds evoked when referring to autism, if there exists a world that autistic people cannot 
access then where do they inhabit? What worlds are constructed in this process of alienation from the 
‘mainstream’ or normative world?21  
 
Hannah articulated something similar to Aime and Sally, however in a more circumvented way. 
Hannah had developed eating difficulties as a teenager and she became fixated on keeping her 
weight a particular number:  
 
I know why my goal weight was a certain number, um and I think it may have been because of, um, 
when I was a kid, I had some, I had a pogo stick and some stilts from the same manufacturer and 
their max weight was 50kg. So, I was like, that number, 50kgs. Um, but I don't know why, because 
there was a period of time where I was absolutely sure I was a trans man. But I've then subsequently 
realised that that could have been OCD, it could have been um, 'cos that's a thing that happens, 
people get. 
[Hannah, 2018] 
Hannah was a participant who repeatedly stated that she didn’t consider her gender identity to be 
core concern during our conversation. However, in the background information in the gender 
 
21 See, for examples, the popular autism blog Wrong Planet, the short documentary film by autistic filmmaker 
Geradine Wurzburg Autism is a World and Worlds of Autism: Across the Spectrum of Neurological Difference, a co-
authored book edited by Joyce Davison and Michael Orsini.  
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identification section she had answered ‘female, but I don’t identify with it’. Despite stating a lack of 
consideration around her gender identity (‘I never felt any pressure regarding gender when I was a kid, 
um, thankfully! [laughs]’), it did come up numerous times, especially in relation to her physical body 
and it’s changes in adolescence. I met Hannah at her previous University. She had graduated and was 
now working and planning to move in with her boyfriend. The conversation with Hannah was 
interesting for me because it was the first time I had interviewed someone somewhere I hadn’t been 
before. I felt a shift in our dynamic of researcher/research participant which in turn made me feel 
slightly unsure of my role.  Hannah initially took charge of our meeting; she chose a table and it was 
one in a busy area of the library where others around us could hear our conversation. However, our 
conversation was engaged, and we sat facing one another with the Dictaphone in between us. Perhaps 
more than halfway through the interview I decided to ask a direct question about Hannah’s gender. It 
hadn’t come up and I couldn’t be certain whether Hannah simply didn’t consider her gender to be 
integral to her narrative or if she hadn’t mentioned it because I hadn’t asked her.  
 
Emily: […] um, some people […]  have said [..] they just didn't understand as autism then, but they 
had a problem with being a girl. And, especially, that transition to becoming a teenager. Did you 
have any of those difficulties? 
Hannah: Yes, yeah. I used to wear jumpers in hot weather because of the changes to my body, like, 
I used to stay in jumpers and keep those on, and um, I think it might have been one of the factors 
in my eating problems as well. Wanting to maintain a boyish figure, I guess. 
 
When going through my interview with Hannah I realised, however, that of course she had discussed 
her sex/gender identity numerous times without having to ask any direct questions. That Hannah 
would articulate her focus on the weight on the pogo stick in relation to her gender identity acts as a 
metaphorical form of dislocation of her physical body onto an object. The particular object, the pogo 
stick, is one which she was able to use as a child thus, the pogo stick stands in for her childhood body 
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and thus her childhood body as it extends into space. As Hannah discusses in the second quotation, 
she would hide her body through large jumpers and discussing that allows her to consider her eating 
difficulties in the same framework. Moreover, Hannah discussed her beliefs that she may be as a 
transman in relation to wanting to maintain the body of her childhood.  Hannah’s comments highlight 
what Joanne Latimer cites as the un/knowing body. Hannah didn’t will or necessarily understand the 
changes in her body; they were seemingly happening outside of her control, as Latimer writes:  
 
‘And bodies, to put it simply, despite our best efforts seem to get out of line: they do not just hurt, 
scream, giggle, leak, cramp, faint, get numb, they are times seem to conceal, rebel, falsify and 
distort. That is, bodies can seem to be or become unknowing’ (p.4) 
 
The changing body became understood as an enemy to Hannah as it did to Aime, seeming as it did to 
have a mind of its own. Hannah’s refuge from this was to extend her body into space, to an inanimate 
object which was, however, not completely other to her, it was a representation of childhood self and 
of her body before it began to change in her adolescence. As Lorna Martens (2011) writes; ‘[O]ne’s 
places and one’s things extend the self into the world, the living and changing being into more lasting 
forms. Our … things are not the other, not the not-me … they grant the comfort of self-extension’ 
(p.44). Thus, Hannah attempted to create a different world for herself where her discomfit at her 
changing body had the potential to be stopped in time, at least metaphorically.  
 
jojo was a participant whose sex/gender identity was considered in a particularly negative light. jojo 
saw the relationality of sexuality and her position as an AFAB person in a heterosexual environment to 
be the main cause of her distress.  I met with jojo and her mother at the University of Leeds. I had 
booked a seminar room in a quiet wing of the University. We sat facing away from one another with 
jojo’s mum looking on at us from a seat a little distance away. The interview was, at least from my 
perspective, emotional. There were moments of tears from frustration and anger but also a current of 
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hopefulness that broke through at points.  During the interview I felt that jojo, her mother and I 
developed a rapport, I felt we had the same aims to disrupt and challenge what is considered a 
legitimate way to be. jojo’s motivation for speaking with me was to, in her words, ‘make more space 
in the world’ for her children, both of whom are also autistic. The interview was long, lasting nearly 
two and a half hours. I left the interview with a range of emotions; relief that jojo and I had so much 
to say to each other, drained from the intensity of the conversation and, a sense of anxiety about doing 
justice to the subject matters which jojo had framed which such urgency to make it so her autistic 
children didn’t have to struggle the same way she did.  
 
jojo’s struggles with sex/gender emerged when she was a young adolescent. First, I asked that she talk 
a little about being a younger person, her hobbies, her school life and so on.  jojo jumped straight to 
discussing her mental health issues which led to her not attending high school education for two years:   
 
I liked primary school but as soon as I went to secondary school that’s where my life went downhill. 
I, I had mental health issues, I eventually, I didn’t finish secondary school, I think, was I thirteen? I 
took an overdose when I was 13. 
[jojo, 2018] 
I asked whether jojo has any idea why she didn’t like secondary school:  
 
I don't, it felt as… the more you're becoming sexually mature, I mean I didn't develop breasts, I've 
never developed anything like that, but your periods, I was quite fearful. I didn't start my period 
until I was 14 and I hid it from my mum, I didn't tell anyone. So, the more I became sexually mature, 
the more the male attention, I don't like that. It's that that I don't like. And because I'm female, my 
friend at the time she was obsessed with male attention and sexual things and because I'm female 
I thought I have to be like her, but I don't, but inside I don't feel like that. But I'm a girl, I've got to 
be like that, I've got to be like that. I'm supposed to do that, I'm supposed to get a boyfriend, I'm 
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supposed to dress, you know I'm supposed to flirt. […] it's like but I don't feel like that inside, I don't 
understand, I felt like very lost and confused in the world like I was having to pretend to be a female 
kind of thing [sobs briefly]. 
[jojo, 2018] 
 
jojo began to cry a little at this point and I asked if we should stop the interview. jojo asked that we 
continue stating that she was emotional because she was finally being ‘honest’ (‘it's not like I'm upset, 
it's that I'm being true to myself. I'm being honest and I've spent my life not being honest […]’). jojo 
also has a similar relationship to her body to Hannah and Aime in that it began to cause a sense of 
confusion as to her place in the world. For jojo being a ‘female’ is necessarily to be heterosexual, 
desiring and desirable. jojo’s response to these pressures was to ultimately take her body away from 
what she saw at the intense regulatory pressures of secondary school peer relationships. After an 
intense period of self-harming behaviours, jojo took herself out of school and wouldn’t leave her family 
home for two years. jojo felt that her changing body became the site of unwanted attention from the 
boys in her peer group. The implicit sexual and romantic demands placed on her caused confusion and 
distress.  
 
jojo, Sally, Aime and Hannah all demonstrate the entanglement of their sex/gender identity and their 
feeling of difference. This sense of alienation became centred on the sexed and gendered body. This 
led to attempts to manage their un/known bodies through various strategies. Hannah restricted her 
eating in order to maintain ‘a boyish figure’ through a certain nostalgia of an androgynous childhood. 
jojo removed herself from the world entirely and did not attend school or the activities of public life 
for several years due to the perceived social demands placed on her by virtue of her sexed body. Aime 
articulated that their bodily changes in adolescence produced a feeling of not belonging and they 
described feeling alienated from both themselves and the world. Sally discussed the variety of 
identities she took on in the attempt to find her place in the world.  
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We could read these understandings of the sexed body as indicative that AFAB people seek to 
transcend the body, furthering the binarising opposition between mind and body.  However, the 
intense focus on the body as the site of this discipline demonstrates the body’s inherent entanglement 
with the world and the ability for it to be shaped and changed and for certain objects to become world 
making tools. It also suggests a deep philosophical engagement with the body as a site of perceived 
oppression. As Lester (1997) has argued discussing anorectic women the intense focus on the body 
demonstrates the embeddedness of the self within the body: that ‘I am my body’. However, I want to 
expand this slightly. What the participants show is not simply ‘I am my body’ but rather, ‘I am my body 
as it is understandable and produced through the social order and its regimes’. Each participant quoted 
here made reference to finding something to position their perceived difference onto and something 
that could be managed. All the participants quoted here disrupt the idea of an ‘undivided, integrated, 
self-contained solid’ individual (Latimer, 2009, p.51). They demonstrate the becoming of bodies in the 
processes of subjectification.  
 
This analysis must also problematise the idea of the world which exists as a social fact or, as there for 
bodies to inhabit. As disability scholars  have taught us, the world is not simply there for us all to inhabit 
equally even if we should remove the restrictive societal constraints which order our sexed/gendered 
physicality, but it is shaped and constructed along ableist normative lines (Davies, 1995, Milton, 2014). 
This means that some bodies cannot comfortably inhabit the world. Thus, we must problematise the 
notion of a universal ‘world’.  I titled this chapter with a quotation from Mary (‘like a square peg in a 
round hole’) because it alerts us precisely to this idea; some bodies cannot neatly fit in the world if we 
think of it as a stable pre-existing fact. Neither can bodies fit in the world if they are considered as a 
pre-existing fact, or, as a perennial ‘round peg’. This sentiment was offered by all of the participants 
of this project in one way or another. As Joanne Latimer (2009) writes:  
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… at the same time as noting how bodies are inscribed into their worlds by virtue of a variety of 
processes of discipline and accountability, it is necessary also to enquire more carefully into what 
worlds are elicited in the process. That is to say that, rather than take the social universe for 
granted, the interest is with the kind of limits and assumptions that would fix, albeit partially and 
temporarily, the nature of the ‘world’. Thus, there is a need to recognize that differently performed 
bodies perform different worlds and vice-versa 
 (p.2, italics in original) 
 
The four interviews I have quoted above all demonstrate a sense that a feeling of difference emerged 
around adolescence. As I have noted in the literature review this has been documented by numerous 
studies into autism and how it impacts those who are assigned female at birth. I argue that none of 
these research projects and articles have fully understood autistic embodiment as produced by the 
social world, and therefore inextricable from understandings of sex/gender/sexuality regimes which 
affect us all. There is an underlying sense that the over representation of autistic people outside of the 
normative regimes of sex/gender can be explained by arguing they lack the social skills to understand 
what is expected of them. Or, that the obsessive cognitive patterns common to autism may lend 
themselves naturally to a fixation on gender (De vries, et al., 2010). This position is what Gillis-Buck 
and Richardson (2014) described as autism as a ‘pathology of gender’. If there is anything that is clear 
in my interview data, it is that the participants have an intimate understanding of what it means to be 
coherently sexed/gendered. There is no question, at least to me, that the participants I spoke to 
understood what genders role is in society and how they ought to do gender and how they should be 
presenting themselves in order to fit within a normative regime of how bodies are ordered and 
understood.  
 
I would like to take a moment to think about whether this is a specificity of autistic AFAB people or 
AFAB people generally. Having not conducted this research with a control group of non-autistic AFAB 
 137 
people it is not possible to provide any empirical findings which speak directly to the line of 
interrogation in this thesis. However, I hypothesise that whilst these feelings of alienation and 
confusion centred around the sexed/gendered body are most likely prevalent in the non-autistic 
adolescent community I think that perhaps a difference lies in how sex/gender becomes mobilised to 
circumvent difference or to find an origin for one’s perceived difference. There was an unidentified 
and un/known difference that was causing the participants distress in adolescent, and it seems like the 
first point of interrogation was the individual’s sex/gender and its intelligibility or lack thereof. I would 
also like to consider the idea that this is not specific to autism but may be found within others who 
have experienced a period of un/known difference. For example, we might find this among those with 
undiagnosed ADHD, undiagnosed mental illness, those who are LGB, and those who are racial 
minorities, for example. It is after all, as Judith Roof (2016) states, gender’s job to make the subject 
‘fit’ (p.2).  Without any other self-understanding then, perhaps, it corresponds that sex/gender would 
be the first place to come under fire by individuals who already feel as though they are a ‘square peg 
in a round hole’ (Mary, 2018).  
 
I want to turn now to think about how the participants sense of un/known difference led them to a 
consideration that they were not performing their genders correctly. This was noted by all of the 
participants who I have quoted above. A sense that some of the participants were ‘faking’ their social 
identity was prevalent and bears certain similarities to theories of ‘passing’, albeit with some important 
divergences.  
5.3 ‘I learnt quite quickly what was acceptable and what wasn't’: masking as a form of passing?  
 
I asked Aime why they felt that their autism was not picked up by themself or others:  
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I learnt quite quickly what was acceptable and what wasn't, I learnt that you must make eye 
contact, you must do this, you must not flap, I learnt all of those things reasonably well on my own 
so I learnt to mask without anybody telling me to, I sort of just learnt just do this or it's another 
thing people will find you weird about […] 
[Aime, 2018] 
 
Tobin Siebers (2004) has noted that ‘passing is possible not only because people have sufficient genius 
to disguise their identity but also because society has a general tendency to repress the embodiment 
of difference’ (p.13). Aime’s surpression of their un/known autistic traits and of their strict adherence 
to the social norms which regulate behaviour enabled them to ‘pass’ as someone who doesn’t have 
any differences to the norm. Everything that Aime ‘learnt’ they shouldn’t do and should do are 
embodied; do make eye contact, do not flap arms. These allow Aime’s behaviour to fit within a 
normative and acceptable framework of embodiment. Aime notes that they repressed their embodied 
difference due to a desire to escape the stigma of being found ‘weird’. Importantly Aime, like many of 
the participants, did not consider that they were autistic until quite soon before they were formally 
diagnosed, thus this masking of difference was not yet known to be autistic difference. Thus, Sieber’s 
idea of ‘disguising an identity’ does not quite fit for thinking about Aime’s experience.  However, it is 
important to remember that, as mentioned in the literature review, masking is relatively new concept 
to think about autism and its presentation in assigned female at birth people (Milner, et al., 2019). As 
such, the participants are engaging with- and reproducing- this as a discourse of autism. All the 
participants knew what was meant by this term and were able to understand their gendered 
experiences retrospectively through this lens.  
 
For some participants, as I have discussed above, this difference became situated as a negative 
difference that was centred around their gender identity. This was the case for jojo who I quoted 
above. I want to revisit a section of her comment:  
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I'm supposed to do that, I'm supposed to get a boyfriend, I'm supposed to dress, you know I'm 
supposed to flirt. […] it's like but I don't feel like that inside, I don't understand, I felt like very lost 
and confused in the world like I was having to pretend to be a female kind of thing. 
[jojo, 2018, researcher’s emphasis] 
 
This was also mirrored by Sally who stated: ‘I felt I wasn't a girl and I felt I wasn't very good at being a 
girl’ and Kate: ‘I remember having [gender] dysphoria type feelings in my teens and pre-teens’ Of the 
participants who brought their gender identity up as a key concern in their adolescence the sense that 
they were only pretending to be women was prevalent. The participants mentioned so far all felt that 
their difference was initially centred as an incoherence in their sex/gender identity. As, I have noted 
above, Judith Roof (2016) has written it is ‘genders job to make the subject fit’. Thus, it makes sense 
that gender would be questioned as the site where the subject becomes intelligible to oneself and 
others. However, what makes this specific to autism is not only the seeming prevalence of this gender 
trouble in autistic individuals but the ways in which the individual’s un/known difference led a 
conscious performance of their gender identity. I argue that this particular form of gender trouble is 
not symptomatic of autism but rather symptomatic of a social world that punishes transgressions of 
the social order, much as Siebers (2004) noted in the quotation above. The sense that transgressions 
would be subject to the individual feeling as though they were singled out as ‘weird’, in Amie and 
Kate’s phrasing, led to a period of intense focus on their embodiment and gender identity in order to 
make the ‘subject fit’ (Roof, 2016, p.2). The sense that gender trouble is individualised and centred 
within autistic individuals, as I have noted in the literature review, needs to be challenged by thinking 
about the places where, and how, gender becomes troubling to the subject and others.  
 
Kate provided an explanation:  
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I think with people with autism there seems to be more obvious thoughts put into the 
performance of gender identity sometimes. Um, like, I’m not really sure if this example proves my 
point or not or if that’s just showing that other people are enforcing their gender roles on these 
people ... but for example there’s an autistic guy who I know who was telling me that he has a 
friend, who I’m pretty sure isn’t autistic, who was saying to him that he needs to get a haircut, 
start going to the gym and get a girlfriend, um, and this autistic guy, he used to have long hair, 
very skinny and non-muscular and been single for a long time and didn’t conform to hegemonic 
sense of masculinity at all. Um, and like, more recently he seems to have been making more of an 
effort to be masculine in a conventional way but it’s sort of like he had to be given these explicit 
instructions on how to be a normal guy and it seems he’s trying to follow these instructions. 
[Kate, 2018] 
 
Here Kate tells me an anecdote about an autistic friend who is taking tips from another man in order 
to do his gender correctly. In Kate’s telling of this anecdote by not conforming to ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ another man has decided to teach him how to be conventionally and subsequently, 
acceptably masculine, or in Kate’s words ‘a normal guy’.  Kate’s autistic friend’s gender presentation 
was troubling to his friend, a masculine heterosexual man.  Kate does not mention that her friend 
found his own to gender to be lacking. In this anecdote Kate’s friend is disrupting a coherent 
sex/gender embodiment and he must work on himself in order to become ‘normal’ or, rather, 
normative. While there is some level of benevolence here through the friendship of the two men, one 
of whom wishes to enable the other to have success with women and become a ‘normal guy’ and 
subsequently ‘to fit’. The true altruistic nature of this is challenged through thinking about how 
heterosexuality and its correspondent gender identity is always unstable and in need of constant 
reproduction. We could, therefore, read this story as attempts from an always-in-crisis heterosexuality 
to bolster and reaffirm a coherent correlation between gender presentation and sexual orientation. 
 141 
This places a focus onto the social and political world rather than the pathologising overtones which 
often accompany discussions of autistic gender trouble.  
 
Kate also notes in our conversation that she was aware of not fully understanding what gender is and 
how to perform and embody femininity in an acceptable way. Kate turned to women’s magazines and 
followed their advice on how to be feminine. Kate discussed wanting to be seen as desirable and to be 
treated as such by people she encountered. However, this pressure was felt to be at odds with the 
sensory issues she has as part of being autistic. She discussed how her femininity was integral to 
achieving the aims of being interacted with ‘positively’:  
 
Kate: [there are] instances when clothes are sort of tight and um, constraining I think it can be 
because they are perceived as more attractive. I've noticed that when I wear clothes that are sort 
of like form fitting, um, people seem to respond to me more positively than if I wear loose 
clothing that doesn't kind of highlight my curves. 
Emily: and does that make you want to wear those kinds of clothes more? […]  do you find 
yourself wearing clothes that you find a bit more uncomfortable just to get those positive 
responses?  
Kate: yes.  
 
Here we see two examples of how gender is reinforced and (re)produced. The ultimate goal for Kate 
and the friend in the anecdote is to be heterosexual, desirable and (in)visible through their normativity. 
Kate discusses here the sense that to be autistic is at odds with normative femininity. jojo also 
expressed something similar which I return to in the next chapter. In this particular anecdote and her 
own experience embodying and performing a coherent heterosexual gender presentation enables 
one’s difference to be negated by diverting attention to that which is positioned as positive within the 
heterosexual matrix. For Kate this comes at a cost to her autistic embodiment, she feels she must make 
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herself uncomfortable in order to gain this positive attention. I don’t want to state that this is only the 
case for autistic women but that this expectant coherence of the subject (sex/gender/sexuality) and 
the modes in which the subject (re)produces these norms effects all people, especially women (Butler, 
2006). Yet, perhaps what is distinct is the sense that a certain inability to reconcile un/known autistic 
difference with gendered expectations was common to most of the participants. As such, gender was 
performed as a mode of passing despite the efforts this demanded and often came at a cost to feeling 
comfortable. This is specific to autistic participants who often cite having sensory issues such as an 
extreme discomfit to wearing tight clothes, to having long hair or to wearing make-up (Wilkinson, 
2017). That sensory issues mark the autistic experience has only recently come in medical and cultural 
understandings of autism (Grapel, et al., 2015).  
 
As noted in the literature review, research into passing often focuses on passing as a heterosexual 
when one is queer, passing as a white person when one is a person of colour or passing as non-disabled 
when one is disabled (hooks, 1997, Buddel, 2011). In these accounts a known privative difference is 
made less visible through attempts to gain the privilege of fitting seamlessly into the social order. As 
Siebers (2004) notes, passing usually makes use of a dichotomy between the knowing subject and 
unknowing others: ‘[…] the [usual] structural binary represents passing as an action taking place 
between knowing and unknowing subjects’ (p.15).  Thus, perhaps what is particular to theories of 
passing is that they generally rely upon the idea of a self-reflexive subject who knows that they will 
gain certain benefits by being a member of a hegemonic social group by hiding their minority status, 
such as how Siebers made reference to the individual who passes having ‘sufficient genius’ to do so.  
For example, a light skinned person of colour will gain the privileges of being white if they are able to 
pass as white, a queer person will gain the privileges of being heterosexual if they do not embody or 
show their queerness. We know that this is not always possible though.  Judith Butler has discussed a 
man who was murdered for his ‘queer walk’ (Butler, 2013).  Sometimes our bodies betray us despite 
our best efforts. There are also times when you pass when you don’t want to. For example, a person 
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passing as heterosexual might not be intentional and forms part of the erasure of non-normative 
sexualities (Hayfield, et al., 2013, Johnston, 2002, p.318). There are numerous arguments around 
passing; a prominent one is that it is a betrayal to your social or racial class, or to the queer community, 
should you attempt to pass because the one who passes doesn’t take a visible political position 
(Samuels, 2002). Importantly, as noted in the literature review, theories of passing often rely upon the 
visual field. A visible difference is made invisible, or less visible.  
 
I argue that where these theories of passing diverge when thinking about the participants of this study 
is the sense that the autistic participants didn’t know precisely what difference they were masking. 
Attempts to alleviate a yet unnamed sense of difference, or, attempts to evade being labelled as 
‘weird’ or ‘odd’, led to a focus on sex/gender as the site where this difference could be managed. Nor 
were techniques of managing the self utilised solely in order to make invisible a visible difference. 
Whilst tools such as magazines helped Kate pass as a normative feminine woman and Sally made use 
of many different identities in order to find one that fits, Aime and Hannah noted that they actively 
hid embodied difference. All the participants mentioned attempted to compensate for an un/known 
lack or difference through certain performed markers of normalcy within the neurotypical regime. The 
participants who experienced some form of gender trouble and who ultilised gendered techniques, 
demonstrate the central role that gender plays in our subject formation. As Davison and Tamas (2015) 
have noted, autism seems to show us the socially constructed nature of gender. As Davison and Tamas 
(2015) state: ‘[f]irst-hand autistic accounts highlight the draining and relentless emotional labour that 
doing gender ‘typically’ requires […]’ (p.59).  
 
5.4 ‘I was an odd one’: negating difference through difference  
Many of the participants discuss a key part in being able to hide one’s difference and to alleviate some 
of the ‘emotional labour’ doing gender demands was to befriend their assigned male at birth (AMAB) 
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peers at school and in social events (Davidson and Tamas, 2015). This enabled a freedom from the 
focus on their gendered embodiment. That they as AFAB people were already different by virtue of 
the gendered assumptions and mythology that exists around the creation of difference allowed their 
un/known autistic difference to remain hidden, or, at least circumvented. Thus, the participants did 
not tend to hide their difference through assimilation into AFAB groups but into groups of AMAB peers 
where they could hide their difference in plain sight. This came up in my conversation with Kate:  
 
Emily: do you know why you preferred spending time with boys? What was it that you liked about 
spending time with them? 
Kate: in secondary school? 
Emily: yeah 
Kate: um, I think I can't really remember when I was younger so much but in secondary school, 
boys didn't really care about appearance and they would just talk about nerdy hobbies, whereas 
the girls in school were all to some degree preoccupied with appearance and boys. Whereas I 
liked talking about hobbies quite a lot. I think the fact that all of my friends were boys already 
made me feel quite different at school.  
 
Here Kate notes both her preference for being friends with boys in her school because of shared 
interests and a lack of, what she saw as, a preoccupation with appearance, but, moreover, Kate notes 
that because of this she was already viewed as different.  Leading psychologists Simon Baron-Cohen 
and Tony Atwood have both stated that autistic AFAB people are more likely to have AMAB friends. 
For Baron-Cohen and colleagues, this has been presented as being symptomatic of the inherent 
maleness of autism (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2003). For Atwood, ‘[b]eing a 'Tom Boy' in 
childhood, not being interested in fashion and femininity, make up and perfumes, as well as 
appreciating the logic of the male brain can lead to concerns regarding sexuality and gender identity’ 
(2019, no pagination). These two examples, which are quite prevalent in the literature on autism and 
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AFAB people, do not appreciate that being friends with AMAB people as a child and adolescent might 
not be an attribute of the ‘autistic mind’, but rather, a way to pass as neurotypical through hiding in 
plain sight.  
 
I wish I had explicitly asked Kate, and the others who stated similar things, whether they felt that being 
friends with boys or being somehow otherwise ‘different’ (such as Sally’s ‘rock persona’) enabled their 
un/known autistic difference to be negated through this. It only really came to me that this was 
seemingly what was at play when I began reading and thinking about all the interviews and noticing 
that this was a theme shared by many. When I discussed this with other participants of the study 
similar experiences were brought up. For example, Sally also spent most of her time with boys, 
whereas Amie had friends who were much younger than them. Aime described to me how they were 
bullied in primary school and they were always positioned as the ‘odd one’:  
 
I was just sort of … I was an odd one. It was clear I was not one of the favourites, which always 
annoyed me because I wanted to be […] it was weird because in year 6 I did have some really good 
friends in the infants, so about the year ones, because I ended up being one of the peer mediators 




Amie had talked to me about their struggles with primary school and being bullied and how the teacher 
was not often sympathetic to Amie’s position when issues were brought up. Aime felt because they 
worked hard, and they were intelligent this should be enough to be one of ‘the favourites’.  This didn’t 
turn out to be the case, so to avoid being positioned as ‘the odd one’, Aime became friends with the 
children in their school who were much younger, where their difference could be attributed to the age 
disparity, and therefore negated. Some of the participants struggled to make any friendships and 
 146 
hadn’t managed to utilise strategies such as Aime or Sally. This was the case Mary who stated: ‘I was 
always different.  I spent most of my childhood trying to please people in the hope that they would 
like me and be my friend, then being sad and confused when it didn’t work. I was bullied a lot’.   
 
Another participant whose un/known autistic difference was negated, albeit through completely 
different means was Sarah.  Sarah stated she had never understood what gender was and she found 
gender confusing.  However, Sarah did identify ways where she could ‘hide things’ though necessarily 
not through her sex/gender expression.  Sarah identified herself as middle class and she had attended 
a private all-girls school. Sarah said to me that she felt in this environment it was ‘easy to hide things’:  
 
 Well of course this was ten years ago so, I think it was just, female autism wasn't particularly know 
about , um, I went to a private school and it was a girls only school and I suppose it was quite small 
and I suppose it was easier to hide things in […] I mean they considered dyslexia at one point. But 
yeah, I think it was because it wasn't known about, nobody really talked about it as a thing. Lots of 
people in school got diagnosed with dyslexia growing up, but […] I don't think I even knew what 
autism was at that age, um, apart from severely disabled sort of people. 
                 [Sarah, 2018, researcher’s own emphasis] 
 
To return once more to Sieber’s phrasing of the ability to mask one’s difference as having ‘sufficient 
genius’ we can see that this is not what was at play for Sarah. Though Sarah states it was easier to’ 
hide things’ (difficulties?) I do not have the sense that Sarah intended to hide or mask her un/known 
autism. Rather that, due to the historical impossibility of even thinking autism through an AFAB 
embodiment meant that her difference was considered to be dyslexia, a frequently administered 
educational diagnosis at the time when Sarah was in high school in the early 2000s (Campbell, 2013, 
p.1).  As discussed in the literature review, Sarah’s comment demonstrates the necessity of the 
prerequisite knowledge of both the self and those around them to even begin to think in terms of 
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certain diagnosis. She demonstrates the contingency which frames both which diagnosis one receives 
and whether one receives one at all (Goffman in Eyal et al, 2010, p.21). Yet, at the same time Sarah 
does make use of the phrase ‘to hide things’ without prompting.  
Sarah was one of the first people I interviewed, and I hadn’t begun to ask direct questions around 
masking at this point. I wished I had followed this up in the interview.  I did contact Sarah again via 
email in order to ask for some clarification about this comment. Unfortunately, too much time had 
passed from the interview and Sarah couldn’t remember the context which she had meant this. 
However, towards the end of our conversation Sarah had talked to me about whether she considered 
autism to be a disability. Sarah said that she didn’t feel her autism should be considered a disability 
because she has economic stability. Sarah’s stated that her parents act as an economic safety net for 
her so she does not worry that she would have to rely on state assistance at any point in her life. Being 
reliant on others outside of the immediate family was how Sarah defined being disabled:  
 
Sarah: well mostly I think about society, it is still very class orientated, um, and I suppose I feel 
privileged that although I've got my autism diagnosis, I don't always feel I fit the statistics 
Emily: in what way? 
Sarah: so, for example, you see lots of statistics about disabled people not having any um any 
money or not having a job or things like that and I, not through myself, but through my parents 
because I have got some money behind me, that hopefully I won't fall into the situation of being 
in poverty as a disabled person, um, so I think that helps me to be a bit more, to not see the 
diagnosis as being detrimental whereas I think if I didn't classify myself as middle class and didn't 
feel I had to live hand to mouth and constantly have a job um, seeing those statistics of 75% of 
people not in employment it would worry me a lot more. 
 
Considering Sarah’s two comments about ‘being able to hide’ and her understanding of disability we 
can also think about this within a framework of passing. Sarah’s privilege of not being forced into 
 148 
situations in order to survive allow her to negotiate her difference in a way that is less beholden to 
narratives of poverty and tragedy or of visible disability. As will be discussed in the next analysis 
chapter disability is not only made visible through embodied difference but through making disability 
visible, often by force, when one needs assistance (Shildrick, 1994).  This is particularly the case for 
those who must claim state benefits or assistance. Having little economic means often enforces a 
making visible of difference.  Sarah also alludes to disability being framed through impairments being 
detrimental to other aspects of a life. Sarah’s relative privilege and the social milieu which she lives 
within have both enabled her to ‘hide’ her differences and to not consider her autism diagnosis as 
‘detrimental’. We can consider this as an ambiguous form of passing. Ambiguous in that Sarah both 
felt that she should be hiding certain difficulties and differences but also that her particular 
environment facilitated this. Like all of the participants in this study, Sarah’s eventual diagnosis of 
autism was much wanted and needed. Thus, as for all the participants, we can see how passing is not 
simply what one does as willed by a self-reflexive, or knowing, subject. Through this analysis of passing 
we can see the entanglement of social regimes, gender regimes, politics and individual embodiment 
and the demonstration of the power that the singular neurotypical and heterosexist world holds.  
 
5.5 In Conclusion  
This chapter looked at the experiences of the participants before they received their autism diagnoses. 
This chapter highlighted how the participants expressed a sense that they were different from others 
but that this difference was intangible, slippery and un/known. This un/known difference for some 
participants became centred on their sex/gender embodiment and attempts were made to normalise 
the self through management of their sex/gender identity and embodiment and that this demanded 
constant maintenance of its coherence to fit within the legibility of the heterosexual matrix (Butler, 
2006). This chapter has been a demonstration of how bodies and worlds are made and in doing so 
challenges the ontological positioning of the autistic mind and neurotypical others. The next analysis 
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chapter will focus on how the participants came to receive their autism diagnosis and whether the 
diagnosis acted as a gendered technology of power for the participants. Did it bring into being any new 
ways of understanding and constructing the self? Did it make ‘known’ the difference the participants 


















Coming Out:  The Diagnosis as a Discursive Event? 
 
 
… the exercise of power creates and causes new objects of knowledge and accumulates new 
bodies of information.  
(Foucault, 1980, p.51) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This second analysis chapter centres how the participants received their autism diagnoses and whether 
the diagnosis brought into being any new ways of thinking about the gendered self. The key areas 
addressed were the process of coming to diagnosis, relations with others post diagnosis, and how the 
participants experienced being autistic. The purpose of these questions was to understand if the 
diagnosis had any impact on how the individual understood themselves, and if any discursive practices 
were enacted post diagnosis. This chapter is framed by what was discussed in the preceding chapter: 
that being undiagnosed led to gendered regulatory regimes to be enacted on the sexed body. The first 
section of this chapter will examine awareness of autism pre diagnosis and motivations for seeking a 
diagnosis. Many participants suggested that gaining a diagnosis came along with the anticipation that 
they could begin to undo some of the normative and neurotypical modes of behaviours they had 
embodied, such as masking. The second part of the chapter will determine how the participants 
negotiate their new autistic identity in relation to their other existing identities. A common narrative 
cited was whilst the diagnosis of autism opened up new ways of being and doing their genders, this 
was also restricted by other existing aspects of their identities. Therefore, the idea that the diagnosis 
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interpolates the participants into a new sense of freedom is problematised through an analysis of the 
temporal and relational nature of discursive practices.  
6.2 ‘Something Weird Men Had’: Awareness of Autism  
As I have noted,  AFAB people are more likely to receive a diagnosis in adulthood due to being ‘missed 
or misdiagnosed’ in childhood (Gould, and Ashton-Smith, 2011). This is in contrast to many assigned 
male at birth individuals who are diagnosed in early childhood due to signposting from early educators 
or care givers (Giarelli et al, 2010). For many AFAB individuals it is speculated that they themselves are 
the driving force to gaining a diagnosis rather than being referred through other services (Research 
Autism, 2019). It is of significance that all the participants of this study, except Esther, referred 
themselves to their General Practitioners with autism as a provisional answer for their difficulties or 
perceived differences. From this visit the majority of participants were referred to a multi-disciplinary 
team of clinicians or a psychologist for an autism assessment. Prior to the initial visit to the doctor, a 
considerable amount of research, self-monitoring and comparison with others had been undertaken 
by each individual, giving the participant an intimate knowledge of autism. However, the knowledge 
they amassed was distinct from the dominant masculine discourse of autism.  The first section of this 
chapter will highlight awareness of autism prior to diagnosis.  
 
I asked each participant what they knew about autism before they sought a diagnosis. Sally first 
became aware of autism when she was studying at University:  
 
[…] probably at University is the first time I came across this... […] with people referring 
particularly to male students who were doing computer science or physics or maths as being 'a 
bit Asperger's or ‘a bit autistic’ and that would be where my overall impression came from. 
Then you have the big ones with Rain Man and the boy from the Curious Incident of the Dog in 
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the Night-Time. They were my impressions of autism. I was aware of it as something small 
children who were very disabled had, and weird men had. 
[Sally, 2018]  
 
Kate articulated something similar:  
 
I do remember when I was younger and reading about Asperger Syndrome on the internet and 
thinking I might have this but then questioning myself because of the stereotype that um 
someone with autism is a maths genius so I thought I'm bad at maths so I can't have autism 
(laughs) […] These characteristics that would throw me off, like you know this thing about 
being really good at maths or science. I know that isn't part of the diagnostic criteria, but I sort 




Here both Kate and Sally give a sense of the gendered cultural discourses that construct what we know 
about autism. In fact, all the participants noted that the 1988 film Rain Man was fundamental in how 
they came to have a vague idea about what autism was and looks like. As Jordynn Jack writes: ‘perhaps 
more than any other rhetorical event [Rain Man] made Asperger’s present to audiences’ (p.108). A 
similar but more recent character to Dustin Hoffman’s Raymond in Rain Man can be found in Sheldon 
Cooper from the Big Bang theory (2007-2019). Amie, the youngest participant at eighteen, makes use 
of this reference: ‘I thought it [autism] was that […] sort of Sheldon stereotype’. Raymond, Sheldon 
and Christopher, the boy in The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night Time, form the holy trinity of 
cultural representations of autism. What all these characters share are, of course, their gender but 
also a savant like ability in mathematics, sciences and memory recall.  They represent what many in 
disability studies have critically described as ‘super crips’ (Schalk, 2016). ‘Super crips’ are those who 
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overcome their disabilities in order to be exceptional at a particular thing, such as sports for example. 
When it comes to autism, particularly Asperger’s Syndrome, it isn’t so much a case of overcoming 
deficit as it is that autism is already bound with mythologised (male) genius.  
 
These representations are of course not overly favourable though they suggest skill and even genius, 
due to the lack or deficit that is also inherent to autism when we conceptualise it this way. However, 
these discourses do not, when attached to cisgender men and boys, challenge a fundamental sense of 
gender identity. Autism when it functions in the ‘super crip’ framework stays within masculine 
boundaries albeit pathological. Consequently, it functions as a form of pathological masculinity. This 
discourse enabled Sally’s fellow male students at University to be labelled as autistic whether or not 
they are. The prevailing trope of the socially inept but technologically or mathematically gifted autistic 
was cited by these participants as preventing them from considering they were autistic. Whilst Kate 
only relied on reading other people’s experiences and therefore couldn’t see a correlation between 
herself and these representations, Sally explicitly states that a certain amount of stigma around autism 
foreclosed her exploration of the diagnosis, as she describes autism as being synonymous with ‘weird 
men’. Thus, the gendered discursive formation of autism prevented a stumbling block for Kate and 
Sally to even think that autism could be the diagnosis that explained their experience.  Jack (2014) has 
written about the tendency for dominant representations of autism to actually add to the numbers of 
those diagnosed autistic, but only if they match the representations that are already available. For 
example, scientifically or technologically inclined men or adolescents who also struggle with 
interpersonal relationships may be more inclined to seek a diagnosis due to the existing gendered 
discourses of autism (p.146).  
 
For AFAB people these dominant discourses can not only foreclose their own ability to recognise 
themselves as autistic but also those of medical professionals. Gatekeepers such as General 
Practitioners were cited as being less willing to refer them to specialist services by some of the 
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participants. This leads some AFAB individuals to pay for a private diagnosis through independent 
services (Research Autism, 2019). This was the case for Sally who paid for a private diagnosis. Sally 
then took this private diagnostic report which stated she was autistic to her GP to ask to be referred 
for an NHS diagnosis. It is of note that private diagnoses are not permittable evidence for state support 
or services related to being autistic, which can further disadvantage autistic AFAB people (Bargeila et 
al, 2016, Citizens Advice Bureau, 2019).  
 
6.3 ‘Full Research Mode’: Producing Knowledges 
From the lack of self-recognition in the cultural discourses which produce autism to receiving the 
diagnosis the participants had conducted a considerable amount of research around the condition. 
Aime describes this as going into ‘full-on research mode’:  
 
If I hadn’t done the full-on research mode, I would have very much viewed it as a guy’s thing. 
When you look at, the very, very minimal representation of it […] or what it could be possibly be 
considered autistic characters, it's always guys in media and stuff so... 
[Aime, 2018] 
 
Sally said something similar. I asked Sally how she came to receive her autism diagnosis despite, as she 
had stated, not seeing herself in discursive representations and medical definitions:  
 
I read the Sara Hendrickx and I went 100% special interest in autism for two years, I have 
probably read more books about autism than most people who train other people on autism 
now [laughs].22 I just read ceaselessly. Neurotribes, everything Sara Hendrickx wrote, 9 Degrees 
of Autism, lots of autism biographies by women and men, books on how to get diagnosed. 
 
22 As described on her website, Sara Hendrickx is an ‘independent specialist consultant and trainer in Autism 




Within these accounts we see an entanglement of medical knowledges and experiential accounts. All 
the participants of this study have experiences of mental health difficulties or difficulties with 
executive functioning which led to a myriad of alternative diagnoses being given to them.23 Yet, for all 
the participants their prior diagnoses did not seem to fully describe their experience. An autism 
diagnosis was actively sought by each, but in order to gain this diagnosis each participant gathered 
information from what is already known about autism. As Sally states, she even read ‘books on how to 
get diagnosed’. This active engagement in the discursive knowledge available about autism bears 
similarities to what Sandy Stone (1993) writes about in The Transexual Manifesto. Stone (1993) 
discusses how transsexual people (who we would now call transgender) have to adhere to the 
dominant and intelligible narratives and discourses which construct transgender identities within a 
medical framework. This is necessary to gain a diagnosis which would enable healthcare and 
transitional services. As Stone (1993) states, the transgender body is never granted agency, it is 
inscribed by, and reproduces, the cultural ideals of sex/gender and their origin stories. As Stone (1993) 
writes:  
 
[the transsexual body is] a hotly contested site of cultural inscription, a meaning machine for 
the production of ideal type. Representation at its most magical, the transsexual body is 
perfected memory, inscribed with the "true" story of Adam and Eve as the ontological account 
of irreducible difference, an essential biography which is part of nature. A story which culture 
tells itself, the transsexual body is a tactile politics of reproduction constituted through textual 
violence. The clinic is a technology of inscription. 
 
general guidebook ‘Women and Girls with Autism Spectrum Disorder: Understanding Life Experiences from Early 
Childhood to Old Age (2015). Hendrickx conducts many educational talks and also offers private diagnoses with a 
specialisation on women and girls at her independent clinic in the U.K.  
23 Executive function or executive functioning refers to aspects of cognitive processing. When someone has 
difficulties with executive functioning they may struggle to stay organised, have difficulties controlling impulses and 




There are certain similarities between the above quotation and the ways that autism has been 
positioned as proof of the ontological and irreducible difference between the sexes (Baron-Cohen, 
2002). Where Stone’s account of transgender engagement with medical services diverges with the 
participants of this study is that medicine isn’t configured as an outright enemy to be fought with 
tactical manipulation. For Stone’s transgender individuals, institutionalised medicine functions as a 
gateway to be passed in order to gain gender transition surgeries and hormonal treatments. For the 
autistic participants the medical understanding of autism is something to be continuously engaged 
with. It is through this medical understanding that they could come to identify as autistic. Such as how 
Kate stated that she relied upon experiential accounts rather than the medical criteria, implying that 
this would have been where she found herself. Yet, rather than simply positioning themselves through 
the existing dominant discourse of autism they sort out counter narratives and built on these by 
constructing new knowledges that interweaved with the dominant discourse.  
 
 Moreover, the diagnosis of autism was for many participants a necessary step to a feeling that they 
understood themselves, or that they could access the truth of themselves.  This functions as what 
Foucault (1980) termed as knowledge/power. As Sally stated about her coming to autism:  
 
[…] when I was doing all my reading and self-diagnosing, I veered between being absolutely sure 
and then feeling completely convinced I'd just found another thing to hang the peg of my 
difficulties on. There was something about wanting an external person to tell me I was right. 
[Sally, 2018] 
 
Aime received their autism diagnosis in an unconventional way. Rather than being referred to a 
specialist autism clinic, their GP diagnosed them in his office. Aime stated that this somewhat 
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‘unofficial’ diagnosis has led to worry over whether her diagnosis is valid. As Aime states: ‘I have a 
never-ending fear that I haven't got an official diagnosis and it's all going to come back and ah! but I'm 
going to ignore that for now’. Here we see that autism is not something that one simply is but rather, 
something that must be co-constructed through the individual and the institutional powers of medical 
professionals. Aime’s worries about an ‘official’ diagnosis are not related to receiving medical support 
or state services but are deeply attached to hopes that Aime has an intimate knowledge of their 
selfhood:  
 
[…] if I was autistic  all my suspicions are correct, I do kind of know what’s going on with who I 
am, it makes sense, and I’d seen stuff online and it was like, this feels like it’s describing me and 




6.4 'Who am I?': The confessional space of the clinic?  
As noted above the diagnosis was important for several of the participants due to a belief that it would 
enable a deeper understanding of the self. As noted in the ‘sociology of diagnosis’ literature review, 
autism holds a strange place in terms of diagnoses; whereas other cognitive or psychological conditions 
generally have treatment plans included post diagnosis, at least for those with fewer daily support 
needs, autism does not. This is mirrored by Aime’s description of what their doctor said after them 
diagnosis: ‘he said it was because I was an adult and that's it, there's no support in [Aime’s hometown], 
deal with it’. Though Aime’s description of their doctor’s advice post diagnosis seems overly 
inconsiderate it is true that services for adults are lacking (Murphy, 2016, Lorenc et al, 2017). This can 
be especially the case for those who do not fall into the catchment criteria for social services support 
or state benefits (Lorenc et al, 2017). None of the participants of this study received any additional 
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support services and the diagnosis was positioned as holding the key to self-understanding and 
acceptance more than anything else. However, for a couple of the participants there was the hope 
that gaining a diagnosis would enable them to complete college or attend University. Such as for Sarah:  
 
I remember going to see my GP when I was probably 20, um, just sort of being quite depressed 
and talking about, I think, I wanted to go back to college because I'd been to college before but 
it hadn't worked out, um and I wanted more support when I was at college and I thought having 
some kind of, um, diagnosis of a learning difficulty or autism, I wasn't totally sure what it was, 
um, or what would be helpful. 
[Sarah, 2018] 
 
A diagnosis is positioned as having the possibility to open up access to support services which are 
believed to be useful to help Sarah successfully complete college. Other participants, such as Hannah, 
who does not think of her autistic spectrum condition as a disability, or indeed as causing her much 
difficulty, stated when I asked about why she wanted a diagnosis:  
 
 Um, I would sit on the floor and do the thing with the toes, you know, curling your toes under 
your feet … um, my insistence of things being a certain way and um, going a bit, um, getting a 
little bit irate when things didn't work out, um, other things about, um, just general obsessions 




I followed this up:  
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Emily: But … did you find those things a problem? or was it just that you noticed a difference 
between you and other people? 
Hannah: I think it was more of a difference, because um, I've, um, I pass fairly well for not being 
autistic.  
 
The sense that Hannah did not necessarily struggle with anything related to autism was present 
throughout our entire conversation. Indeed, several of the participants didn’t particularly discuss 
wanting to have an answer to specific difficulties but more an answer for perceived differences. I found 
myself wondering several times what it is that defines this group of participants as autistic. Indeed, 
during the interviews the participants were producing knowledge about what autism is and looks like 
which challenged my sense of what autism is. The things that make up autism were constructed as 
multiple and fragmented and taken on their own did not signify very much, or they signified something 
totally different. As Esther noted, autism was a useful catchall category for her because she worried 
that would need around ‘fifteen different diagnoses’ in order to make sense of all her various 
difficulties and traits. A process of self-analysis and mentally collecting disparate behaviours, ways of 
perceiving,  motivations and desires and connecting them to one another through engaging with the 
discursive knowledges of autism was necessary to enable autism to come into being as a probable 
diagnosis for the participants. For Hannah, it is on ‘the little things’ of perceived difference that the 
possibility of autism rested. Margrit Shildrick (1994) has written about disabled welfare claimants who 
must self-document every physical difficulty in order to gain financial aid: ‘no area of bodily functioning 
escapes the requirement of total visibility, and further, the ever more detailed subdivision of bodily 
behaviour into a set of discontinuous functions speaks to a fetishistic fragmentation of the embodied 
person’ (p.48).  
 
It would seem that because the welfare claimant is not being physically examined by another that this 
is a more benevolent form of power. However, Foucault (1995) argues the idea that either the patient 
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or the prisoner (the two are interchangeable regulatory regimes in his theorisation of power) should 
freely offer up their inner self to an another is not a move away from an authoritarian power. It is 
rather a ‘dovetail’ of this prior form of power into a new all-encompassing form of power whereby the 
individual becomes responsible and accountable for monitoring their every desire and behaviours 
(Foucault, 2003, p.242). This consequently delves deeper into the subject and her body through what 
Foucault defines as ‘capillary power’.  The individual and society are implicated within capillary power, 
for it is through this self-interrogation and construction of knowledge about the self that this 
power/knowledge can then circulate in society. In some ways, this bears similarities to Ian Hacking’s 
(2006) theory of ‘looping effects’.24 New categories and ways of being are co-created by institutional 
power, individuals and the processes of knowledge transmission.  
 
In Shildrick’s (1994) usage of this Focauldian understanding of power the disabled person is still 
beholden to an authoritarian power regime. The difference is that the individual yields to this power 
and consequently they are made accountable and responsible for the outcome of the bureaucratised 
system they must engage with.  The claimant does the work for the regime in their observation and 
documentation of the self. As Shildrick (1994) writes:  
 
The gaze now cast over the subject body is that of the subject herself. What is demanded of her 
is that she should police her own body, and report in intricate detail its failure to meet standards 
of normalcy; that she should render herself, in effect, transparent. 
 (p.48).  
 
 
24 It is important to note here that despite Hacking’s distinction of natural kinds and human kinds he does note that 
there exists a third category; one which acknowledges the limits of this social construction approach. This third 
category is called ‘interactive kinds’. I am of the mind that nearly everything we deal with in the Social Sciences 
would fit into this last category but for Hacking it has specificity.  For example, Hacking argues that autism could be 
considered an interactive kind. This is because when the condition becomes known through the naming of it as a 
distinct diagnosis, it changes the experience of the individual, both in how they experience themselves and how 
others conceive of them. This is the sense that I am making use of Ian Hacking here (Hacking, 2000). 
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Hannah was not seeking welfare payments nor was she asked to submit to a bureaucratised 
documentation of herself for any other type of aid. Yet, she did so through her own volition and 
monitored her behaviours to the minute degree. This was much like Esther who had considered many 
other mental health and cognitive conditions which could each explain seemingly disparate fragments 
of her experience. We could quite easily suggest that Shildrick’s (1994) analysis of welfare claimants is 
what is at play within Hannah’s and Esther’s monitoring and subsequent reporting of the self to 
medical experts who can determine what their particular deviances from the norm suggests. 
Regardless of Hannah’s lack of desire for support, it is true that having an autism diagnosis would open 
up access to certain financial aid and support. Thus, there is an anticipatory material benefit in gaining 
a diagnosis of this kind. However, Shildrick’s case studies are forced to make themselves transparent 
and are consequently removed of their agency. I argue that the participants of this study are, in many 
cases, willingly seeking a diagnosis and this confounds the traditional understanding of the 
pathological and the normative. In particular,  Hannah discussed how prior to her diagnosis she felt 
forced into a normative mode of being: ‘I think I've done a lot of learning, about how to be in ... um, 
I've got a lot in my repertoire of, um, social situations, so I can go, um well this (audio cut out) for this 
situation, I pass as non-autistic […]’.  
 
Consequently, Hannah’s own management of her autistic traits have meant that they do not present 
a problem for her, yet they do constitute a difference and that perceived difference was what pushed 
Hannah into seeking a diagnosis. As Hull et al. (2017) write:  
 
Essentially, social imitation may be a form of acting, whereby girls with undiagnosed ASC may 
be coping without receiving a diagnosis or even needing a diagnosis because their acting is 
relatively successful. Success here may be defined as simply not having overt functional 
impairments or raising concerns of teachers or other professionals […] 
 (p.2534, own italics). 
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The above statement challenges what we understand autism to be. As autism is considered to be an 
ontological fact of the person, it is not ‘outgrown’, nor can it be ‘overcome’. As Frith (1991) has noted 
the autistic person will have strategies of ‘adaptation and compensation’ but autism will always be 
present (p.58). For a medical diagnosis such as autism the ways autism is experienced must also 
present ‘impairment’. In the above quotation a diagnosis is presented as something given under 
requirement of need. Yet for many participants a diagnosis was sought as legitimation of certain 
difference that they felt and knew to be their experience. As Samuels (2003) has suggested, we often 
think of people who are able to ‘pass’ - as not disabled, as straight, as women when trans, for example-  
as being privileged yet this ignores the harm that social exclusion does to an individual when they are 
continuously forcing themselves into a round hole, to borrow Mary’s phrase again.  This medical 
understanding of autism explicated through Hull et al, (2017) assumes the behavioural approach of 
autism diagnosis, rather than an exploration into the underlying worries, anxieties and fears that many 
undiagnosed autistic people have. Whilst they may seem to be successful, it is an ‘act’ as Hull et al 
(2017) note. For many of the participants the diagnosis was not sought for access to support, treatment 
or curative strategies but rather as a liberation from intensive normalisation of the self, as seen in the 
previous chapter.  
 
For Hannah, difficulty or impairment had been significantly worked through by intense attempts of 
normalising the self. Thus, although Hannah’s concerns about her difference from the norm seem to 
suggest a reproduction of the binary between the pathological and the normal, I argue that through 
this particular mode of articulation Hannah is opening autism up to be less pathological and more 
grounded in possibilities of what the body does and can do. As it relates to the discussion of ‘masking 
and passing’ in the preceding chapter, Hannah’s use of the term passing suggest a realisation that her 
perceived difference was always already being monitored from outside and she sought legitmisation 
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of the self through seeking the diagnosis. Being diagnosed was positioned by Hannah as allowing her 





The diagnosis for Hannah was key to her understanding both her limitations and simultaneously her 
possibilities. As Hannah states:  
 
 
All the people who I interact with now, they all know how I interact, they all know the way I 
interact, so I never actually have to do the thing of feeling anxious before I say something, or 
worrying that I'm going to say the wrong thing and all of my encounters now are much smoother. 
[Hannah, 2018] 
 
For Hannah the diagnosis acted, in her words, as a ‘stamp of legitimacy’. However, rather than 
interpolating her into a framework of pathology Hannah suggested that it enabled her to enact her 
difference rather than to continue hiding it through concerted efforts of normalisation.  From Hannah’s 
self-monitoring of her the smallest detail of her bodily movements (the curling of toes) to Sally’s 
extensive engagement with the autism literature, all of the participants who took part in this study 
demonstrate that they are utilising technologies of the self. In Foucauldian terms this means the belief 
that one has access to the truth of the self through both the self-monitoring and intimate exploration 
of the self, combined with the expertise, in this case, of medical professionals, psychologists and 
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psychiatrists.25  The participants took all their prior bodily and discursive knowledge to their autism 
diagnostic appointment.  
 
All of the participants of this study recounted their diagnostic experience as being partly composed of 
observation and of narrating their childhood and their current thought patterns, behaviours and 
motivations to a team of clinicians. As we have seen in the first analysis chapter some AFAB people are 
supposedly adapt at ‘hiding’ or ‘masking’ their autism so what takes place in the diagnostic room is 
configured, in part, as a revealing of the truth of the self. The clinician’s office is a confessional space 
where disparate moments of a life become signs of autism. Notably, it is necessary to have this 
narrative of childhood because autism has to be present from early childhood, thus diagnosis takes 
place, in part, retrospectively for late diagnosed people. Some of this knowledge can come from school 
reports or early caregivers which are interpreted for signs of autism but for many these documents 
have been long lost, caregivers have died or simply cannot remember (McGrath, 2017). Thus, for many 
people the narrative must be given by the person seeking diagnosis.  
 
 
This was the case for Aime who talked to me about what happened at their initial assessment:  
 
We talked through them [Aime’s suspicions they were autistic], he [the doctor] asked me 
questions about my school, my school life and stuff that had happened there, I explained the 




25 Here we can include engagement with autistic literature (medical, autobiographical, journalistic), self-diagnostic 
tests which are popular and widely disseminated across the internet and the monitoring of the self for perceived 
differences against the norm.  
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What is interesting about these techniques of the self being not only used by, but expected of, autistic 
individuals is that it presents a profound disruption to what is expected of autistic people. Historically, 
autistic people, as discussed in the methodology chapter, were not presupposed to have an in depth 
understanding of the self, much less the ability to recount that to another. Moreover, what is 
demanded in the uncovering of truth of the self is to talk to someone else, an expert, who holds more 
power than you do to determine your selfhood. This co-construction is productive in that it brings 
something new into being. For the participants of this study it brings an autistic subject into being.  
 
 This is not only the case in psychiatry but in all areas, from the institutional to the most intimate areas 
of desire and love. Precisely why this confessional system has become so common place is because it 
is presumed to hold the key to liberation (Foucault, 1990). Power is presumed to deny access to truth 
and consequently uncovering these power structures through confessional acts paves the way for the 
liberated subject to emerge. This is indeed the narrative that is played out for the participants of this 
study; liberation, or freedom, from normative and neurotypical modes of being were sought. As Mary 
wrote: ‘I think I wanted to become more understanding of myself, kinder to myself because there was 
a reason for my difficulties, I wasn’t just “weird”’. However, it is not accurate to think of what emerges 
in the clinician’s office as the truth, but rather as ‘truth effects’ for the potential that these encounters 
have for creating truths.  
 
The ability to engage in this mode of subject production in the clinician’s room is of course dependent 
on existing power relations and the subject positioning one already holds. To be able to have prior 
access to the knowledge that produces autism is a distinct privilege. Like the majority of the 
participants in this study, Sally is well educated and also had the time available to research and 
understand what autism is. As Sally stated: ‘I think there's a massive discrepancy particularly for 
women of lower class who […] haven't grown up with the socialisation that gives them the tools to talk 
about their mental health and to access mental health services’. Despite the literature that Sally 
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engaged with not always representing how she experienced being autistic she was able to build on this 
through her own experience, creating new discourses about autism (liking art, being creative). Through 
this accumulation of knowledge, to refer back to Foucault’s words which opened this chapter, new 
bodies of information are being created, not only bodies of information in the sense of medical 
knowledge and discourse but new modes of doing and being bodies.  
 
6.5 The Diagnosis as a Discursive Event? 
After receiving a diagnosis many participants noted that they felt they could begin to enact certain 
behaviours which they defined as autistic. In some cases, the diagnosis with the statement ‘you are 
autistic’ given at the end of a long period of assessment acted as an event.  It simultaneously named 
and made sense of the subject, at least for a period of time. Prior to diagnosis, as I have discussed in 
the first analysis chapter, for many the body was un/known and un/knowing. Receiving a diagnosis, 
for most participants (with the exception of jojo, who will be discussed later) the diagnosis ‘legitimised’ 
a new set of discursive practices to be mobilised through the body. I asked Sally if after she received 
her autism diagnosis, she felt that she could behave in different ways:   
 
Yes. I'm trying it out. I’m trying out being autistic and not masking and I’m enjoying it, it's quite 
fun. Um, one of the things that people talk about that I didn't quite take seriously for a while 
was, […] post diagnosis, […]  people talking about rediscovering stimming after they've, they've 
sort of had hidden stims all their lives and I really enjoy it. I really enjoy waving my arms about 
and having a bit of a dance in the living room and generally being a bit autistic. And, flapping in 
the cinema because I thoroughly enjoying flapping my arms about in the cinema […] I will wave 
my arms about at the cinema and it's just fantastic, having that freedom to do it [laughs].  
[Sally, 2018] 
Aime also articulated something similar:  
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I don’t do the stereotypical autistic flap, but I need to do a slightly more controlled version of it […] 
I feel free enough to be able to do that now and do those small things in public. Like, I don’t do any 
of the stuff that would really draw attention to me because I hate being the centre of attention […] 
but it does feel very freeing to think ‘I could do this’. 
[Aime, 2018, emphasis in speech] 
 
However, enacting autistic behaviours was not free of concerns such as appearing that they were 
‘faking’ being autistic.  Such as for Aime when they discussed how they related to people after receiving 
their diagnosis:  
 
I felt I wouldn't seem autistic enough, which, I hate that phrase but it's what I felt like, but, so I 
sort of felt like I had to prove I'm autistic to them and then like to people who I shared the 
diagnosis with I sort of felt that there was pressure to not mask too much in front of them … but 




Aime highlights both the behavioural performativity common to both ‘masking’ and being autistic. 
Whereas Hull et al (2019) suggest that masking leads to a sense of faking or pretence, Aime alerts us 
to the temporal nature of embodied discursive practices. A diagnosis of autism does not give access to 
an authentic self which can simply be uncovered and lived in its truth. The becoming from one status 
(undiagnosed) to another (autistic) is (re)negotiated and situated in relation to different encounters 
and environments. For Aime, the pressure to appear ‘autistic enough’ was felt the most around other 
autistic people. This bears similarity to how Aime situates themself as a queer person, Aime is asexual 
and non-binary. Aime feels that their non-binary gender identity and non-object orientated sexuality 
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leaves them outside of queer communities. Thus, we could understand Aime’s attempts to seem 
autistic enough as a way of seeking acceptance within others who share the diagnosis. Yet, this is not 
a seamless transition and Aime must demonstrate themself as being autistic through considered 
behaviours which are the shared identifiers or markers of belonging. Aime must also not transgress 
the expectations of what their new autistic community expects of an autistic person.  Despite entering 
into a new behavioural regime and still having one foot in the old one, Aime states that they now have 
the possibility to behave in different ways and they feel a certain ‘freedom’ to explore that. Thus, the 
diagnosis opened a new range of possibilities for what the body can do for Aime. Of course, the ways 
that this ‘new’ was framed was already constructed by what is known to be ‘typical’ autism and the 
correspondent autistic behaviours (flapping the hands or arms, for example).  
 
Autism is largely what we would call an invisible condition. Therefore, whilst it may come to form a 
person’s identity (much as most of the participants stated that autism was a key part of their identity) 
it is not always be visible to others. There is a disconnect between the identity and the embodied 
visibility of their condition which Aime highlights here. To refer back to the first analysis chapter and 
the section on passing, here we see the tension between wanting to be viewed as autistic and the 
behaviours one must enact in order to be accepted by others (and the self) as being autistic. Rather 
than thinking about passing as non-autistic as assimilationist attempts I prefer to consider it as Samuels 
(2003) does: ‘passing can be a subversive practice and […] the passing subject may be read not as an 
assimilationist victim but as a defiant figure who, by crossing the borders of identities, reveals their 
instability’ (p.243). In my conversations with all of the participants, not only Aime, the sense I got was 
that whether they passed or whether they were seen as autistic they continuously demonstrated the 
thin and always fragile hierarchy which delimits where we belong and who we are. These identities 
demand constant attention, reproduction and negotiation.  
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Esther provided a similar critique which speaks to the temporally situated nature of discursive 
practices and presents a challenge to the notion of the self being uncovered through the diagnosis:  
 
After my diagnosis I guess I did explore more kind of can I just be this way and I think they 
[Esther’s parents] suddenly struggled with me behaving in more autistic ways, or what looked 
to them as more autistic ways […] because of course, not many of my colleagues know I'm 
autistic, a few of them do, but I'll often end up in conversations where people talk about 
autism and how none of us are autistic [laughs] and it's like, oh I can't say anything now! So 




Here Esther highlights a tension within her family and also in her workplace. Esther is a doctoral 
student studying neuroscience with a focus on autism. She was encouraged to see a psychologist at 
the age of eighteen before her parents would allow her to attend University and begin living 
independently. The psychologist referred her for an autism diagnosis which she then received. 
However, here Esther talks about her parents ‘struggling’ with her more overt autism despite her 
family already having noted her struggles and difficulties. My conversation with Esther revealed certain 
tensions between what autism is and looks like and who can be autistic. Esther is well educated and 
comes from a medical family; she now works with other young scientists. There was an underlying 
sense that autism is stigmatised and does not ‘fit’ with her background and her profession. This was 
highlighted through Esther’s desire to seem autistic but not ‘too autistic’.  
 
The diagnosis also came to bear upon how some of the participants considered their gender identities. 
For Sally the diagnosis enabled her to stop feeling as though she were ‘rubbish at being a woman’.  As 
noted, Sally has struggled with alcoholism and has taken on many identities prior to receiving her 
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autism diagnosis. Sally had a period of wondering if she was transgender, much like Hannah (see 
analysis I), and on receiving the diagnosis Sally could (re)imagine her younger self as an autistic person. 
As Sally states:  
 
 […] after University I didn't wander around inferring that I was a man anymore, I just kind of 
settled into having a job and a life, and an ordinary life sort of thing and … but what the autism 
diagnosis did was put to bed any of these ideas that I was crap at being a girl […] because the 
autism is what made me not fit in, not the fact that I was rubbish at being a woman, I wasn't 
rubbish at being a woman. I was rubbish at interacting with people in a neurotypical world. I 
have found my tribe on Twitter and on Facebook. I have found other autistic women […] 
whose experiences resonate with me.  
[Sally, 2018] 
 
Despite this being Sally’s experience, it is important to note again here that autistic transgender people 
have historically been situated as not being transgender and solely being autistic (de Vries, et al., 2010, 
Van der Miesen, 2018). That is, their gender trouble is situated as being caused by their autism. Whilst 
in some cases, (such as Sally and Hannah) being an undiagnosed autistic person and feeling a profound 
sense of difference can lead to considerations around gender identity, as discussed in the previous 
analysis chapter,  this should by no means be assumed as being the same for autistic transgender 
people. This was something that Sally was aware of and she was cautious to advise that she only spoke 
from her experience.  
 
Though I have highlighted some positive aspects of what it means to become autistic, or to ‘come out’  
as autistic, through beginning to feel as though one can begin to live differently and enact different 
modes of using the body, the participants were still largely bound within the confines of what a 
neurotypical world expects of them. Moreover, we can see the push and pull of identity negotiation 
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and the individualised nature of constructing the self through the ways in which it is monitored and 
adapted. We have gained a picture thus far that destabilises notions of a preconceived ontology of the 
self and the other. The participants have articulated some of their processes of subjectification; in this 
case to becoming an autistic subject.  
 
The participants I  have discussed make it clear that whilst an autism diagnosis is, in many respects, a 
positive legitimation of difference and it means one can effectively ‘come out’ and say ‘I am autistic’,  
it does not ever completely act as a ‘totalization of this ‘I’’ (Butler, 1990, p.309). There are still 
regulatory norms which define what ways a body is gendered and in what ways a body is to be in a 
neurotypical world. This always temporally and spatially contingent upon where and who the 
individual encounters and engages with. This was felt most clearly by jojo. I will spend some time with 
my conversation with jojo because she most clearly identified the struggles between wanting to 
become autistic and feeling beholden to her prior interpolations. In particular, jojo discussed a deep 
ambivalence between being autistic and being a woman. This was something that was not articulated 
as strongly with the other participants, although many noted that prior to the diagnosis they felt at 
odds with their gender identity.  
 
6.6 ‘I still think I’m trapped in my gender’: Inability to become Autistic 
jojo articulated a sense of not fully being able to ‘become autistic’ despite wishing that she could 
embody some modes of being autistic. jojo evoked an idea of an ideal autism that was genderless and, 
yet, at the same time she cannot escape the expectations of her gender:  
 
jojo: I still think I'm trapped in my gender, I still think I'm trapped in the role. You know I'm a 
mother, I'm a partner, I’m still trapped in that, which I don't like. 
Emily: In what ways does it make you feel trapped? I think I know what you're getting at … 
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jojo: That I've still got to be a certain way for the outside world. Say with my children, I couldn't 
be overtly autistic in the outside world with my children, I've still got to, you know, I don't know. 
I've still got to look presentable, I've got to, I'd love to just shave all my hair off, but I'm not 
allowed to do that am I… 
Emily: Why would you like to shave your hair off? The feeling…? 
jojo: I don't like hair on the back of my neck, I still put make-up, I don't know why… I've still got 
to present myself as an attractive female, I don't know why, even though I detest the attention 
of men, but …  I don't know why, I'm still conflicted, I don't know…  
 
jojo’s sensory issues which cause her distress and are a part of her embodied autistic experience 
become a way for her to articulate a sense of how autism and femininity cannot coincide in a way that 
makes her feel comfortable.  However, being autistic and having the knowledge of her condition does 
not free her from feeling as though she doesn’t have to perform certain markers of femininity. I have 
quoted the following section of our conversation at length because it demonstrates the intersections 
of autism, gender and class and age that are so often missing from research into autistic experience.  
jojo was the oldest participant, with the exception of Mary. However, my interview with Mary was 
written so I did not have the opportunity to follow up on some of Mary’s points. jojo’s age was integral 
to her not feeling as though she could explore other modes of being gendered:  
 
jojo: you know, if I was diagnosed as a teenager maybe I could have been what I was meant to be, 
you know, maybe... 
Emily: How would you have like to exist... 
jojo: I don't like being a woman 
Emily: So, would you prefer … in an ideal world if you could have been born a boy? 
jojo: Yes, I'd prefer to be male 
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Emily: … because of the freedom men have?  men can shave their hair off, they don't have to wear 
such tight clothing or make-up...? 
jojo: They can be more theirselves [sic], can't they. We are so confined by stereotypes as being 
female. 
 
As jojo considers, perhaps if she had been diagnosed as a teenager, she would have had a legitimisation 
to explore a less rigid way of enacting gender. The freedoms jojo sees in being assigned male at birth 
are correlated to feeling more comfortable in her autistic embodiment. Despite wishing she could 
transgress her gender, jojo feels she cannot. This is tied to her role of a mother to two young children. 
Being a mother and being ‘overtly autistic’ for jojo are incompatible.  Ultimately, for jojo the diagnosis 
of autism did not offer a sense of freedom to explore different modes of being, predominately because 
her diagnosis was not received in time or, indeed, at the right time. When jojo and I discuss the 
accessibility of younger people to different ways of doing gender, jojo takes an ambivalent position:  
 
Emily: what do you think about this […], um, well I guess about how people are thinking about their 
genders right at this moment in time? 
jojo: I don't, I think it's a little bit, it's that group mentality and I think we just want to label ourselves 
as this as we'll get through the door into this group, kind of thing. But life's not like that, just because 
I don't know, you like one thing and another person likes another thing doesn't make them a good 
person, but again that could be younger people, so maybe it's for younger people […] 
Emily: uhmm, but I guess on the other hand, as you said earlier if you could have been born a boy 
you would have been happy with that […] and I think maybe, having that freedom to identify as the 
gender that you want could be quite helpful for people, can you see that side of it? 
jojo: yes, yes, totally, I can see that side of it 
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Emily: but you just don't, you would rather maintain your, um, kind of identity as a female and 
present yourself as a woman and that seems easier for you than going down a different […] different 
path? 
jojo: Yeah, I'd rather not kind of challenge, you know, social stereotypes, I'd rather, where I come 
from in [jojo’s hometown] saying I am this [not binary gendered] everyone would be like ‘what!', 
my children would get bullied.  I can't do that, I'd love to be able to shave my hair and whatever, 
but I can't, I can't do that. 
[emphasis in speech] 
 
Here, jojo discusses how her class and her location are also a fundamental part of her not being able 
to shake free from some of the social stereotypes of being a woman. Through this, jojo alerts us to the 
notion of queer privilege. Though queer privilege is paradoxical sounding, it is an important point to 
consider. For many the term queer is synonymous with an ethical non-normativity as a political 
position against heterosexuality and its enshrinement in law and governance. Or, as Warner cited in 
Epstein (1991) describes it; queer is in ‘opposition to the normalising regime’. As jojo stated a certain 
identity does not make you morally unaccountable or a ‘good person’. To be able to enact queerness 
is at one and the same time a subjugated, and yet privileged, positionality. Donna Haraway’s (1988) 
discussion on the privilege partial perspectives critiques this notion when she writes:  
 
The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical reexamination, decoding, 
deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of 
critical inquiry. The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions. On the contrary, 
they are preferred because in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and 
interpretive core of all knowledge. They are knowledgeable of modes of denial through repression, 
forgetting, and disappearing acts-ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively.  
(p.11) 
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Innocence, for Haraway, is not only impossible but an attempt to de-politise oneself and to state an 
inculpable position whereby one does not replicate and reproduce certain modes of oppression. In 
jojo’s account she acknowledges the conflict between a desire to be, and to live, as an autistic person 
which for her means someone who isn’t beholden by gender stereotypes and the modes in which she 
must uphold her prior interpolations as a feminine heterosexual mother who doesn’t disrupt the 
coherence of her position in the social class. As jojo articulates it, her position as a woman comes 
directly from being seen as heterosexual: ‘I feel trapped in my circumstance now because I'm in a 
heterosexual relationship, I'm trapped to being a woman.’ Here jojo highlights the relational 
construction of gender through heterosexuality which in turn produces the category of woman. As 
Monique Wittig (1992) wrote: For what makes a woman is a specific social relation to a man […]’ (p.10). 
Moreover, what is clear in jojo’s case is a responsibility to her children to be a woman and a mother 
and her articulation she cannot be ‘overtly autistic’. This is not because being autistic would mean she 
could not be a good mother, but because of the stigma that would come from suddenly enacting a 
form of gender queerness which she believes would directly affect her children negatively.  
 
Elsewhere in our conversation jojo and I discussed the politics of location. jojo is from a small working 
class town in Northern England. As many other small towns in Northen England, it was once a thriving 
community and had industrial and clerical jobs for many. Now the area acts more as a commuter town 
for those who want cheaper rents and mortgages and who have employment in the surrounding bigger 
cities. Jobs in jojo’s town are few and poverty is high. jojo discussed this as a key restriction on how 
she could be a gendered subject. Despite a disidentification with her working-class positioning (jojo 
identified herself as working class, yet she constantly stated how she wasn’t working class like the 
‘others’ around her) she had to maintain certain modes of identification particularly through 
heterosexuality and hiding her autistic traits which she sees as not compatible with one another within 
her class positioning. Beverly Skeggs (1997) has written there is an ‘emotional politics of class’ and for 
working class women this is a politics of ‘disidentification, insecurity and unease’ (p.75). For jojo, this 
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unease makes her feel like an alien: ‘I feel like an alien in [jojo’s hometown]’. This bears similarities to 
the alien metaphor that is found commonly in discussions of autism: see, Ian Hacking’s (2009) article 
‘Humans, Aliens and Autism’, the autism online forum ‘Wrong Planet’ or Temple Grandin’s (1995) 
proclamation ‘I’m an anthropologist on Mars’, to name but a few. Here jojo suggest that her feelings 
of being alien-like do not come from being autistic but, rather, from an inability to be autistic.  
 
If jojo felt she could be ‘more herself’, as she states, then she would feel, in her words, more 
‘comfortable’ and yet she discusses that the possibility isn’t there because of her geographical location. 
In particular, its reproduction of certain forms of compulsory heterosexuality and correspondent 
femininity and motherhood which are only intelligible and valid through performed heteronormativity. 
Through her comments, jojo alerts us to a sense that as she understands it to be autistic is to be gender 
queer. For jojo the normative modes of being a woman cannot co-exist within autistic embodiment. 
As jojo sees more pressures on women to be normatively gendered then her solution would be to have 
been assigned male at birth. To be queer with less threat of violence or social ostracization can be class 
privilege. Or, to be more precise, it is a privilege for those whose social milieu prizes visible queerness 
as both a product of, and proof of, the tolerance of liberalism.  
 
Moreover, to be able to be queer is, for jojo, inherently linked to a social and political temporality 
where the ability to be queer as an autistic person is a privilege of younger people and especially those 
who are technologically engaged.  This emerged when we discussed younger people’s understanding 
of different gender and sexuality categories, especially in how people talk about their identities on 
social media platforms such as Twitter. The quotation cited below followed the discussion I noted 
earlier about young people’s gender expressions. Earlier jojo was dismissive toward young gender 
queer people, yet here she admits to jealousy:  
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[…] I totally respect young people, I think that's great that they can find a like-minded group and 
I think that's brilliant and so freeing and they're so open and I really respect that and I am a little 
bit, probably, jealous of that, ‘cos I missed out …  because I missed out on that.  
[jojo, 2018] 
 
Through jojo’s comments we can see that an autism diagnosis does not automatically enable certain 
discursive practices to be enacted, nor does it enable gender to be queered despite a desire to be less 
tied to certain gendered behaviours. However, a certain space is opened up for consideration, if not 
necessarily enactments of different modes of doing gender. As Sally stated: ‘[…] I also think there's 
something that nobody's quite managed to articulate about, um, autism giving you the freedom to be 
that [queer]. Or, of autistic people being more predisposed or more open to ideas about that […].’ 
Jordynn Jack (2012) writes: ‘[a]utobiographies, blogs and internet posts show how autistic individuals 
view gender as a copia, or a tool for inventing multiple possibilities through available sex/gender 
discourses’ (p.1). It is perhaps true that gender can be viewed or considered in its current potentialities. 
However, as jojo shows us, there are important intersections to consider if we want to translate this 
to everyday lived gendered experience. Moreover, jojo’s experience alerts us to the untimeliness of 
her experience. The worlds one can create and embody has expanded considerably for queer and 
gender queer people in the U.K, yet perhaps only if they are still young, with age comes added 
responsibility (motherhood, work expectations, for example) and as such, increased social stigma 
should one transgress boundaries as jojo discusses. Furthermore, it is important to remember the 
medium of the internet is incredibly important for autistic people and autistic queer people, but it does 
not mean that these radical positionalities can necessarily be lived offline.  
 
What became clear to me during the process of interviewing, transcribing and analysing the data which 
has gone into this thesis is the sense that a bigger thing is at stake than simply finding and diagnosing 
AFAB autistic people. If we stop here, we are simply saying: ‘you are autistic, now you know your truth’. 
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This is especially unhelpful when secondary support services are not available for many. The diagnosis 
did actually enable some participants to enact and realise autism – of course within the discourses of 
autism and what is known and knowable, but it was not a straightforward path which ended in 
liberation because autism is always entangled with other aspects of their identities. The participants 
continue to become autistic by enacting various behaviours and eclipsing others.  We need to think 
about the ways that not only the diagnosis of autism has its own regulatory regimes but that being 
told one is autistic does not enable one to escape the regulatory regimes inscribed upon them from 
their prior interpolations.  
 
6.7 In conclusion  
This chapter began by ascertaining what the participants understood autism to be prior to their 
diagnosis. It was apparent that many of the participants could not recognise themselves as autistic 
through the dominant discourse, as they described understanding autism as being attached to cultural 
and social ideas of masculinity and maleness. However, through extensive self-motivated research into 
the discursive knowledge of autism, combined within monitoring and mapping their own traits and 
difficulties allowed several of the participants to see autism as potential diagnosis.  Some of the 
participants sought a diagnosis to explain their un/known difference that was discussed in the first 
analysis chapter.  
 
A sense that a diagnosis would enable certain possibilities and freedoms to be enacted emerged. Aime 
and Sarah suggested that the diagnosis would allow them the possibility to complete education. 
Hannah and Sally suggested that a diagnosis enabled them to begin to behave in more overtly autistic 
ways. Sally also suggested that the diagnosis allowed her to ‘put to bed any of the ideas that I was crap 
at being a girl’. For all the participants, the diagnosis did act as a ‘stamp of legitimacy’ of their perceived 
difference, to borrow Hannah’s phrase. Or, as Sally stated the diagnosis affirmed her difference as 
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positive: ‘yay! I’m official’.  The diagnosis, for many participants, acted as a legitimation of difference 
but certain disidentifications with the deficit driven, or pathologically defined, understandings of 
autism were also apparent. The participants presented alternative ways of understanding what autism 
is, which were distinct from how autism is typically understood. Such as Sally who argued that her 
creativity and artistic interests were never included in autism definitions. Despite the participants 
pushing the boundaries of what autism is, and how one is able to be autistic, the path to liberation 
from neurotypical norms was not straightforward and was perhaps not even fully possible. The prior 
interpolations which constructed the participants subjectivities continued to restrict their path to 
becoming autistic.   
 
Despite their never being an explicit mention of sex differences and the brain, or an engagement with 
the more polemic discussions around the extreme male brain, there was always a persistent 
undercurrent that the autism that is already in existence does not fully name the condition that the 
participants of this study experience. And, whilst they might enact certain forms of being autistic 
(flapping, modified ways of being social, for example) they challenged the sense that being autistic is 
an ontological entity which is indivdualised and medicalised and that one simply owns, or that which 
makes up the knowable body, or that which makes the body knowable. As Bruno Latour (2001) has 
stated ‘one is not obliged to define an essence, a substance (what the body is in nature), but rather an 
interface that becomes more and more describable when it learns to be affected by many more 
elements’ (p.2, italics in original). For the participants of this study the diagnosis enabled the body to 
be more readily described. Yet, autism cannot describe the entirety of the participants experience 
(p.2). In short, an autism diagnosis does not give access to an essence or a truth of the subject.  
 
 The contexts in which one could be autistic are restricted by other normative modes of being, such as 
gender and class. I would like to have added race to this but that will be saved for another project. 
Consequently, it is clear from the participants here that autism does not simply emerge in the 
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clinician’s room nor was it always ‘known’ by the participants but that it is an emergent way of being 
that is temporally and spatially contingent on all the intersections mentioned in this chapter. Perhaps, 
the key problem articulated by the participants cited above is a disconnection between what is 
presumed to be the medical understanding of autism (pathological, always, already defined and a 
negative difference) and the modes in which some of the autistic people in this study seemingly 
understand their autism (processual, non-pathological and positive difference).   
 
To return back to the Foucauldian analysis, we can see how the participants of this project disrupt the 
notion of a universal autistic subject and consequently in doing so, refute the idea a unified essence of 
subjectivity. Rather, we see how autistic subjectivities are constructed within a framework of what is 
knowable and what can be done with the body and its desires, whether that is through the regulatory 
regimes of autism or of gender. Despite the restrictions which are placed upon the participants of the 
study (femininity, heterosexuality, neurotypicality, for example), they have opened a space for us to 
consider that autism is not solely something one is, but it is something one does and consequently it 














Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter concludes the thesis. This chapter begins by revisiting the context which facilitated and 
motivated the project from its inception to its completion. The research objectives and questions will 
also be revisited. I will summarise the various narratives that were co-constructed through the 
interviews I held with the participants and the narratives I developed through the data analysis. I will 
then discuss how this research aids to the sociology of gender and autism. This chapter will close with 
a brief discussion of how this particular intervention into autism research can be mobilised in further 
projects and empirical work.  
 
7.2 Revisiting the research context and the research objectives  
This thesis was an explorative empirical study into how people assigned female at birth understand, 
talk about and produce their gender identities through the discourse of autism. The thesis took as its 
starting point the ways that gender has been a focus point in much research into autism. From the 
disparity in gender diagnosis rates, to the ‘extreme male brain’ theory, to the idea that autism people 
do not have a strong sense of gender identity, I have argued that autism, as a diagnostic category, a 
neurobiological condition and a socio-cultural phenomenon  has come to constitute a form of gender 
trouble (Gould and Ashton-Smith, 2011, Baron-Cohen, 1997, Baron-Cohen, 2014, Baron-Cohen, 2018, 
Jack, 2012, Davison and Tamas, 2016). In particular, this thesis has explored if autism’s connection to, 
what I have called, ‘pathological masculinity’ impacts how people assigned female at birth understand 
their gender identity when diagnosed in adulthood. The diagnosis was tentatively positioned as a 
discursive event and I examined whether the diagnosis of autism functioned as a regulatory gendered 
regime. I posed two foundational questions to guide this thesis:  
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1) Does the diagnostic category of autism act as a discursive event and a gendered technology of 
power for late diagnosed autistic people?  
2) How do autistic people assigned female at birth produce a sense of the autistic self through 
the existing discourses of autism?  
 
To answer these questions eight participants took part in this study. All the participants were assigned 
female at birth and had received their diagnosis from the NHS at age eighteen or over. I have argued 
that recent research into autism and gender is rarely conducted using qualitative methods and it is 
rarely conducted with autistic adults. Furthermore, the research in existence does not often think of 
the diagnosis as an event that brings into being discursive practices and one that is potentially 
productive of new ontologies, or understandings, of the self. In particular, to my knowledge no 
research has asked what the a priori gendered discursive formation of autism does to individual’s sense 
of, and production of, gender when one is diagnosed in adulthood. Thus, this thesis stepped into this 
gap and asked the question; what does autism do to gender?  
 
7.3 Summarising the narratives 
When I began thinking about this research all the way back in my Master’s degree, I had considered 
that autism’s entanglement with gender, specifically essentialised maleness, would impact on late 
diagnosed autistic people who were assigned female at birth. Considering the ontological status that 
autism has, through it being considered as a neurological condition and one which is not acquired 
which forms the entirety of experience and is life-long, I posed the following question: does the 
neurological aetiology of autism entangled as it is with ideas of masculinity and normative gender 
ideals come to bear on how autistic people think and produce their gender identities? I wondered if 
AFAB individuals had to reconcile the notion that autism is neurologically and discursively connected 
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to masculinity and even essential maleness and, whether this promoted a new consideration of the 
gendered self through the new gendered regime of autism. I hypothesised that the diagnosis would 
act as a discursive event and would interpolate the participants into a new gendered regime which 
would in turn be enacted through discursive practices which make autism legible. To put this in a 
simpler way, I had considered that the essential masculinity which frames autism may be enacted by 
those who receive a diagnosis in order to legitimise their autism to themselves and to others. I initially 
hypothesised that the gender norms which produce autism as a ‘pathology of gender’, to borrow Gillis-
Buck and Richardson’s (2014) phrasing, would impact somewhat negatively on the participants of the 
study. I considered that the diagnosis would interpolate the participants into a new restrictive 
gendered regime and that a diagnosis would potentially lead to a crisis of gender.  
 
I wanted to understand how people become autistic within a network of relationality which 
encompasses scientific discourses, lay understandings, and popular cultural discourse about autism. 
Whilst I began this research feeling a certain level of feminist anger towards the essentialist claims of 
sex/gender that were being foregrounded in certain areas of autism research, throughout this project 
I came to think with ideas of entanglement and ambiguity rather than through polemics or the search 
for an alternative origin story (Fitzgerald, 2017, Wilson, 2015, Haraway, 2016). I realised that the 
interviews in relation to the bodies of knowledge I had amassed were too complex to offer a “new” 
autism narrative which could counter the essential sex/gender claims of certain sectors engagement 
in autism research. That is, countering the idea that AFAB people were being subjected to neural 
centric gendered ideals through the construction of a male brain being ‘transplanted’ into them at the 
point of diagnosis (Moreover, I found that, quite simply, people didn’t care about the idea of ‘the 
extreme male brain’. The participants didn’t see these discourses as interacting with their lives in any 
meaningful way and they barely played a part in any of the interviews). Consequently, during the thesis 
production process I widened the scope of my research hypothesis. Whilst the extreme male brain 
theory may be brushed off as inconsequential or as ‘bad science’, as my participant Aime had briefly 
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stated, there were still many ways that being diagnosed autistic allowed the participants of the study 
to (re)consider their gender identities. 
 
When I began speaking to the participants of this project, I realised that it was not necessarily the 
discourses of autism which provoked and produced a sense of gender trouble, but that gender trouble 
was, for several participants, a presence in their lives long before the diagnosis. Indeed, the diagnosis 
was in many ways framed as an anticipatory freedom from the restrictive gender norms which 
structure neurotypical sociality. Perhaps there is something about autism which means that autistic 
individuals are more critical and sensitive to the arbitrary connections of the signs and signifiers which 
order and make legible our gendered experience. This I can’t say with any evidence or full conviction, 
but what emerged through this research project is a sure sense that for some participants the gender 
trouble that is recognised within autism was often seen to be a positive legitimation to begin to 
(re)think and enact different modes of doing gender, and of being a gendered subject, once they 
received their diagnoses. During the interviews all the participants whom I spoke with in person or on 
Skype calls I felt a sense of relief when we came to discuss how they felt when they eventually received 
an autism diagnosis.  
 
For some participants, such as Esther, the diagnosis was able to make sense of a number of seemingly 
unconnected difficulties and differences. I didn’t write about this in the analysis chapters, but Esther 
told me that she had recognised herself as different from others from her first day of nursery school. 
Esther came home after her first day and asked her mother: ‘mum, am I disabled?’. From this very 
early sense of difference to the age of nineteen when she received her diagnosis Esther had never had 
a framework within which to understand her experiences which she had, from such an early age, 
understood to position her as different. For other participants, such as Sally, the diagnosis was 
connected to understanding why she had never felt like she was being true to herself, this was echoed 
by jojo who stated she was finally ‘being true to herself’. For Sally, jojo and Aime the diagnosis was 
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connected to their gender identity in numerous different ways. Sally felt it enabled her to understand 
herself as not being a ‘crap woman’, in her words, but as instead missing the social cues and lines along 
which sociality functions. For Aime, it enabled them to suggest a link between their queerness and 
their gender identity such as when they stated; ‘I am autistic in the same way as I am queer; it’s who I 
am’.  
 
It was not so evident that the diagnosis opened up the path to gendered liberation in such simple 
terms though. Although it was clear that the participants experienced a sense of relief upon receiving 
the diagnosis this was framed by ambiguity and conflict between enacting their autistic self and still 
feeling beholden to a neurotypical regime. For Hannah the diagnosis came to stand in as a freedom 
from the social norms; through stating her autistic difference she could legitimise not taking part in 
conversations and she felt as though she could ask for clarification when she didn’t understand 
something.  Sally felt an embodied freedom whereby she could flap and stim. This embodiment still 
needed to be read as autistic and as such must be within the framework of what makes autistic 
difference legible. This was mirrored by Esther who felt a confliction between wanting to be seen as 
autistic but to not look too autistic. Aime noted that they felt a pressure to be demonstrably autistic 
in order to fit into autistic culture. Thus, the diagnosis clearly has its own set of rules through which 
one is legible as autistic and it is not as simple as the diagnosis acting as a moment which opens up the 
ability for one to be ‘true to themselves’.  
 
Participants such as Aime and Sally utilised queer discourses to articulate this ambiguity, and the 
diagnosis functioned and was framed, in many ways, as a ‘coming out.’ Much as in Butler’s (1990) 
understanding of what it means to come out, the participants who used this framework noted the 
constant efforts that coming out as autistic demands. One cannot simply come out and be autistic even 
though they have received the ‘stamp of legitimacy’ from a medical team, to borrow Hannah’s 
phrasing. For the younger participants who attempted to build an autistic queer subjectivity this was 
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reliant upon community building and finding other queer people with whom to collectively build a 
sense of identity as a queer autistic person. I argue this acts as a (dis)identification with the autism 
diagnosis (Munoz, 1999). That is, being interpolated into a form of gender trouble enabled a 
legitimisation to further subvert and disrupt gender norms.  
 
As noted in the first analysis chapter, the majority of participants struggled with an un/known 
difference and attempts to manage this difference often became focussed on the sexed/gendered 
body. These particular difficulties have been little researched and, when it is the subject of research, 
it is often cited as being attributed to autistic sensory difficulties or to autistic specific restrictive and 
repetitive actions (Goldschmidt, 2019). These are often the arguments when autistic AFAB individuals 
with eating disorders are discussed (Baron-Cohen et al, 2013). I argued that this need for bodily control 
in autistic adolescents has not been considered as a feminist issue and nor has it been considered as 
produced by a gendered and neurotypical world which enforces normative gender presentation as a 
prerequisite for social inclusion, thus I argued that when considered in this framework,  gender trouble 
for undiagnosed autistic individuals might be found to be less symptomatic of autism but indicative of 
the foundational importance that gender has to subject formation. I find this to be somewhat a trite 
point but considering the almost absolute absence of this way of thinking about autism and gender I 
believe it necessary to highlight this.  
 
The participants who made use of the coming out metaphors furthered added to this idea, to come 
out as autistic is to break with the social order, the visual field and the ordering of bodies. To come out 
of autistic is a radical act for some, such as for Aime who clearly stated their autism and their queerness 
to be intimately entangled. It is not the case that all the participants felt this way about autism. Two 
participants, Esther and Sarah, never noted any considerations around gender, but they did note that 
this was not because they felt it to be an unquestioned identity, but because they had simply never 
considered it as an important identity category that shaped their experience. Esther noted that she 
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understood her gender in the same way as she considered her eye colour. As younger people, prior to 
diagnosis there was a sharp divide between the participants; those who considered their gender to be 
unstable and something they had to actively perform thus causing distress or, deep reflection, and 
those who also felt their gender was something superfluous to their sense of self but they did not feel 
that it caused them any distress.  What was common to the majority of participants was the notion 
that gender isn’t fixed. Whilst in many cases this notion preceded the autism diagnosis, I argue that 
the diagnosis was integral for many participants in (re)constructing their gendered identities. For some 
participants, such as Sally, the diagnosis enabled them to retrospectively consider their gender and to 
alleviate guilt that they were, in Sally’s words, simply a ‘crap woman’. For Esther, who maintained she 
had never considered gender, the diagnosis and its connection to gender prompted her to actually 
realise that gender is something that other people think about, something she said she had never 
considered prior. Thus, the autism diagnosis acted in many ways as a legitimation to begin to think 
about and sometimes create different ways of being gendered subjects.  
 
Whilst, as I have noted, for many of the participants the diagnosis of autism was positioned as 
potentially liberatory from the intensive gendered regimes that they felt they had to embody prior to 
diagnosis, this was not the case for all participants.  jojo was the participant who felt most strongly 
that she was still restricted by what her gender is supposed to look like and do. jojo was one of the 
oldest participants and she is also a mother. A sense of responsibility towards her children meant that 
she felt she could only embody a conventional cis gendered presentation. Importantly, jojo suggested 
that this gendered regime is as at odds with being autistic. jojo felt her children would be bullied if she 
gave up a traditional femininity in favour of something that would make her more comfortable in her 
autistic embodiment.  jojo wanted to take on a far more androgynous gender presentation than she 
felt she could do. Ultimately jojo stated that in an ‘ideal world’ she would have liked to have been 
‘born male’ because she felt they have more freedom. jojo also felt a pressure to be desirable to men 
despite having no sexual or romantic attraction to them. jojo showed most clearly that a diagnosis of 
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autism does not enable an autistic subjectivity to emerge. In fact, the diagnosis changed nothing for 
jojo in terms of her behaviours, and gendered presentation. jojo still felt trapped by her prior and 
ongoing interpolations as a heterosexual presenting mother.  
 
I want to end this research project by suggesting that it is an impossibility to fully realise a finished 
autistic subjectivity in an ontological sense. I want to argue from a radical position and suggest that 
the autistic individuals I interviewed are engaging with a project of alternative autistic world building. 
This is centred at the intersection between the body, identity, medicine and the social world. To return 
back to the Foucauldian analysis mentioned earlier, we can see how the participants of this project 
disrupt the notion of a universal autistic subject and consequently in doing so, refute the idea a unified 
essence of subjectivity. Rather, we see how autistic subjectivities are constructed within a framework 
of what is knowable and what can be done with the body and its desires through the regulatory and 
intersecting regimes of autism and gender. Despite the restrictions which are placed upon the 
participants of the study (femininity, heterosexuality, neurotypicality, for example), they have opened 
a space for us to consider that autism is not simply something one is, but it is something one does, it 
emerges differently in relation to other things and people.  
 
In order to enable people to become autistic we need to address autism as materialising in various 
interrelated openings and, simultaneously foreclosed in others. To put that in another way would be 
to state that we need more than an identity politics around autism. We need to understand that in 
order for autistic people to live comfortable, dignified lives then autism cannot simply be reduced into 
a pathological ontological (in the traditional understanding of the word) fact of the individual whereby 
they remain a ‘square peg in a round hole’ to quote Mary again. This is, of course, not to deny the 
challenges and distinct difficulties that people with autism face, but to also address the challenge of 
the difficulties of being different in a singular ‘world’. To return back to jojo’s comment from the 
previous chapter; ‘we need to make more space in the world’ which doesn’t have room for those who 
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don’t fit the mould. Rather than suggesting that those AFAB autistic people take on the mantel of 
autism as it is currently conceived as a form of affirmative identity building, as in the categorical; ‘I am 
autistic’,  I would like to push this even further and suggest that we need to begin to attune ourselves 
to the existence of multiple worlds,  where studying relationality and how certain ways of being can 
be enacted is key to understanding how we conceptualise and live ethically with difference. 
 
7.5 Contributions to the field of autism research and looking forward 
In this thesis I have approached the issue of gender trouble in autism.  Whilst there are a number of 
papers from psychology which focus on gender trouble in autism, there are very few from the social 
sciences and the humanities (Davidson and Tamas, 2016, Jack, 2012, Gillis-Buck and Richardson, 2014).  
It is difficult to see past a correlation sometimes to the wider world that has produced this correlation. 
The correlation being the over representation of autistic people who are gender queer, non-binary or 
trans and all the research prior that suggested that autism and gender were inextricably linked 
(Aspergers in Frith, 1991, Baron-Cohen, 2010). It seems to be the simple answer that autism is the 
cause of this. However, this individualises and depoliticises non normative gender as a product of a 
different neurology. Thus, non-normative gender can be policed and contained by attributing it as the 
product of an already non-normative neurology. This conclusion also occurs within certain social 
science and humanities approaches, such as Jack (2012) and Davidson and Tamas (2016). I did not want 
to take this as the answer and I wanted to understand how autistic people think about, create and 
produce their gender identities through the discourses which already attribute a certain gender 
trouble to autism. If we don’t situate gender as a societal and political issue and we focus solely on 
autistic people’s experiences then we can’t understand, or even improve, the gender conditions that 
produce all of our subjectivities, not simply autistic ones.  
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In this way I have thought with scholars of critical disability studies such as Dan Goodley, Margrit 
Shildrick, Katherine Runswick-Cole and Lennard Davies with the belief that centralising disability in 
research allows us to interrogate the complexities of human life.  At the same time, it doesn’t erase 
the experience of being disabled in a world that is governed by and for those who fit seamlessly within 
it. Critical disability studies is necessarily interdisciplinary as it traces and uncovers the political, social 
and cultural regimes which produce disability and ability, or as Goodley cites it; ‘dis/ability’.  I have 
attempted to keep autistic experiences at the forefront of this project, but I have also aimed to given 
equal weight to critiquing the normative and neurotypical world within which autistic people are 
encouraged to be a part of. This thesis has aimed to understand how people become autistic through 
these gendered discourses of autism.   I hope this thesis has shown that autism and autistic subjects 
do not live outside of, and distinct from, the governing rules that structure our gendered experience 
and our expectations of gendered subjects. 
 
Furthermore, I hope I have shown that the circular and causal understandings of gender and autism 
are not particularly useful for understanding how autistic people experience their gender. Moreover, 
I have argued that autism and gender have an emergent – or a co-constituent- relationship to one 
another. By examining the temporal and spatial moments where autism and gender emerge in their 
relationality to each other and to other things, people, discourses and institutions we have a unique 
vantage point on the ways that autism and gender are enacted and where they are restricted from 
fully becoming. This particular focus should be taken up to understand other intersections of autism, 
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Appendix II. Twitter recruitment 
 
These screenshots from my Twitter account document the tweets I put out at various stages of the 











Appendix III. Information sheet for participants 
 
This information sheet was given to all interested participants on the first email correspondence.  
  
How do People Assigned Female at Birth think about their Gendered Identities after a Diagnosis of 
Autism in Adulthood? 
Introduction  
I would like to speak to women and trans/non-binary identifying people who were assigned female at 
birth*26 and who have received a diagnosis of autism over the age of eighteen. You must have been 
diagnosed with what would have been called Asperger Syndrome or ‘High Functioning Autism’ prior 
to the change to Autistic Spectrum Condition. You must have been diagnosed in the United Kingdom 
and by services which are a part of the National Health Service.  
This research aims to understand how you think about your gender after receiving a diagnosis of 
autism in adulthood. I would like to know how you think about autism and what you understand about 
the diagnosis. Topics covered in the interview will relate to areas such as; what you understand about 
autism and how you feel about your diagnosis, how you came to receive a diagnosis, your memories 
of childhood before you received a diagnosis and whether you think about autism in relation to your 
gender identity. I am not interested in looking for causal links between autism and gender identity. I 
am interested in whether the construction of autism as a diagnostic category has shaped how you 
think about yourself as an autistic person and whether you think about gender in relation to this. This 
pays particular attention to how autism has historically been conceived of as a male condition and is 
tied to ideas of masculinity in popular culture and medicine alike.  
Why am I doing this project? 
 
26 This means the medical professionals said you were a girl when you were born but now you may identity as a 
man, a trans-man, non-binary, Agender, or you may identity as a woman.  
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I am a PhD student at the University of Leeds in the School of Sociology and Social Policy.  I am 
interested in how people assigned female at birth think about their gender after receiving a diagnosis 
of autism.  My research project is examining how the diagnosis of autism is attached to gendered ideas 
about men and women. There is emerging research which suggests that people assigned female at 
birth are missed from diagnosis because of their gender, but not many researchers are thinking about 
how the diagnosis impacts on your understanding of yourself and how you think about your gender. 
 I am a non-autistic researcher and I came to this research through working with autistic adults and 
realising that there was more work to be done with regards to gaining a full picture of how individuals 
experience the diagnosis of autism. Ultimately, I hope my research is part of a move towards autistic 
people assigned female at birth gaining timely and ongoing support with their varying support needs.  
What will you have to do if you agree to take part? 
You will fill out a short questionnaire with some initial information. This will be sent to you by email. 
We will have a discussion, either by email or phone, so we can work to make the interview as 
comfortable as possible for you.  
At present I am based outside of the U.K so our conversation will take place on Skype. This will be a 
voice call and I will not record images only audio. The conversation will be recorded with audio 
recording software and stored on a hard drive which will be kept separate from my laptop.   
How much of your time will participation involve? 
The questionnaire will take around ten minutes to complete.  
The interview will take one to two hours to complete, but it may be longer or shorter.  
You can end the interview at any time and for any reason.   
There will be no repercussions should you chose to end the interview, and any information or 
recordings I have will be destroyed.  
What are the advantages of taking part? 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits to taking part in this research there may be some long-term 
benefits. This might include having the chance to tell your story of how you think about and understand 
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yourself after receiving an autism diagnosis. In turn, this information could help change understandings 
of autism which could be beneficial to many people. 
What will happen to the information gathered in the interview? 
The research you take part in will form my thesis, but it will also be used for conference presentations 
and journal articles, this will enable alterative and emerging stories about autism to be heard by a 
wider audience. On completion of the thesis it will be uploaded to an online repository so other 
researchers in the area can benefit from the findings. 
The interview may be made available online in full for other researchers if you consent to this. 
Two years after the completion of my PhD thesis all of the information you have given me in interviews 
will be destroyed with the exception of what has been used in the thesis. You may request your 
interview and corresponding information to be removed from this project at any point until June 2020. 
All your information will be anonymised, and I will ask you choose a pseudonym which will be used at 
all times in reference to your interview. This includes discussions of our interview in my thesis, in 
conference papers and publications and in discussions with my supervisory team. 
What are the disadvantages? 
We may touch upon sensitive issues in the interview, this could be upsetting for you.  To alleviate this 
please be aware that you do not have to answer all the questions and you are free to leave the study 
at any time.  
We will talk about ways to make the interview as comfortable as possible based on your individual 
preferences. We will talk about your individual preferences prior to meeting. This can through email 
or a phone call to ensure that you are as happy as possible with the entire process of taking part in the 
project.  
Do you have to take part in the study? 
No. Even if you agree to take part in the research you are free to leave the study at any point, including 
during the interview itself.  
What happens now? 
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If you are still interested in taking part in this research, then please contact me on the email below to 
express an interest and we can begin to make arrangements for your participation in this project.  
 
Thank you for your interest! 






















Appendix IIII. Interview Schedule 
 
The interview schedule was used as a guide for the conversations with participants. I generally asked 
each question but the order which I asked differed in each interview. Some follow up questions were 
asked at points. The schedule was given to the participant before the interview so they could feel 
prepared. I verbally pointed out where we were on the schedule whenever I began a new section. I 
aimed to make the interview process as transparent and structured as possible.  
 
1.Opening questions and self-identification 
Opening warm up questions 
1) Preferred pronouns, gender identification, disability first/person first language? 
2) Can you tell me a bit about yourself? (What do you like to spend your time doing? do you 
work?) 
3) What identities would you ascribe to yourself?/ what words would you use to describe 
yourself? (for example, mother, friend, teacher, autistic, child, artist) 
4)  If you could be an idealised version of yourself what would that look like? (eg. successful in 
relationships/work, being a mother/parent, pursuing a creative talent) 
 
2.Reflections on life before diagnosis 
Home life, Education and Background 
1) Can you tell me a bit about your home life when you were a child? (eg. who did you live with? 
family dynamics, education, friendships?) 
2) How were your experiences of primary school and high school? Please elaborate.  
3) Did you feel like you ever struggled with particular things as a younger person?  (eg. mental 
health difficulties, friendships, romantic relationships) Please give examples here.  
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4) Did anyone pick up on things you were struggling with in school or in your home life and were 
you offered any support? Please give examples here.  
Life as an adult before diagnosis 
1) What did you do after high school? (eg. college, University, start a family)  
2) How did you find this transition? 
3) Did feel like you learnt to behave in certain ways in order to ‘get by’? Some people talk about 
masking autistic behaviours, did you do this and if so, can you give some examples of when 
you felt like you were ‘masking’ or performing learnt behaviours? Please elaborate here.  
 
Gender Identity 
1) Did you feel comfortable with your identity as girl, or being read as a girl? 
2) How do you understand gender and how do you think about your own gender? 
3) Can you think of a specific instance where your gender influenced events? (for example, 
gaining preferential treatment, being denied access to something, bullying on the basis of your 
gender?)  
Awareness of Autism 
1) Were you aware of autism before you received the diagnosis? (Did you know anyone who had 
it? TV/film representations?) 
2) What did you think about autism before you received your diagnosis? 
3. Reflections on the diagnostic process 
The diagnosis 
1) How did you come to receive an autism diagnosis? (eg. self-diagnosed, referred through 
another service, recommendation from friend or family member) 
2) Why did you want to seek out a diagnosis? What would have gaining one meant for you? 
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3) Can you tell me about the autism diagnostic process? (where did it take place, how long, when, 
how old were you?) 
4) How did you feel throughout this process? 
4. Post diagnosis 
Self-identification post diagnosis 
1) How did you feel about the diagnosis after you received it? 
2) Did the diagnosis of autism change any ways that you thought about yourself? 
3) What did it change? (Some autistic people have talked about a wanting to understand which 
parts were ‘them’ and which were autism, did you feel like this?) 
4) Did you consider the neurological underpinning of autism in any way? 
5) Do you ever think about how autism is positioned as an extreme form of masculinity and do 
you have any opinions on this? Please elaborate here.  
6) Do you understand autism as a disability? Would you consider yourself a disabled person 
because you are autistic? 
7) When did you start referring to, or thinking about, yourself as an autistic person? 
Relations with others post diagnosis 
1) Did you share your diagnosis with anyone? (friends, family, employees, educators?) 
2) Did you feel interactions between you and the people around you changed in any way as a 
result of the diagnosis? 
3) Did you ask friends or family whether they believed you to be autistic prior to the diagnosis? 
Did you ask for specific examples which could be signs of you being autistic? 
4) Do you feel like you have to look/act a certain way for others to see you as autistic or believe 
you are autistic? 
How do you experience being an autistic person? 
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1) Could you talk me through some of the ways that your experience yourself as autistic? For 
example, do you have difficulties communicating? do you stim? Have any tics or echolalia? 
What form does this take?   
2) Do you have sensory issues and what forms do these take? (eg. aversion to certain clothing 
or bodily sensations, tastes, sounds) 
3) Have you ever struggled, or do you currently struggle with any aspects of the social roles 
expected of being read as female? (for example, connecting with other women, making and 
maintaining romantic relationships, being a mother?) please elaborate here.  
4) Have you ever, or do you currently struggle with, some of the ways women’s bodies are 
‘supposed’ to act or look? (for example, maintaining a slim and feminine body, being 
confident in how you move, walk and position yourself in different spaces?) Can you give an 
example?  
5) Have you ever felt, or been made to feel, like an inferior or failing woman because of some 
difficulties you have that are related to being autistic? Please give an example.  
Gendered identity 
1) Did you find your autism diagnosis allowed you to rethink your gendered identity or to better 
understand it? 
2) In which ways? (i.e., did it give you the freedom to not perform a certain identity because you 
have autism? Did it legitimate your gendered identity in some way?) 
3) What ways do you see other people around you with autism thinking about their genders? 
4) Do you think the diagnosis of autism impacts on how others think about your gender and/or 
sexual orientation?  
5) Are there any other factors that you think impacts on your experience as an autistic person? 
(eg. Class, ethnicity, age, nationality)  
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6) Do you see any connections between autism and your gender identity and/or your sexuality? 
Are you aware of any ways that others discuss connections between autism and gender 
identity and/or sexuality? 
Understandings of autism post diagnosis 
1) How do you understand autism now? 
2) What did you use to understand autism?  Did you read autobiographies, use forums online, 
watch T.V shows or read medical literature? 
3) Which representations did you agree with (see yourself in) and which did you not agree with? 
Engagement with autistic communities 
1) Do you talk to others who are autistic? What platforms do you use to do this? (ie, do you use 
Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, specialist internet forums? 
2) Do you think that your relationships with others with autism has allowed you to think about 
your identity in different ways? 
3) Do you see people discussing their genders in relation to autism (online or offline)? 
Reflections on childhood post diagnosis 
1) How do you feel about receiving a diagnosis of autism as an adult? 
2) Did you reconsider your childhood through your autism diagnosis, and did it bring up any 
confusing thoughts or, any enlightening thoughts about the person you are now?  
(i.e., has it allowed you to think back on past events and explain them through the autism 
diagnosis? Or does it allow you to alleviate self-blame around issues like childhood bulling or 
abuse if these were an issue for you?)  
Conclusion 
1) Is there anything you would like to add here? Anything you think is important that I have 
missed? 
2) How did you find these questions to answer? 
